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“BECAUSE IT IS WRONG”: AN ESSAY ON THE
IMMORALITY AND ILLEGALITY OF THE ONLINE
SERVICE CONTRACTS OF GOOGLE AND FACEBOOK*
Preston M. Torbert†

This essay argues that the behavioral-advertising business model under which an
internet platform, such as Google or Facebook, provides free services in exchange
for the user’s personal data is immoral and illegal. It is immoral because it relies
on addiction, surveillance, and manipulation of the user to deplete the user’s
autonomy. The contract between the company and the user is immoral. It can also
be plausibly argued that the contract is illegal under California law because it is
contrary to good morals, is unconscionable, and is against public policy. As society
becomes more aware of these moral and legal defects, courts in the future should
be more willing to find these contracts illegal and thus void. In such case, the user’s
consent to the contract would be nullified and the company would have no legal
right to gather and monetize the personal data of the user. The companies should
then be forced to convert to a subscription model with a fiduciary duty to users to
restrict the gathering and monetizing of personal data. This essay employs
perspectives not only from morality and law, but also from philosophy, history,
political theory, and neuroscience. Part One covers morality, Part Two legality.
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“Because It Is Wrong”: Immorality and Illegality of Online Service Contracts
PART ONE: MORALITY
I.

INTRODUCTION

Many internet service companies have a business model that relies on
advertising. A user enters into a contract with the company by accessing the
appropriate web page and clicking on the consent button to confirm that the user
agrees to the company’s Terms of Service. A contract between the user and the
company is established.1 Under the contract, the user consents to the company’s
collection, aggregation, and handling of the user’s personal data and the company
sells the attention 2 of the user to advertisers, political parties, and others.
Essentially, the user barters his or her personal information in exchange for free use
of the service. Under this model, the users are not the company’s customers, the
advertisers are. 3 This has become the predominant business model for internet
service companies.
This business model has attracted criticism. Some say that the model will
inevitably be misused; that it is harmful to the health of the public sphere and
politics; that under it crucial decisions are made unilaterally, without recourse, and
1

The validity of the clickwrap license was first recognized in California in the case Hotmail Corp.
v. Van$ Money Pie, Inc., No. C-98 JW PVT ENE, C 98-20064 JW 1998 WL388389 (N.D. Cal.
1998). For a discussion on clickwrap licenses see generally Nathan J. Davis, Presumed Assent:
The Judicial Acceptance of Clickwrap, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 578, 579-81 (2007). See also, E.
ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 4.26 (2004). More recently, courts have
been moving away from the idea that a click on an icon is the same as a signature on a page. See
Nancy S. Kim, Online Contracting: New Developments, 72 BUS. LAWYER 243, 244 (Winter 20162017). Professor Robin B. Kar and Margaret Jane Radin have proposed that certain terms, such as
an arbitration clause, should be precluded from legal effect because they are not part of the
“shared meaning” of the parties. Robin B. Kar & Margaret Jane Radin, Pseudo-Contract & Shared
Meaning Analysis, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1135 (2019). The Google and Facebook user contracts do
not provide for arbitration and the courts have so far assumed the contracts are properly formed
and inclusive. For example, see In re Facebook, Inc. Consumer Privacy User Profile Litigation,
MDL 2843, Case No. 18-md-02843-VC, Pretrial Order No. 20: Granting in Part and Denying in
Part Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint, at 38 (“the contract between Facebook and its
users does not merely consist of the SRR [Statement of Rights and Responsibilities], . . . . It also
includes the Data Use Policy”). If a contract were not formed, Google or Facebook could be liable
under the doctrine of promissory estoppel. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90; see
also E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 4.26 (2004).
2
Some have said that Facebook “sells your data.” Mark Zuckerberg has denied this. “[W]e
[Facebook] don’t sell people’s data . . .” Mark Zuckerberg, The Facts About Facebook, WALL ST.
J., Jan. 25, 2019, at A15. But see ANTONIO GARCIA MARTINEZ, CHAOS MONKEYS: OBSCENE
FORTUNE AND RANDOM FAILURE IN SILICON VALLEY 328-29 (2018) (asserting that Facebook
does “buy” your data). See also note 194 infra.
3
A popular digital-age axiom is that “if you’re not paying for the product, you are the product.”
JACOB SILVERMAN, TERMS OF SERVICE 254 (2015).
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without accountability; 4 that it leads the companies to consciously addict their
users;5 that it is at cross-purposes with healthy technology usage;6 that it involves
surveillance marketing;7 and that it involves mass behavior modification.8 But it
seems that no commentator has overtly criticized the morality of this business
model and questioned the validity of the contracts that underly it.9 Many critics
have suggested legislative or administrative solutions to the problems noted above,
but no one seems to have suggested a judicial solution through the interpretation of
contract law. That is what this article does for the contracts of the two giants of
internet advertising, Google and Facebook.10
These two companies were chosen for two reasons: (1) they developed the
current model of behavioral advertising, take in over half of all worldwide digital
advertising, and earn the overwhelming percentage of their revenues from
advertising (about 90% for Google, 95% for Facebook); 11 (2) they are very
powerful. According to Marc Rotenberg, Executive Director of the Electronic
Privacy Information Center, “[i]t’s difficult to imagine a more complete hegemony.
Google and Facebook control eight of the top 10 internet services . . . They are
among the five largest corporations in the world. They face no competition. And
their power came about through the unregulated collection and use of personal
data.” 12 It has been said that they have reengineered the internet into vast
Zeynep Tufekci, Facebook’s Surveillance Machine, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/19/opinion/facebook-cambridge-analytica.html.
5
Roger McNamee, Foreword in VIVEK WADHWA & ALEX SALKEVER, YOUR HAPPINESS WAS
HACKED vi (2018).
6
Id. at 161.
7
See JONATHAN TAPLIN, MOVE FAST AND BREAK THINGS 144 (2017).
8
See JARON LANIER, TEN ARGUMENTS FOR DELETING YOUR SOCIAL MEDIA ACCOUNTS RIGHT
NOW 10, 26 (2018).
9
WOODROW HARTZOG, PRIVACY’S BLUEPRINT: THE BATTLE TO CONTROL THE DESIGN OF NEW
TECHNOLOGIES 172 (2018) (suggesting that the extension of the contract doctrine of
unconscionability represents an opportunity for users of online agreements to regain at least some
autonomy over the flow of personal information).
10
This essay refers to “Google” and “Facebook” generically to include all companies owned by
Alphabet, Inc. and Facebook, Inc.
11
MARTIN MOORE, DEMOCRACY HACKED: POLITICAL TURMOIL AND INFORMATION WARFARE IN
THE DIGITAL AGE 140-41 (2018). Cf. KEN AULETTA, FRENEMIES: THE EPIC DISRUPTION OF THE
AD BUSINESS (AND EVERYTHING ELSE) 23 (2018) (giving a slightly different revenue figure for
Google (87%)). Google’s revenue of $135 billion from advertising is almost double Facebook’s.
Laura Forman, From Google: What You Didn’t Know to Look For, WALL ST. J., May 18-19, 2019,
at B16.
12
Marc Rotenberg, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2018, at A21 (emphasis added). A
further demonstration of Google’s power is the fact that it has seven services that each have 1
billion users. Xavier Harding, Google Has 7 Products With 1 Billion Users, POPULAR SCIENCE
4
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preference manipulation platforms13 on which “Google defines what we think” and
“Facebook defines who we are.”14
II.

MARKETS AND MORALS

What are the moral limits of the market in a liberal democracy? Do we want
market forces to spread into the most “intimate spheres of life”?15 These are the
fundamental moral questions behind the behavioral-advertising business model.
Unfortunately, they have not been raised or publicly debated since the creation of
these digital platforms. In the legal field, the immediate reason for this silence may
be “market imperialism,”16 the triumph in the law schools during the last fifty years
of market reasoning17 and its role as the predominant analytical tool. This market
view of life also lies at the heart of computer-centered technology and culture;
internet boosters often speak in the language of economics. 18 The major
presumption of market reasoning certainly is not without justification: that people
in their market roles express important motivations and attitudes and even some
fundamental truths of human nature.19 But it has been extended to the supposition
that in all spheres of life, human behavior can be explained by assuming that people
decide how to act by weighing the costs and benefits of the choices before them
and choosing the one that will give them the greatest welfare or utility. 20 This
extension is the concept of “universal commodification.”21 This presumption and
(Feb. 1, 2016), https://www.popsci.com/google-has-7-products-with-1-billion-users/. Washington
and Lee Law Professor Joshua A. T. Fairfield has written, “[t]o exaggerate only slightly: the most
important social contract of the twenty-first century is not the U. S. Constitution, it is the
Facebook Terms of Service.” JOSHUA A. T. FAIRFIELD, OWNED: PROPERTY, PRIVACY AND THE
NEW DIGITAL SERFDOM 43 (2017).
13
YOCHAI BENKLER, ROBERT FARIS & HAL ROBERTS, NETWORK PROPAGANDA 345(2018).
14
GEORGE DYSON, TURING’S CATHEDRAL: THE ORGINS OF THE DIGITAL UNIVERSE 308 (2012).
15
See NICHOLAS CARR, UTPOPIA IS CREEPY AND OTHER PROVOCATIONS 85 (2016); see also
STEPHEN A. MARGLIN, THE DISMAL SCIENCE: HOW THINKING LIKE AN ECONOMIST UNDERMINES
COMMUNITY 1-2, 71, 255 (2008) (suggesting that a concern for community should limit the
application of market principles and has pointed to the Amish as an example).
16
MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE 120 (1983).
17
Jon D. Hansen & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630,
640 (1999).
18
LEE SPIEGEL, AGAINST THE MACHINE 31 (2008).
19
ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 219 (1995).
20
MICHAEL J. SANDEL, WHAT MONEY CAN’T BUY: THE MORAL LIMITS OF MARKETS 48 (2012).
21
Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1901 (1987). Political
Science Professor C. B. MacPherson of the University of Toronto suggested that universal
commodification is inherent in Locke’s philosophy. He has suggested that if you accept Locke’s
premise that a man is human only as sole proprietor of himself only in so far as he is free from all
but market relations, “you must convert all moral values into market values.” C.B. MACPHERSON,
THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM: HOBBES TO LOCKE 266 (1962).
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supposition, however, avoid the fundamental question: does it make sense at all to
use market norms to govern our conduct regarding a particular good?22
This is essentially a moral question, but both the market23 and technology24
lack a moral basis, so they turn every question into an analysis of costs and
benefits—the greatest welfare or utility. 25 Market imperialism and technology
empty public life of moral argument, and any attempts at moral thinking tend to
devolve into utilitarian analyses of the costs and benefits of probable scenarios.26
The scholar who seems to have thought about this issue most deeply, Professor
Margaret Jane Radin of the University of Michigan Law School, believes that the
characteristic rhetoric of economic analysis, when it is put forward as the sole
discourse of human life, is “morally wrong.” 27 In fact, freedom and autonomy
require that certain goods be outside market relations. Michael Walzer of the
Institute for Advanced Study has made the most extensive list of dealings outside
market relations.28 They include the purchase and sale of human beings; political
power and influence; criminal justice; freedom of speech, press, religion, and
assembly; marriage and procreation rights; etc.29 He also includes simony, bribery,

22

ANDERSON, supra note 19, at 219. Professor Anderson has suggested that the proper limits of
the market can be partly defined by asking two questions: (1) do market norms do a better job of
embodying the ways we properly value a particular good than norms of other spheres; and (2) do
market norms, when they govern the circulation of a particular good, undermine important ideals
such as freedom, autonomy, and equality, or important interests legitimately protected by the
state? Id. at 143-44.
23
See FRED HIRSCH, SOCIAL LIMITS TO GROWTH 117-18,143, 157 (1976); see also CHARLES
FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 109 (1978) (noting that market thinking fails to see the need for a
moral foundation for choice).
24
NEIL POSTMAN, TECHNOPOLY: THE SURRENDER OF CULTURE TO TECHNOLOGY 79 (1973) (“the
Technopoly story is without a moral center”).
25
For a discussion of the economics of a cost-benefit analysis, see e.g., Will Kenton, Cost-Benefit
Analysis, INVESTOPEDIA (July 7, 2020), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/costbenefitanalysis.asp#:~:text=A%20cost%2Dbenefit%20analysis%20(CBA,decision%20to%20purs
ue%20a%20project.
26
SANDEL, supra note 20, at 5, 6, 14; see SHEILA JASANOFF, THE ETHICS OF INVENTION:
TECHNOLOGY AND THE HUMAN FUTURE 253 (2016).
27
Radin, supra note 21, at 1851. In a similar vein, Stanford University Philosophy Professor
Debra Satz believes that some markets are “noxious,” and that their use should be blocked and,
further, that they can “even undermine the conditions for a democratic society.” DEBRA SATZ,
WHY SOME THINGS SHOULD NOT BE FOR SALE: THE MORAL LIMITS OF MARKETS 94-96, 208
(2011). Columbia University Law Professor Bernard Harcourt in describing systems analysis has
said, “[a]nd all that was necessary—that is, necessary to avoid talking about morality, was a lot of
information and good statistical analyses.” BERNARD D. HARCOURT, EXPOSED: DESIRE AND
DISOBEDIENCE AND THE DIGITAL AGE 155 (2015).
28
See WALZER, supra note 16.
29
Id. at 100-03.
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and prostitution.30 Even this extensive list may not be complete. It does not seem
to include judges selling their decisions to the highest bidder or the enforcement of
unconscionable contracts. To acknowledge that the market has limits is to recognize
that it has a proper role in analyzing human life. The challenge is to reap the
advantages of the market while confining its analysis to those areas suited to it.31
Market imperialism has not only expanded market thinking to all areas of
human experience, it has also necessarily resulted in precluding discussion of moral
issues. The British historian Tony Judt has explained that since the 1970s,
“[i]ntellectuals don’t ask if something is right or wrong, but whether it is efficient
or inefficient. They don’t ask if a measure is good or bad, but whether or not it
improves productivity.”32 The insightful internet critic Evgeny Morozov reached a
similar conclusion about the last few decades. He believes that one of the greatest
misconceptions of this period has been “the idea that technology ought not to
intrude on questions of morality . . . [m]orality here, technology there: the two shall
never overlap.”33 The veneration of technology has also precluded the discussion
of moral issues because it presumes that technical innovation has only positive
effects.34
But this preclusion of moral analysis ultimately undermines the moral
legitimacy of the market economy. It is generally recognized that a market
economy, even in its purest form, requires some restrictions on self-interest to
prevent theft, fraud, and contracts contrary to the public interest, as well as the
30

Id. at 9.
ANDERSON, supra note 19, at 166-67.
32
TONY JUDT & TIMOTHY SNYDER, THINKING THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 361 (2012). Some have
questioned whether new technology is now increasing productivity: “[t]he more tech we get, the
less productive we are.” WADHWA & SALKEVER, supra note 5, at 90; see also MICHAEL J.
SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 196 (2d ed. 1998) (implying that a disregard of
moral issues is attributable to liberal democracy. “Political liberalism insists on bracketing our
comprehensive moral and religious ideals for political purposes ….”); see also MICHAEL J.
SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 323 (1996).
“A political agenda lacking substantive moral discourse is one symptom of the public philosophy
of the procedural republic.” MICHAEL J. SANDEL, PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY: ESSAYS ON MORALITY IN
POLITICS 28 (2005).
33
EVGENY MOROZOV, TO SAVE EVERYTHING, CLICK HERE: THE FOLLY OF TECHNOLOGICAL
SOLUTIONISM 323 (2013).
34
Id. at 167. As Siva Vaidhynathan, Professor of Media Studies at the University of Virginia, has
observed, “[i]nnovation lacks a normative claim of significant betterment . . . . The ultimate goal
of innovation seems to be more innovation.” SIVA VAIDYANATHAN, ANTI-SOCIAL MEDIA: HOW
FACEBOOK DISCONNECTS US AND UNDERMINES DEMOCRACY 205 (2018). Nicholas Carr has
suggested that a utopian view of technology also encourages people to “switch off their critical
faculties and give Silicon Valley . . . free reign to remaking culture to fit their commercial
interests.” ROUGH TYPE (Sept. 12, 2017). http://www.roughtype.com/.
31
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corruption of legislators and judges. Truth, trust, restraint, and obligation are social
virtues grounded in religious belief that play a central role in a market economy.
Such an economy requires morality to assure that the law is obeyed and those
aspects of life not covered by the law are governed by some rules. By trying to fill
the vacuum left by the decline of religion and the preclusion of morality, market
values weaken moral sanctions and sabotage their own legitimacy.35
Given that some activities are off limits to the market, might they include
the behavioral-advertising business model for internet services? We can attempt to
answer this question by using our common-sense moral intuitions and by allowing
our moral judgments to be guided as much as possible by the reasons that can be
given for opposing views.36 Although the digital behavioral-advertising business
model is in many respects unprecedented, analogies to familiar practices can be
helpful in evaluating it. Appeals to both moral common sense and analogy are
invoked below.
III.

ADVERTISING
A.

THEN AND NOW

In 1922, Herbert Hoover remarked about radio that “[i]t is inconceivable we
should allow so great a possibility for service, for news, for entertainment, for
education, and for vital commercial purposes to be drowned in advertising
chatter.”37 Later, at the dawn of the television age, the respected columnist Walter
Lippman observed that “while television is supposed to be ‘free,’ it has in fact
become the creature, the servant, and indeed the prostitute, of merchandizing.”38 In
1958, Vance Packard’s book The Hidden Persuaders referred to advertising firms
as “one of the most advanced laboratories in psychology” and quoted an adman’s
statement that psychology held great promise for understanding people and
“ultimately for controlling their behavior.”39 In the 1980s, some philosophers wrote
that persuasive advertising was immoral because it manipulated people and reduced
autonomy.40 Advertising, nevertheless, was adopted as the primary revenue stream
35

R. C. O. Mathews, Book Review, 87 THE ECON J. 576-77 (1977) (reviewing FRED HIRSCH,
SOCIAL LIMITS TO GROWTH (1976)); HIRSCH , supra note 23, at 141, 143: see also, AMARTYA
SEN, ON ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 22-25 (1987).
36
JAMES RACHELS, THE ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 11-12 (4th ed. 1986).
37
TIM WU, THE ATTENTION MERCHANTS 86 (2016).
38
Id. at 150.
39
Robert L. Arrington, Advertising and Behavior Control, 1 J. BUS. ETHICS 4 (1982)
40
See, e.g., Paul C. Santelli, The Informative and Persuasive Functions of Advertising: A Moral
Appraisal, 2 J. BUS. ETHICS 27-33 (1983); Roger Crisp, Persuasive Advertising, Autonomy, and
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for radio and television and later became the revenue model for internet services.41
Before the rise of Google, Silicon Valley viewed advertising with some disgust—
it was considered a core sin of the old media, especially television.42 The idealists
were adamant that information should not be monetized online.43
But, of course, ubiquitous radio and television services depended on
advertising. And this common use of advertising on radio and television suggested
that advertising on an internet service should be acceptable too. But the analogy of
internet services to free radio and television is misleading. There is a fundamental
difference between internet and other services: the nature and amount of personal
data disclosed by the user. Computers and digitization have profoundly changed
the personal data available to advertisers. 44 The data collected through internet
platforms have four distinguishing characteristics: the data is essentially permanent,
is easily transferable, is all-pervasive, and is gigantic. Market imperialism suggests
that these characteristics make the data a commodity and, indeed, a very marketable
one.
In considering the amounts of information on users, a better analogy than
radio and television might be mail and telephone service. As distinguished from
radio and television, consumers have used the mail service and telephone to
exchange large amounts of personal information. In this respect, they are similar to
Facebook’s services. But they are different in that customers have always paid a
fee for mail and telephone service and the service providers have always been
prohibited from using the personal information contained in the messages for
commercial purposes.45 Why has no one seriously suggested free mail or telephone
the Creation of Desire, 6 J. BUS. ETHICS 413-18 (1987); Tom L. Beauchamp, Manipulative
Advertising, 3 BUS. & PRO. ETHICS 1-22 (1984).
41
LANIER, supra note 8, at 97.
42
JARON LANIER, YOU ARE NOT A GADGET: A MANIFESTO 82 (2010).
43
JARON LANIER, WHO OWNS THE FUTURE? 207 (2013).
44
Jeroen van de Hoven et al., Privacy and Information Technology, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHIL. (revised October 30, 2019) https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/it-privacy/#PerDat (discussing
the history and advances of digital privacy and the implications of technology).
45
As to mail, Justice Stevens stated in his dissent in United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 626
(1977) that “throughout our history Congress has respected the individual’s interest in private
communication. The notion that private letters could be opened and inspected without notice to the
sender or the addressee is abhorrent to the tradition of privacy and freedom to communicate
protected by the Bill of Rights.” See also ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877) (asserting that
letters and sealed packages subject to letter postage are fully guarded from examination and
inspection, except as to their outward form and weight). As for the telephone, eavesdropping for
commercial or private purposes has been legally prohibited starting with state statutes enacted as
early as 1862. The Crime Control Act of 1968 authorized electronic surveillance, but only subject
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service in exchange for the collection and use of the information contained in the
letters or the calls? An economist’s answer—and partially an accurate one
historically—would be that, before the computer, it was too costly to gather and
aggregate the information. But even today the answer is surely that most people
would feel uncomfortable with such an arrangement and, if they thought about it,
would consider it immoral. Perhaps the conclusion should be the same for internet
services.46 The case seems even stronger and the privacy and autonomy concerns
much greater for internet services because the providers collect vastly more
personal information.
These analogies point out two moral issues not applicable to advertising on
radio or television: privacy and autonomy. Essentially, the word “privacy” denotes
a “cluster” of problems.47 The specific privacy problem referred to here is the right
to control over information about oneself provided by oneself. This issue arises
because the user discloses personal information and then loses control over it. The
service provider sees the relationship solely in market terms and collects,
aggregates, and processes data in ways that violate the user’s expectation of
privacy. This creates a moral problem of depriving the user of privacy.
Privacy is closely linked to the second moral issue, autonomy. In fact,
privacy can be seen as a precondition for autonomy. The problem of autonomy
occurs at a later stage, as the service provider’s business develops after privacy has
been weakened. The service provider goes public (Google in 200448, Facebook in
201249) and needs to satisfy the demands of its shareholders and Wall Street for
larger profits. To support greater revenues in an advertising-based business model,
the service provider needs more users and more engagement to gather more data to
better target the advertisements. 50 Monetizing users’ private data to the greatest
extent becomes the goal.51 With enormous amounts of data obtained both from the
user’s activity on the site and outside sources, the service provider is able to
to strict judicial control. Electronic Eavesdropping, ENCYC. BRITTANICA ONLINE. See also Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967) (asserting that the protection of the Fourth Amendment
applies to an individual in a telephone booth).
46
The legal answer to this question is that the user has consented to the collection and use of the
personal information.
47
DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 172 (2008).
48
Jay Ritter, Google’s IPO, 10 Years Later, FORBES (Aug. 7, 2014),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jayritter/2014/08/07/googles-ipo-10-years-later/#ad157ff2e6ca.
49
Justin Walton, When Did Facebook Go Public, INVESTOPEDIA (June 9, 2020),
https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/111015/when-did-facebook-go-public.asp.
50
See generally Suketu Gandhi, Bharath Thota, Renata Kuchembuck & Joshua Swartz,
Demystifying Data Monetization, MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV., (Nov. 27, 2018),
https://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/demystifying-data-monetization/.
51
See id.
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manipulate the user and deprive the user of autonomy, shunting him or her in
directions that benefit it, not the user.52 This manipulation and loss of privacy and
autonomy are immoral. This is why advertising has been called the Internet’s
“original sin.”53
A full recounting of the history of Google and Facebook would reveal many
failures to fulfill commitments to users and to government authorities.54 This article
treats, however, only those moral failings that are the direct result of the
advertising-based business model and therefore does not cover many events in the
history of the two internet giants. It generally avoids discussion of privacy abuses
by the founders in the daily conduct of the business (e.g., Cambridge Analytica
scandal55) even if these actions were perhaps incentivized by the business model.
The focus of analysis is on the business model, not the individuals, even though the
founders held extreme corporate powers as noted below.
B.

THE ADVERTISING-BASED BUSINESS MODEL

The successful advertising-based business model was first developed by
Google and then adopted by Facebook. To consider the moral and legal issues in
this business model, we need to understand the history of these two companies. In
large part that is the history of the founders. The unusual multiple-class share
structure of these two companies gives the founders voting control over the
company’s management.56 The founders also served for many years in the most
important management roles. 57 Therefore, to an almost unprecedented extent in
Natasha Singer, Just Don’t Call It Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2018, at SR 4.
HARTZOG, supra note 9, at 78.
54
See infra pages 136-141; FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET
ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION 144-45 (2015); Gabriel J. X. Dance,
Miguel LaForgia & Nicholas Confessore, Facebook Offered Users Privacy Wall, Then Let Tech
Giants Around It, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2018, at A1;
Daisuke Wakabayashi, Google Plus Shutting Down After User Data Was Exposed, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 9, 2018, at B3; Cecilia Kang, F.T.C. Is Said to Consider Hefty Fines for
Facebook, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2019, at B1.
55
Nicholas Confessore, Cambridge Analytica and Facebook: The Scandal and the Fallout so Far,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/04/us/politics/cambridge-analyticascandal-fallout.html.
56
SHOSHANNA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM: THE FIGHT FOR A HUMAN
FUTURE AT THE NEW FRONTIER OF POWER 101-02 (2019).
57
Until recently, Sergey Brin was President of Alphabet, Inc, the holding company of Google, and
Larry Page was CEO (the chief operating decision maker) of Alphabet. Letter from Josh Paul, Dir.
of Acct., to SEC Staff (Dec. 15, 2017),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1652044/000165204417000048/filename1.htm [https://p
52
53
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major corporations, the views and conduct of the founders and owners of these two
companies influence the actions of the companies and, specifically, its business
model. In effect, Larry Page and Sergei Brin have been Google and Mark
Zuckerberg is Facebook. To an unusual degree, these individuals, not Wall Street
investors, are responsible for the corporate ethics of the two companies. 58
Facebook’s use of the advertising-based business model has attracted more
attention and Mark Zuckerberg is now at the center of a discussion about the moral
character of Silicon Valley and its leaders. 59 The discussion below emphasizes
Facebook, although it starts with Google, the pioneer in developing the advertisingbased business model. It suggests that we can understand how we arrived at our
current predicament only by understanding the history of the two companies.
IV.

THE HISTORY OF GOOGLE
A.

BEFORE ADVERTISING

Larry Page and Sergey Brin, two fellow Ph.D. students in the computer
sciences department at Stanford, incorporated Google in 1998 with a goal of
promoting an internet search engine.60 From the beginning, the company’s mission
was “[o]rganize the world’s information and make it universally accessible and
useful.”61 This was a grand, pretentious, but seemingly noble cause—and perhaps
all young men exhibit some degree of grandiosity. But Elias Aboujaoude, Director
of the Obsessive Compulsive Disorder Clinic at Stanford Medical School, has
described “grandiosity” as “an exaggerated belief in one’s importance and
erma.cc/P6U2-BY8B]. In December 2019, Brin and Page gave up their management positions.
Jack Nicas & Daisuke Wakabayashi, End of Era for Google as Founders Step Aside, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 4, 2019, at B1; Mark Zuckerberg is Chairman and CEO of Facebook. Facebook,
Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 13, 2018).
58
See ROGER MCNAMEE, ZUCKED: WAKING UP TO THE FACEBOOK CATASTROPHE 101 (2019)
(“When called to account for this [exploiting human weaknesses to make money], tech companies
blame pressure from shareholders. Given that the founders of both Facebook and Google have
total control of their companies, that excuse falls short”).
59
Evan Osnos, Ghost in the Machine, NEW YORKER, Sept. 17, 2018, at 35. Facebook seems to
have met more public criticism because it has been more forthcoming. To a certain degree, Google
has been able to let Facebook take the criticism that applies to the business model both companies
employ.
60
See Samuel Gibbs, Google has ‘outgrown’ it’s 14-year old mission statement, says Larry Page,
GUARDIAN (Nov. 3, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/nov/03/larry-pagegoogle-dont-be-evil-sergeybrin#:~:text=Page%20insists%20that%20the%20company,it%20universally%20accessible%20an
d%20useful%E2%80%9D.
61
How Search Works, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/search/howsearchworks/mission (last
visited Sept. 6, 2020) [https://perma.cc/NM88-APDW].
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abilities...[that] seems to be in the Internet’s DNA.” 62 It is a characteristic and
stubborn trait of the “e-personality,” the unwitting creation of extensive online
interactions.63 The e-personality may explain the business philosophy of Silicon
Valley start-ups pioneered by PayPal: “raise a boatload of money, expand quickly,
and present lawmakers with a fait accompli. Here is the future, deal with it.”64
Even before the incorporation of Google, Larry Page and Sergey Brin were
struggling with the moral issues of the internet search business. In a 1998 paper,
“The Anatomy of a Large-Scale Hypertextual Web Search Engine,” they noted an
ethical problem they called “Advertising and Mixed Motives.” They observed that
“[c]urrently, the predominant business model for commercial search engines is
advertising. The goals of the advertising business model do not always correspond
to providing quality search to users.”65 They saw an irreconcilable conflict between
the integrity of a search engine’s search function and the business of search.66 They
concluded, in effect, that advertising caused so many conflicts of interest between
the integrity of search and the lure of profits that only a transparent and academic
search engine could preserve the integrity of search.67 An objective search engine
would have to be located in a non-profit environment like a university. They did
not seriously consider other possible business models, such as paid subscriptions.
They believed that the company would make money, in part, from licensing fees
and selling search services to corporations.68 The search engine was an end in itself
and too important to be corrupted by financial interests.69

62

ELIAS ABOUJAOUDE, VIRTUALLY YOU: THE DANGEROUS POWERS OF THE E-PERSONALITY 48
(2011).
63
Id. at 20. The other traits are narcissism, darkness, regression and impulsivity. Id. at 43.
This grandiosity seems related to Ayn Rand’s famous quote “[w]ho will stop me?”
described as Google’s “founding principle” by Director Emeritus of the Annenberg School
for Communication and Journalism at the University of Southern California, Jonathan Taplin.
He has described the principle as meaning: “Google will do whatever it wants without asking
permission and the results will be so awesome that no one will complain.” He points to
Gmail, Google Street View, and the effort to digitize the world’s books as examples.
TAPLIN, supra note 7, at 97-99. In a similar vein, writer Franklin Foer asserts that “Google is
never plagued by second-guessing.” FRANKLIN FOER, WORLD WITHOUT MIND: THE
EXISTENTIAL THREAT OF BIG TECH 42 (2017).
64
TOM SLEE, WHAT’S YOURS IS MINE: AGAINST THE SHARING ECONOMY 167 (2017).
65
Larry Page & Sergey Brin, The Anatomy of a Large-Scale Hypertextual Web Search Engine,
STAN. INFOLAB PUB. SERVER, http://ilpubs.stanford.edu:8090/361/1/1998-8.pdf (last visited Sept.
6, 2020).
66
See id.
67
Id.
68
KEN AULETTA, GOOGLED: THE END OF THE WORLD AS WE KNOW IT 61 (2009); STEVEN LEVY,
IN THE PLEX: HOW GOOGLE THINKS, WORKS, AND SHAPES OUR LIVES 95 (2011).
69
RICHARD L. BRANDT, INSIDE LARRY AND SERGEY’S BRAIN 40 (2005).
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An incident from 1999 demonstrates the founders’ attitude toward
advertising at that time. Sergey Brin told Susan Wojcicki, an employee in the
marketing department, “I have a good idea . . . [w]hy don’t we take the marketing
budget and use it to inoculate Chechen refugees against cholera. It will help our
brand awareness and we’ll get more new people to use Google.”70 If that didn’t
work, he had a backup plan: “[w]hat if we gave out free Google-branded condoms
to high-school students?” 71 Two years later, Eric Schmidt was hired to provide
“adult supervision” to the young founders.72
At a 2001 internal meeting to consider Google’s evolving position in the
marketplace, the attendees spent the first fifteen minutes describing what Google
was not and what it would not do.73 Larry Page urged that Google should be “a
force for good,” which excluded marketing tricks like sweepstakes, coupons, and
contests that took advantage of people’s cognitive biases.74 He declared that it was
evil to prey on people’s stupidity.75 Google would not deceive people by selling
placement in search results.76
B.

AFTER ADVERTISING

The aftereffects of the 2000 collapse of the dotcom bubble77 threatened the
existence of the young company and changed the founders’ views. Advertising
seemed unavoidable; it was the prevailing business model for commercial search
engines.78 The two founders did not know how ads would function, but they had
one condition: the ads had to be useful to users and not slow down the site.79 They
looked at the possibility of paid listings in search results, but rejected that as
crossing an invisible ethical line. 80 Instead, Google began to experiment with
70

DOUGLAS EDWARDS, I’M FEELING LUCKY: THE CONFESSIONS OF GOOGLE EMPLOYEE NUMBER
59, 48-49 (2011).
71
Id.
72
Daisuke Wakabayashi, Katie Benner, & Claire Cain Miller, Eric Schmidt to Step Down as
Alphabet’s Executive Chairman, N.Y. TIMES, (Dec. 21, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/21/technology/eric- schmidt-google-alphabet.html.
73
EDWARDS, supra note 70, at 290.
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
Id. at 190-91.
77
See e.g., Adam Hayes, Dotcom Bubble, INVESTOPEDIA (June 25, 2019),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/dotcombubble.asp#:~:text=During%20the%20dotcom%20bubble%2C%20the,equities%20entering%20a
%20bear%20market (summarizing the Dotcom Bubble collapse).
78
See id.
79
BRANDT, supra note 69, at 95.
80
EDWARDS, supra note 70, at 310.
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advertisements, but would not allow banner or pop-up ads that were ubiquitous on
the web.81
The rationalization for ads went beyond utility for users and income
generation. For Larry Page, at least, there was the experience of Nikola Tesla, the
inventor whose lack of business sense left him in poverty despite his brilliant
inventions.82 Tesla’s experience was a lesson for Page. “I didn’t want to just invent
things,” he said, “I also wanted to make the world better . . . .”83 But he needed the
resources that Tesla did not have to do that. As one commentator put it, “[t]o realize
their dreams, Page and Brin had to build a huge company.”84 Advertising would
give them the necessary resources and scale to fulfill their grandiose goal of
organizing the world’s information and making it available to all.85
But even if ads were necessary both for survival and for scale, were they
still reprehensible? Early in its history Google’s moral vision was summarized in a
phrase invented by the engineer Paul Buchheit at an in-house meeting in July, 2001
to discuss Google’s corporate values. He suggested something that would make
people uncomfortable but also be interesting: “[d]on’t be evil.” 86 The founders
adopted it as their hope and mantra for the company.87 What did the phrase mean?
One interpretation was that it was an elaboration of the earlier phrase “[d]on’t go
commercial.”88 This interpretation fit with the 1998 article noted above regarding
the conflict of interest between search results and advertising. 89 Another
interpretation calls the phrase an exemplification of a sense of moral purity.90 The
trenchant internet critic Nicholas Carr has suggested that the mantra means that the
company can make money without doing evil.91 However naïve, presumptuous, or
inaccurate Google’s motto was, it could nevertheless rationalize the use of
advertising to make money: if the company wasn’t being evil, then advertising was
necessarily not evil.

81

See id. at 286-87.
See e.g., Gilbert King, The Rise and Fall of Nikola Tesla and His Tower, SMITHSONIAN MAG.
(Feb. 4, 2019), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/the-rise-and-fall-of-nikola-tesla-and-histower-11074324/.
83
LEVY, supra note 68, at 13.
84
Id. at 6.
85
See supra note 61.
86
See EDWARDS, supra note 70 at 276.
87
See id. at 272-76.
88
BRANDT, supra note 69, at 39.
89
See Page & Brin, supra note 65.
90
LEVY, supra note 68, at 6.
91
CARR, supra note 15, at 283. Financial Times columnist Rana Foroohar has said that “evil was
baked into the business plan” of Google. RANA FOROOHAR, DON’T BE EVIL 32 (2019).
82
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The founders began to see keyword-targeted text ads as an important part
of the information package given to the user as part of a search result.92 This new
system was called “paid-search,” but it did not provide for the direct payment to
Google to improve the search results.93 Advertisers simply bid in an auction on
search words—large numbers of them—to win the right to have their ads appear
alongside the search results that were generated by the use of those words for the
search.94 The ads did not affect the search itself, but they displayed next to search
results.95 Every time a user clicked on an ad, the advertiser paid a fee to Google.96
The ads were so well targeted that, according to a test, users did not realize they
were ads and actually liked them.97 Ads would not just be necessary, they would be
helpful. They could improve the user’s search experience. This “paid search”
advertising business broke new ground in advertising history.98 For advertisers, it
meant that for the first time they could connect to enormous numbers of consumers
as individuals as they were making shopping decisions online.99 Most important, it
was also very profitable. Google’s income from advertising went from zero in 2002
to over $2 billion in two years.100 The company would not just survive but flourish
beyond the founders’ dreams.
The “paid search” ads that Google ran were successful because they assured
advertisers that the environment surrounding the ad was appropriate—the content
on the web page where Google sent it. 101 At the beginning, these ads were not
directed to specific individuals. But as Google grew and acquired more behavioral
data about its users, the “surplus” (more data than needed to serve its users) became
a zero-sum asset that was diverted from improving service to targeting individual
users. 102 This personalization of advertising has been described by Shoshanna
92

DAVID VISE, THE GOOGLE STORY 99 (2005).
See JOSEPH TUROW, THE DAILY YOU: HOW THE NEW ADVERTISING INDUSTRY IS DEFINING
YOUR IDENTITY AND YOUR WORTH 66-67 (2011).
94
Id. at 66.
95
Douglas Edwards has said that these ads were displayed “directly in line with regular results”
and were “a form of paid placement, the exact practice Google had railed against so vehemently
when it profited others.” EDWARDS, supra note 70, at 308. But the key distinction is that the ads
were not influencing the content of the search results; the ads were simply placed next to the
search results.
96
TUROW, supra note 93, at 67.
97
NOAM COHEN, THE KNOW-IT-ALLS: THE RISE OF SILICON VALLEY AS A POLITICAL
POWERHOUSE AND SOCIAL WRECKING BALL 131 (2017).
98
TUROW, supra note 93, at 65.
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
Id. at 118.
102
ZUBOFF, supra note 56, at 81. Jaron Lanier has described the change as an inevitable result of
the advance of the internet, the devices and the algorithms. L ANIER, supra note 8, at 97.
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Zuboff, Professor Emerita at Harvard Business School, as “surveillance
capitalism.”103
This new form of capitalism is characterized by two phenomena, the
“extraction imperative” and the “prediction imperative.” Extraction refers to the
gathering of a user’s data.104 Prediction refers to the use of that data to predict and
manipulate the user’s behavior.105 Google was the first company to integrate an
array of tools, such as cookies, proprietary analytics, and algorithmic software
capabilities into a new system that centered on the unilateral expropriation of
behavioral data.106 In contrast to industrial capitalism, which requires “economies
of scale in production in order to achieve high throughput combined with low unit
cost . . . [,]” surveillance capitalism necessitates “economies of scale in the
extraction of behavioral surplus.” 107 Under surveillance capitalism, competitive
pressures compel an ever-expanding need for raw material—personal data.108 This
explains Google’s drive to expand its supply chain of data surplus to other activities
than mere search through such free services as Gmail, Google Maps, Google
Calendar, Google News, and Google Shipping. Actual extraction entails a
dispossession cycle consisting of a carefully designed sequence of incursion,
habituation, adaptation, and redirection. 109 The prediction imperative necessarily
involves manipulation because “the way to predict behavior is to intervene at its
source and shape it.”110 This new type of advertising was called “online behavioral

The description of “surveillance capitalism” is taken from ZUBOFF, supra note 56. The term
“surveillance capitalism” may be derived from the term “surveillance society.” See Kirstie Ball
and David Murakami Wood infra, note 237. Al Gore has gone even further and suggested that we
now have a “stalker economy.” Alisha Foster, Al Gore at Southland: We Now Have a Stalker
Economy, USA TODAY (June 10, 2014), https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2014/06/10/algore-tech-southland-conference/10299753/. Other authors who have used the capitalism metaphor
are NICK COULDRY & ULISES A. MEJIAS, THE COSTS OF CONNECTION: HOW DATA IS
COLONIZING HUMAN LIFE AND APPROPRIATING IT FOR CAPITALISM 3 (2019).
104
See ZUBOFF, supra note 56, at 87.
105
See ZUBOFF, supra note 56, at 200-03.
106
Id. at 87. Nicholas Carr has described this system as “vampiric.” “Their [Google’s and
Facebook’s] overriding goal is to know us, to transfer into their data bases our informational
lifeblood. Their thirst is unquenchable. To survive, they must suck in ever more intimate details of
our lives and desires.” CARR, supra note 15, at 51.
107
ZUBOFF, supra note 56, at 87.
108
See ZUBOFF, supra note 56, at 81.
109
Id. at 138-55.
110
Id. at 202. Franklin Foer says that Facebook’s “whole effort is to make human beings
predictable—to anticipate their behavior, which makes them easier to
manipulate.” FOER, supra note 63, at 77.
103
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advertising” because it altered people’s behavior 111 and it was an advertiser’s
dream come true. The advertisers could not only persuade users to buy, they could
manipulate them to purchase.
This surveillance capitalism model of online behavioral advertising
deprives users of autonomy and is immoral. But users’ loss of autonomy was not
the only moral issue raised by this business model; it also compromised search
integrity in three ways.
First, as Larry Page and Sergey Brin said in their 1998 talk, “a search engine
could add a small factor to search results from ‘friendly’ companies, and subtract a
factor from results from competitors. This type of bias is very difficult to detect but
could still have a significant effect on the market.”112 “Difficult to detect” is an
understatement. While there has been no indication that Google currently adjusts
the search algorithm to favor a third party, it is impossible to show that Google does
this or to prove that it does not. We will never know whether the integrity of the
search is affected because, for competitive reasons and to prevent the “gaming” of
search results, Google will never explain—if it even can—how its search
algorithms work.113 This is a moral hazard.
111

TUROW, supra note 93, at 176. Others have used different words to describe this
phenomenon. Professors Paul M. Schwartz and Donald J. Solove refer to it as “behavioral
marketing.” See Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove The PII Problem: Privacy and a New
Concept of Personally Identifiable Information, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1814, 1854 (2011).
Professor Robert H. Lustig refers to this advertising as “neuromarketing.” See ROBERT H.
LUSTIG, THE HACKING OF THE AMERICAN MIND: THE SCIENCE BEHIND THE CORPORATE
TAKEOVER OF OUR BODIES AND BRAINS, 190 (2017). Siva Vaidhyanathan calls it “contextual
advertising.” See SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, THE GOOGLIZATION OF EVERYTHING: (AND WHY WE
SHOULD WORRY) 27 (2011). The Federal Trade Commission has defined the term “behavioral
advertising” as “the tracking of a consumer’s activities online – including the searches the
consumer has conducted, the Web pages visited, and the content viewed – in order to deliver
advertising targeted to the individual consumer’s interests.” FED. TRADE COMM’M, ONLINE
BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING MOVING THE DISCUSSION FORWARD TO POSSIBLE SELF–
REGULATORY PRINCIPLES (2007),
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/online-behavioraladvertising-moving- discussion-forward-possible-self-regulatoryprinciples/p859900stmt.pdf. Some have criticized the term “behavioral advertising” as a
euphemism for “microtargeted manipulation.” BENKLER, FARIS, & ROBERTS, supra note 13, at
269.
112
Page & Brin, supra note 65.
113
See How Search Algorithms Work, GOOGLE,
https://www.google.com/search/howsearchworks/algorithms/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2020)
(providing an explanation generally on how search algorithms work); see also Kirsten Grind, Sam
Schechner, Robert McMillan & John West, How Google Interferes With Its Search Algorithms
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Second, it is clear that this business model’s demand for data has
compromised the search results. A 2015 study at the Harvard Business School
found that Google began to develop its content as it expanded its product
offerings.114 For example, Google reviews compete with TripAdvisor and Google
shopping competes with Amazon. But Google continues to act as a search service
as well. It has a clear conflict of interest in these situations. But Google has invented
a feature called “universal search,” by which it “intentionally excludes content
competitors and only shows Google’s content.”115 The founders seem to think that
allowing a third-party advertiser to influence search results is wrong, but it is
acceptable for the search company to do so. The problem is that in either case, the
advertiser gains and the trusting user who believes in the integrity of the search
engine loses. One would struggle to call Google’s practice ethical. This is a betrayal
of the founders’ concern for search integrity.
Third, search engine integrity also is at stake in another aspect of
surveillance capitalism—personalization (tailoring online content to what will
interest the individual user). 116 In 2005, Google began to personalize searches
because it boosted revenue from advertising. 117 But personalization compromises
and Changes Your Results; The internet giant uses blacklists, algorithm tweaks and an army of
contractors to shape what you see, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 15, 2019),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-google-interferes-with-its-search-algorithms-and-changes-yourresults-11573823753.
114
Michael Luca, Timothy Wu, Sebastian Couvidat, Daniel Frank, & William Seltzer, Does
Google Content Degrade Google Search? Experimental Evidence 2 (Harv. Bus. Sch. Working
Paper No. 16-035, 2015), http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:23492375.
115
Id.; see also PASQUALE, supra note 54, at 66-69, 160-65.
116
Commentators have been critical of personalization. Nicholas Carr has written,
“[p]ersonalization’s evil twin is manipulation.” CARR, supra note 15, at 258. University of
Maryland Law Professor Frank Pasquale has said, “Personalization means vulnerability as well
as power.” PASQUALE, supra note 54, at 79.
Eli Pariser, chief executive of Upworthy, has written, “But there’s always a bargain in
personalization: In exchange for convenience, you hand over some privacy and control to the
machine.” ELI PARISER, THE FILTER BUBBLE: WHAT THE INTERNET IS HIDING FROM YOU 213
(2011). University of Michigan Professor John Cheney-Lippold believes that “personalization”
(the assumption that you as a user are distinctive enough to receive content based on you as a
person with a history and with individual interests) generally “does not exist.” Instead, he believes
that we are communicated to through “profilization” that allows our data to be categorized. JOHN
CHENEY-LIPPOLD, WE ARE DATA: ALGORITHMS AND THE MAKING OF OUR DIGITAL SELVES 87
(2017).
117
Thomas W. Simpson, Evaluating Google As an Epistemic Tool, 43 METAPHILOSOPHY 426, 437
(2012). For more details on the gradual process of personalization, see Chris Jay Hoofnagle,
Beyond Google and Evil: How Policy Makers, Journalists and Consumers Should Talk Differently
About Google and Privacy, 14 FIRST MONDAY (2009), https://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/a
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the integrity of the search results. There are a number of factors in assessing the
functioning of a search engine, such as precision, recall, and objectivity. 118
Personalization does not affect any of these except objectivity, but objectivity is
critical for the informational task that a search engine performs. 119 And
personalization diminishes objectivity in a search engine by reinforcing
confirmation bias. 120 This means that people are more likely to: (1) justify
disbelieving evidence that contradicts their preexisting beliefs, (2) not subject
evidence that supports their preexisting beliefs to the same level of scrutiny, (3) and
take as confirmatory evidence that is consistent with their preexisting beliefs.121
Personalization reduces the chances that the search engine will inform the user of
contrary opinions, or “unknown unknowns.”122 But objectivity in search results is
a public good required by a democratic society.123 Democracy requires a degree of
objectivity that allows the public a sufficient understanding of the issues. If the
search engine reinforces confirmation bias, then it will reinforce political
polarization. Through personalization, Google’s advertising-based business model
thus not only reduces the objectivity of Google’s search engine, it also weakens
democracy. As in the case of the contradiction between search and advertising
mentioned in the 1998 paper, 124 we will never know how much personalization
lessens objectivity in Google searches. Personalization of search is a moral
challenge and a moral hazard.
Search engine integrity is not the only way in which Google has weakened
democracy. It seems clear that its search algorithm could decide an election. In a
2015 article, Robert Epstein, Senior Research Psychologist at the American
Institute for Behavioral Research and Technology, recounted “How Google Could
Rig the 2016 Election: Google has the Ability to Drive Millions of Votes to a
Candidate with No One the Wiser.” His research suggested that “Google, Inc., has
amassed far more power to control elections—indeed, to control a wide variety of
opinions and beliefs—than any company in history has ever had. Google’s search
algorithm can easily shift the voting preferences of undecided voters by 20 percent
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or more...with virtually no one knowing they are being manipulated.”125 As one
example, he noted that:
According to Google Trends, at this writing [August,
2015] Donald Trump is currently trouncing all other
candidates in search activity in 47 of 50 states. Could
this activity push him higher in search rankings, and
could higher rankings in turn bring him more
support? Most definitely—depending, that is, on
how Google employees choose to adjust numeric
weightings in the search algorithm. Google
acknowledges adjusting the algorithm 600 times a
year, but the process is secret, so what effect Mr.
Trump’s success will have on how he shows up in
Google searches is presumably out of his hands.126
Out of the public’s hands, and the public will never know how much the search
algorithm benefitted Donald Trump. It seems morally wrong to give an unknowable
search algorithm and its masters such power.
Behavioral advertising transforms the moral issue from one of privacy to
one of autonomy.127 “Autonomy” refers to governing “oneself, to be directed by
considerations, desires, conditions and characteristics that are not simply imposed
externally upon one, but are part of what can somehow be considered one’s
authentic self.”128 Autonomy is distinguished from “freedom,” which concerns the
ability to act without external or internal constraints, because it concerns the
independence and authenticity of the desires (values, emotions, etc.) that move one
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to act in the first place.129 Autonomy seems to be an “irrefutable value”130 and it
requires significant constraints on the application of market principles. 131 Our
common moral intuitions and the basic principles of Kantian philosophy tell us that
a person should never act so as to treat another person merely as a means to an end,
but treat the other as an end in himself or herself.132 But the behavioral-advertising
business model undermines the individual user’s right to make decisions free from
manipulation or exploitation.133 Through addiction, surveillance, and manipulation
it undermines the user’s autonomy.134 The behavioral-advertising business model
of surveillance capital is morally wrong.
Google started as an academic enterprise that valued above all else the
integrity of its search engine, despised advertising, and believed that advertisements
would irremediably compromise search results.135 But adopting the business model
of surveillance capitalism made it what it had despised—an advertising company.
Ultimately, the moral issue was not only about the integrity of search, but also the
integrity of the users—the compromising of their autonomy. This morally deficient
business model also weakened democracy. Unfortunately, this model was adopted
and further developed for social media by Facebook.
V.

THE HISTORY OF FACEBOOK
A.

BEFORE ADVERTISING

Facebook has been a phenomenally successful innovation—no human
enterprise, technology, utility, or service has ever spread so widely and so
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quickly.136 This is a tribute to Mark Zuckerberg’s grandiosity.137 From almost the
beginning, his motto was “Dominate!” and soon became “to make the world more
open and connected.”138 These slogans reflected Mark Zuckerberg’s grandiosity
and his reckless haste, two traits to which Steven Levy who has written the inside
history of the company, attributes virtually all Facebook’s recent problems.139
Mark Zuckerberg was known as a computer whiz at Harvard and, in his
sophomore year, established his hacker’s cred. In the fall of 2003, he created
“Facemash,” the predecessor to Facebook, using photos he had hacked from the
digital versions of “facebooks” for each of Harvard’s undergraduate “houses”
(dormitories).140 He did this, of course, without asking permission.141 One writer
has described the moral issue by hypothesizing how Mark Zuckerberg rationalized
his conduct: in a sense, it was stealing because he didn’t have the legal right to the
photos and because the university certainly didn’t put them there for someone to
hack and download. 142 But then, if information was hackable, didn’t a wellintentioned hacker have the right to hack it? Who had the rightful authority to
decide that he wasn’t allowed access to something he could access so easily?
Wasn’t he really doing them a favor, teaching them a lesson? Even though the
administrators wouldn’t see it that way, wasn’t he really doing a good deed by
showing them the flaws in their system?143 Another writer has speculated on the
relevance to Mark Zuckerberg of the moral issue in this hacking, “the fact that he
was doing something slightly illicit gave Mark little pause . . . . It’s not that he set
out to break the rules; he just didn’t pay much attention to them.”144 This ethically
challenged hacker ethos valuing brilliant, but heedless, disruption survived and
flourished at Facebook.145
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But the hacking was only the first of the moral issues. Facemash was a
Harvard version of the website HotorNot.com and placed photos of two students
next to each other, asking the user to choose the “hotter” person. 146 Students
condemned it as “hurtful and demeaning” and the staff of The Crimson, the Harvard
college newspaper, criticized it as “cater[ing] to the worst side of Harvard
students.”147 Mark Zuckerberg was called before Harvard’s Administrative Board
for violations of the college’s code of conduct in connection with security,
copyright, and privacy issues.148
He closed down Facemash and expressed particular concern about privacy,
telling The Crimson that “issues about violating people’s privacy don’t seem to be
surmountable...I’m not willing to risk insulting anyone.” 149 But a comment in a
messaging exchange, when he was appearing before the Administrative Board for
the Facemash fiasco, yields a different insight on his judgement and ethics:
[redacted friend’s name]: But what are the grounds for kicking you out of
school?
Zuckerberg: Unethical behavior.
[redacted friend’s name]: Wouldn’t that be dependent on the court case?
Zuckerberg: Haha man come on. You can be unethical and still be legal
that’s the way I live my life haha.150
But early the next year, Zuckerberg created “TheFacebook,” another social
media site that retained Facemash’s emphasis on connecting people with “a dash of
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vanity and more than a little voyeurism.”151 It resolved some of the moral issues
with Facemash. One change came from a suggestion in The Crimson: instead of
hacking the pictures from the houses’ websites, the users of TheFacebook would
provide the photos themselves, thus avoiding one privacy issue.152 But in an email
exchange at the time about TheFacebook, Mark Zuckerberg offered another
perspective: that the users of the site were stupid dupes.153
The private comments by Mark Zuckerberg contrast with the public
comments he made about users’ privacy when he shut down Facemash. Perhaps the
public comments were insincere. On the other hand, maybe his email comments to
a friend were just a bit of sophomoric bravado. But they seemed to show contempt
for the privacy of schoolmates who had trusted him.
The launching of TheFacebook created two other moral issues: (1) whether
Mark had stolen the idea for TheFacebook; and (2) whether he had sabotaged a
competing platform. In December, 2002, a year before Facemash, fellow Harvard
students, the brothers Tyler and Cameron Winklevoss and Divya Narendra, began
to develop a business plan for a new type of website that would allow students of a
college to create a network specific to that institution and allow students to meet,
exchange information, discuss employment prospects and serve as an online dating
service.154
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These three students had developed a prototype for the website (called
“Harvard Connection”) but needed additional help to finalize it.155 In the fall of
2003, they asked Mark Zuckerberg for help. He worked on the project for a time,
but without a written contract.156 Even though the “Harvard Connection” website
was close to being completed, before they were able to launch, Mark Zuckerberg
launched his own new site, TheFacebook.157
The Winklevosses and Narendra were taken aback. As Tyler Winklevoss
said, “[Mark Zuckerberg] said he was working for us; he led us on; he took unfair
advantage of us . . . [h]e’s just not a fully formed individual, from an ethical
standpoint.”158 The Harvard Connection, the site created by the two brothers and
Narendra, finally launched in late spring 2004, 159 but TheFacebook had already
seized the initiative and dominated the field. The Harvard Connection (renamed
ConnectU) never achieved the success it seemed to promise. After discussions with
Mark Zuckerberg failed to settle the dispute, ConnectU sued him in September,
2004, alleging “breach of contract, misappropriation of trade secrets, breach of
fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment, intentional interference with prospective
business advantage, breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing and fraud arising
out of [Mark Zuckerberg’s]...unauthorized use of [ConnectU’s] source code and
confidential business plans, and usurpation of business opportunity.”160
In fact, both sites were variations of existing websites: Friendster, MySpace,
and Club Nexus. Mark Zuckerberg admitted that, “there aren’t very many new ideas
floating around... The facebook [sic] isn’t even a very novel idea. It’s taken from
all these others.”161 Indeed, the original inspiration for Facebook seems to have
come from Kris Tillery’s “Exeter Facebook”—a digital version of the photo address
book at the Phillips Exeter Academy that appeared while Zuckerberg was a student
there, and which he was aware of. 162 But TheFacebook did have a novel feature;
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he described it as bringing social connection to a “different level”—it was bringing
the connections down to a specific domain, that is, limiting it to the Harvard
community.163 But a website designer, Victor A. Gao, a fellow student who worked
first on the Harvard Connection and then later until November 2003 on
TheFacebook, said that that novel feature was pioneered by Narendra and was
Narendra’s idea.164
The Crimson Staff’s conclusion was that neither ConnectU nor
TheFacebook was very original, but Mark Zuckerberg had the know-how and put
in the effort to make his site successful and nobody else could take credit for that.165
But the propitious timing of TheFacebook’s launch was not merely the result of
good faith hard work. Confidential emails that were disclosed at the trial, and never
denied by Mark Zuckerberg,166 suggest that he deliberately delayed his work on the
Harvard Connection until TheFacebook launched.167
The complex litigation was finally settled in 2008.168 The Winklevosses and
Narendra reportedly received $65 million in cash and stock in Facebook.169 The
settlement may reflect that Mark Zuckerberg was innocent, but wanted to get rid of
a nuisance suit—the amounts, however, suggest that the claims against him had
some merit.170
The “don’t ask permission” attitude, the self-proclaimed “unethical” way of
life, the contempt for users, and the sabotaging of a competitor suggest ethically
questionable behavior in Facebook’s origins. In Mark Zuckerberg’s defense, one
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can observe that the prefrontal cortex, the seat of the executive function and
judgment in the human brain, is not fully developed until the age of 25.171 As a
sophomore born in May, 1984, he was only 19 when he launched TheFacebook and
his lapses might be excused as biologically conditioned youthful exuberance. But
the question remains whether his moral lapses were a stage in his maturing or
whether they represent a fixed character trait.172 In either case, his adoption of the
behavioral-advertising business model ensured that the company would be morally
challenged.
B.

AFTER ADVERTISING
1.

Formation, 2004-2012: The Issue of Privacy

Facebook’s relationship with advertising can be divided into two periods.
The first period, from the origins to 2012, exemplified the extraction imperative of
surveillance capitalism: a formative time in which Facebook accumulated gigantic
amounts of data, but did not know how to exploit them effectively in advertising.
During this period, the moral issue was privacy. The second period, from 2012 to
the present, exhibited the predictive imperative: a period of consolidation of the
advertising model. By this time, Facebook had learned how to use the mountains
of personal data to craft personalized advertisements to users; it had adopted
behavioral advertising. At this time the moral issue was not merely control of an
individual’s personal information (privacy), but control of the individual himself or
herself (autonomy).
The origins of Facebook would suggest that Mark Zuckerberg was not
greatly concerned about privacy and never thought of autonomy as an issue. As a
hacker, he was undoubtedly influenced by Silicon Valley’s disdain for advertising.
In early 2004, his business partner and fellow student Eduardo Saverin began to
push him to think of advertising, but it was a tough sell. Mark Zuckerberg wanted
to keep Facebook as a fun site and not make any money off it.173 Later, Washington
Post CEO Caroline Little, after a meeting with him about investing in Facebook,
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opined that “Mark was kind of against ads, as far as we could tell . . . .”174 A sales
rep who worked for Facebook’s first advertising firm said, “Mark never wanted
ads.” 175 Zuckerberg himself remarked “I don’t hate all advertising. I just hate
advertising that stinks.”176 The most perspicacious observer of Facebook, the writer
David Kirkpatrick, has written that Zuckerberg was “ambivalent,” “blasé,” and had
“contempt for advertising.”177 When Eduardo arranged for them to visit potential
advertisers in New York, Mark slept through about half of the meetings.178
Mark Zuckerberg was forced to adopt a utilitarian view of advertising. He
accepted it only in order to cover the costs of operation, not to make a profit.179 The
first advertisements, starting in April 2004, were for moving services, T-shirts, and
other products attractive to college students. 180 They were few, cute, and
harmless,181 were all the standard-size banner ads and did not include any annoying
pop-up ads. 182 For a time, he even placed small captions above the display ads
reading “[w]e don’t like these either but they pay the bills.”183 Like Larry Page and
Sergey Brin, he was uninterested in advertising that interrupted the user’s
experience or distracted the user’s attention; he wanted advertising that would be
useful for the user. 184 In 2006, Facebook’s Chief Operating Officer, Owen Van
Natta, whose primary task was generating revenue, remarked that “[w]e almost
shouldn’t be making money off of [advertising], if it isn’t adding value [to the user’s
experience].”185 Facebook maintained a profound corporate ambivalence towards
advertising.
But in 2008, Mark Zuckerberg hired Sheryl Sandberg from Google to
improve Facebook’s advertising strategy.186 Google’s strategy was to help people
find what they had already decided to buy; Facebook’s would be to help them
decide what it was they wanted to buy. Google’s advertising was “fulfill demand,”

174

KIRKPATRICK, supra note 144, at 109.
Id. at 43.
176
Id. at 175.
177
Id. at 159, 255, 235, 172.
178
Mezrich, supra note 142, at 144.
179
KIRKPATRICK, supra note 144, at 258.
180
Id. at 37-38.
181
WU, supra note 37, at 297; LANIER, supra note 8, at 98.
182
KIRKPATRICK, supra note 144, at 43, 140.
183
Id. at 43.
184
Id. at 175, 176; WU, supra note 37, at 297.
185
KIRKPATRICK, supra note 144, at 175.
186
Brad Stone & Miguel Helft, Facebook Hires Google Executive as No. 2, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4,
2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/04/technology/04cnd-facebook.html.
175

27

Journal of Law, Technology & the Internet — Vol. 12
while Facebook’s would be “generate demand.”187 Sheryl Sandberg remarked that,
“There has been this myth that everyone’s waiting for our [Facebook’s] revenue
model. But we have the revenue model. The revenue model is advertising. This is
the business we’re in, and it’s working.”188 Essentially, she introduced to Facebook
the Google behavioral-advertising business model. 189 Facebook became an
advertising firm, gathering enormous amounts of information about what all users
of its site do and then selling the ability to reach them anonymously with advertising
based on the profiles that the Facebook users had created for themselves. 190 By
2010, Facebook was the best social media site for mining data and finding
customers.191
Sheryl Sandberg’s introduction of behavioral advertising did not initially
change Mark Zuckerberg’s utilitarian view, nor did it overcome his complaints
about advertising. The complaints were twofold. First, that advertising was
disruptive; it interfered with the user’s experience when accessing the site. 192
Second, that advertising was offensive; it was too commercial.193 His insistence on
preventing advertising from interfering with the user’s experience on the site
suggests that his opposition was primarily due to the disruptive effect.
But neither he, nor Sheryl Sandberg, nor her import of surveillance
capitalism addressed the morality of the advertising-based online business model.
The bartering of one’s personal information in exchange for use of Facebook’s
platform is a Faustian bargain: free service for your data.194 In the early days of
Silicon Valley, the advertising-based business model was considered one of the
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worst “devils” that needed to be destroyed. 195 A leading internet legal scholar,
Professor Tim Wu of Columbia Law School, has referred to the attention merchants
(including Facebook and Google) as “those Faustian geniuses who thought they
had beaten the Devil.” 196 Other commentators have noted Facebook’s “devil’s
bargain of advertising” and referred to its contract with users as a relationship with
“a Faustian element.”197
The “free” use of the platform is a key aspect of this Faustian bargain.
“Free” is, of course, a misnomer. “Free” is not an accurate economic explanation,
but a deceptive con game or a “bait and switch” ploy.198 Experience tells us that
everyone loves to get “something for nothing.” 199 And framing transactions as
“free” makes it very difficult for users to evaluate the fairness of information
practices given that they often carry a hidden charge.200 Psychologists tell us that
people do not act rationally when they are told something is “free.” 201 They
overestimate the value of free and lose their normal sense of cost vs. benefit.202 As
a result, people end up trading their personal data for less than they should.203 One
perceptive historian, Yuval Noah Harari, has analogized the situation in the
following damning terms: “[a]t present people are happy to give away their most
valuable asset—their personal data—in exchange for free email services and funny
cat videos. It’s a bit like the African and Native American tribes who unwittingly
sold entire countries to European imperialists in exchange for colorful beads and
cheap trinkets.”204
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2.

Consolidation, 2012-present: The Issue of Autonomy

As noted above, advertising on radio and television is different from that on
the internet. Although all three media use advertising, radio and television employ
inefficient across-the-board, hit-or-miss ads. The innovation that made Facebook
advertising phenomenally successful was its targeting. 205 While advertising
represents itself as uncovering what consumers already desire, rather than
informing them what they should want,206 in fact, the goal of any advertising is to
get people to buy—to create demand. Thus, targeted advertising is more effective
because it is more manipulative. 207 But despite Sheryl Sandberg’s focus on
advertising until 2012, when Facebook made its initial public offering, its ads were
not smart. Antonio Garcia Martinez, a product manager at Facebook, describing
Facebook’s poor monetization of ads, said that Facebook’s monetization of ads was
laughable compared to Google’s, although the usage was ungodly.208
But in 2012, in preparation for its initial public offering and to show
investors its market value, Facebook created an intelligent targeted advertising
powerhouse. 209 The key was its “microtargeting,” ads that were targeted or
“personalized” to the type of individual user.210 Facebook adeptly used the huge
trove of personal data provided by a user to target ads to that specific type of user.
It enjoyed three advantages in developing targeted ads: it had more users than
anyone else (over one billion); it knew more about its users than anyone else; and
it had unique access to the users through their friends.211
And the larger the amount of personal information that a service has, the
greater the power to manipulate. Given the mountains of data Facebook had, its
power to manipulate was very significant. In fact, one cogent critic of current digital
practices, computer philosopher and Microsoft employee Jaron Lanier, has
suggested that “advertising” is a misnomer; the proper name is “behavior
modification” because Facebook users are bombarded with continuously adjusted
stimuli without interruption as long as they are on the site and the options open to
them are directly micromanaged moment to moment.212 Technology mediated cues
developed by B.J. Fogg, the inventor of “captology” (Computers As Persuasive
205
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Technology), 213 seem to be more effective than the physical cues used by the
pioneer of behavioral modification B. F. Skinner. 214 As with Google, this
behavioral modification was an advertiser’s dream come true—not just enticing to
buy, but causing a purchase. It was the nightmare foretold by advertising’s critics
in the twentieth century. These new behavioral advertisers were truly able to reduce
the users’ autonomy.
Behavior modification depletes autonomy through three processes:
addiction, surveillance, and manipulation. Addiction and surveillance facilitate
manipulation.
a.

Addiction

As early as summer 2004, Mark Zuckerberg and his colleagues, observing
how students used TheFacebook, described it as “the trance.”215 As Sean Parker,
Facebook’s first President, said, “[using TheFacebook] was hypnotic. You’d just
keep clicking and clicking and clicking from profile to profile, viewing the data.”216
Roger McNamee, an early investor in Facebook and Google, has noted that
Facebook “consciously addict[s]” its users in order to make their products and
advertising more valuable. 217 One chronicler of Facebook’s history has
characterized the website as “addictive” from the very beginning. 218 Antonio
Garcia Martinez, a Facebook product manager, has written, “[u]p there with heroin,
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carbohydrates, or a weekly paycheck: that is how addictive and rewarding
Facebook was.”219
Until recently, few psychologists had concluded that social media sites,
including Facebook, were “addictive,” because addiction is generally associated
with substances, not behavior.220 Adam Alter, Associate Professor at NYU’s Stern
School of Business, notes that substance addiction and behavioral addiction
activate the same brain areas and arise from the same aspects of human nature: the
need for social engagement and social support, mental stimulation, and a sense of
effectiveness.221 He defines “addiction” as “something you enjoy doing in the short
term that undermines your well-being in the long term—but that you do
compulsively anyway.”222 In 2013, the fifth edition of the American Psychiatric
Association’s DSM (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders) added
the official diagnosis “behavioral addiction” to the list. 223 David Greenfield, a
clinical psychologist and founder of the Center for Internet and Technology
Addiction, asserts that Zuckerberg knew from the beginning that the site was
“addictive” and was designed to have social validation loops and intermittent
reinforcement to push people to use it over and over again.224
The product designer Nir Eyal, the author of “Hooked: How to Build HabitForming Products,” has laid out the “hook model” to addiction in four sequential
steps used by internet service providers: trigger (the spark plug, such as a Web site
link); action (behavior in anticipation of a reward); variable reward (unpredictable
feedback loops create intrigue); and investment (the input of time, data, effort social
capital or money by the user into the service).225 One example of this design would
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be the “like” button on Facebook which changed tracking friends’ lives from a
passive activity to a deeply interactive one with the type of unpredictable feedback
that contributes to addiction.226 It has even been proposed that Facebook might have
its own version of addiction—“Facebook Addiction Disorder.”227
The British neuroscientist Susan Greenfield has stated that Facebook
“likes” are “designed from the ground up to be addictive.”228 She described the
neurochemistry of the process as follows:
(1) fast-paced screen interaction is exciting and
arousing; (2) as a consequence of this arousal,
dopamine is released; (3) dopamine underlies
systems for reward and addiction, and also inhibits
the prefrontal cortex [the site of the brain’s executive
function]; (4) an underactive prefrontal cortex
characterizes the brain-states of schizophrenics, the
obese, compulsive gamblers and children, there the
here-and-now trumps any consequences; (5) the
screen will have more appeal as it offers strong
sensory stimulation.229
The result on Facebook is addiction “to short-term, dopamine-driven feedback
loops.”230 This is perfectly suited to Facebook’s business model, which is online
behavioral advertising. Advertising is driven by engagement, and the best way to
engage is to keep delivering small dopamine hits.
Robert H. Lustig, Professor of Pediatrics at U. of C. San Francisco, has
noted that markets, even if unpredictable and volatile, usually work, but he adds,
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/06/technology/phone-screen-addiction-tech-nireyal.html (explaining that Nir Eyal’s views have changed and his most recent book is on how to
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226
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“[e]xcept when it comes to addictive substances.”231 If Facebook and Google are
addictive, then it would be inappropriate to allow operation on market principles
without restriction.
Google and Facebook’s services operate through dopamine-feedback loops
and on market principles and are addictive--“the twenty-first century version of
Marx’s ‘opiate of the people.’” 232 And addiction is a “paradigm threat to personal
autonomy.”233
b.

Surveillance

Obtaining the data necessary for the behavioral-advertising business model
requires surveillance, or watching and tracking.234 Mammals dislike surveillance,
which is considered a threat because it indicates they are prey to predators.235 But
surveillance is widespread because people like freedom, enjoy convenience, and do
not perceive the surveillance.236 Great Britain’s Information Commission Office’s
2006 report described Western democracies as “surveillance societies”237; cyber
security expert Bruce Schneier has called surveillance the “business model of the
Internet” 238 ; and Shoshanna Zuboff, as noted above, has described the current
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American economy as an example of “surveillance capitalism.”239 And Facebook
is at the center of this economy, having the most pervasive surveillance system in
the world240 and being the biggest surveillance-based enterprise in the history of
mankind.241 According to WikiLeaks founder, Julian Assange, Facebook is also
“the greatest spying machine the world has ever seen.”242 Facebook’s surveillance
involves not only the collection of Facebook users’ information disclosed on
Facebook but also information from other sources, including those from people
who are not even on Facebook. It enables surveillance not only by commercial and
political entities but also by Facebook users and government. 243 As the Edward
Snowden revelations of 2013 showed, American intelligence services had access to
the data acquired by Facebook and Google, demonstrating that state and
commercial surveillance is inextricably linked.244
Information is power, and more information is more power. 245 Some
information grants some control, and extensive information grants extensive
control. As a source of information, surveillance facilitates control.246 Facebook
possesses unparalleled databases on users and has unparalleled power and control
over them. One critic has observed that the chief danger from Facebook’s
surveillance system is in its concentration of power in Facebook. 247 Given the
extensive reach of the federal criminal law, it seems likely that Facebook possesses
information on many individuals sufficient to support an indictment, if not
conviction, based on some obscure provision of the law.248 As noted above, the
government seems to have access to Facebook’s data, making every Facebook user
potentially subject to a careful review of their data for potential evidence of criminal
offenses. Some may confidently assert that this has never happened, but there is no
assurance that we would ever know if it has happened or that it will not happen in

239

ZUBOFF, supra note 56.
See VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 34, at 35.
241
Lancaster, supra note 136, at 3-10.
242
KEEN, supra note 199, at 165.
243
PASQUALE, supra note 54, at 51. “And once someone else has collected...information, little
stops the government from buying it, demanding it, or even hacking into it.” Id.
244
JULIA ANGWIN, DRAGNET NATION 60 (2014); VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 34, at 61-62.
245
ANGWIN, supra note 244, at 19. Professor Pasquale believes that the core harm of surveillance
is “that it freezes into place an inefficient (or worse) politico-economic regime by cowing its
critics into silence.” PASQUALE, supra note 54, at 52.
246
SCHNEIER, supra note 201, at 113.
247
VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 34, at 59.
248
See also Max Read, Trump is President. Encrypt Your Email, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 2, 2017)
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/31/opinion/sunday/trump-is-president-now-encrypt-youremail.html?auth=login-google; STUART RUSSELL, HUMAN COMPATIBLE 104 (2019) (noting that
“automated, personalized blackmail” as the result of surveillance and algorithms).
240

35

Journal of Law, Technology & the Internet — Vol. 12
the future. In sum, pervasive surveillance generates information that enables the
manipulation of the users of Google’s and Facebook’s services.
c.

Manipulation

Addiction and surveillance allow manipulation—treating another person
not as a fellow rational agent who can be reasoned with, but as a device to be
operated. Manipulation violates another person’s autonomy.249
Manipulation by Facebook refers specifically to utilizing the cognitive
biases of users to influence their perceptions and their behavior.250 Addiction and
surveillance entail manipulation particularly when something is new and poorly
understood. The overwhelming majority of internet users have no formal training
in it and lack a knowledge of how Facebook and other firms are manipulating
them. 251 As University of Chicago Law Professor, Eric Posner, has said of the
advertising-based business model, “[a]ll this is so new that ordinary people haven’t
figured out how manipulated they are by these companies.”252 Roger McNamee has
warned, “Facebook exploits its users’ fear and anger to such a degree that many are
vulnerable to manipulation by those who exploit its algorithms and architecture to
. . . harm the powerless.”253 When Facebook introduced its video tab, Watch, in
August, 2017, the chief executive of the agency 360i said, “[o]ne of the things that
Facebook has done here . . . is that they let the ad model lead the consumer behavior
versus the other way around.” 254 One tech investor surmised that the thought
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process of the Silicon Valley founders could be characterized as “[w]e have to
understand people better in order to manipulate them better.”255
This manipulation is enabled by the data collected through addiction and
surveillance. This data, even in its initial form is not “raw,” but reflects certain
assumptions. 256 It is formatted through algorithms which contain further
assumptions.257 These formats of information then open and foreclose opportunities
for the users.258 Formatting is political work—the exercise of power. The resulting
information allows control, not in the sense of a direct, perceived suppression of
the user’s autonomous will, but through framing the user’s world through the direct
and constant micromanagement of the options in front of the person. And this
framing takes place beyond the user’s gaze and without the user’s comprehension;
the user remains largely unaware of it. Stuart Russell, Professor of Engineering at
the University of California, Berkeley, noted that Facebook’s content-selection
algorithms are designed to maximize the probability that the user clicks on
presented items, but the end result is not simply to present items that the user likes
to click on; it is to change the user’s preferences so that they become more
predictable.259 He says, “Once surveillance capabilities are in place, the next step
is to modify your behavior to suit those who are deploying this technology.”260
Professor Russell, in treating content selection algorithms on Facebook, has
described in the abstract what is different in this process from traditional
advertising:
First, because AI systems can track an individual’s online
reading habits, preferences, and likely state of knowledge,
they can tailor specific messages to maximize impact on that
individual while minimizing the risk that the information
will be disbelieved. Second, the AI system knows whether
the
individual reads the message, how long they spend
reading it, and whether they follow additional links within
the message. It then uses these signals as immediate
feedback on the success or failure of its attempt to influence
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each individual; in this way, it quickly learns to become
more effective in its work.261
Dutch Professors Mireille Hildebrandt and Bert-Jaap Koops give a specific
example of manipulation:
For example, if I am contemplating becoming vegetarian,
profiling software may infer this from my online behaviour.
It may for instance infer that there is an 83 per
cent
chance that I will stop eating meat within the coming month
and sell this information to a retailer or industry that has
an interest in me remaining a carnivore. Whoever bought this
information may send me free samples of the type of meat I
am inferred to prefer and may for instance place
‘advertorials’ on websites that I visit containing scientific
evidence of the specific benefits of the consumption of beef.
The profiling software may have calculated that such
measure will reduce the chance that I stop eating by 23 per
cent, thus making such investment worthwhile. Meanwhile I
am unaware of all this activity.262
This manipulation is the inevitable result of the behavioral-advertising business
model and the combination of addiction, surveillance, and manipulation is essential
to this model.
d.

Loss of Autonomy

Philosophers have questioned the nature of autonomy. Clearly, no one can
conduct herself free from the influence that does not derive directly from her own
authority. As Philosophy Professors Sarah Buss and Andrea Westlund have
observed, “[e]verything we do is a response to past and present circumstances over
which we have no control.”263 The critical question for philosophers then is: what
distinguishes autonomy-undermining influences on a person’s decision, intention,
261
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or will from those motivating forces that merely play a role in the self-governing
process? Philosophers have been unable to reach a consensus on the answer to this
question which is also the question of the precise nature of the threats to personal
autonomy.264
One way of responding to this question in the current digital context of
Facebook and Google, is the concept of the “autonomy trap” as conceived by
Director of the Berkeley Center for Law and Technology, Professor Paul M.
Schwartz. The “autonomy trap” refers to the fact that self-determination in the
digital age is not self-determined, that is, self-determination itself is shaped by the
processing of personal data. 265 The most concrete description of the implications
of the “autonomy trap” has been given by Vice Dean of the University of Haifa,
Law Faculty, Tal Zarsky. He describes the vicious cycle of the autonomy trap as
follows:
(a) Individuals inform the information providers which types
of knowledge and information they are interested in and
provide (both implicitly and explicitly) personal information
such as their traits and interests;
(b) The content providers supply individuals with specific
information ‘tailored’ to the needs of every person,
according to each provider’s specific strategy, and chosen on
the basis of the personal information previously collected;
(c) The individuals require additional information. This time,
however, the request is affected by the information
previously provided;
(d) Again, the information providers supply information, in
accordance with their policies and discretion;
And so on.266
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The central feature of the “autonomy trap” is manipulation. Professors Buss
and Westlund are correct that we respond to circumstances over which we have no
control. We take the natural environment as given and would not consider it as
limiting our autonomy. The key question is how the circumstances arise. Are they
the result of the objective conditions of the general environment or are they directed
at someone by someone else? This distinction is important for autonomy. We can
see this when we consider slavery. Why is it that we find slavery is so morally
egregious? “It is not just because the slave is not able to govern himself, it is
because he is governed by someone else. The master has imposed his will on the
slave in a way that the slave would not endorse.” 267 When circumstances are
intentionally arranged to influence the individual in a way that is beneficial to the
influencer and detrimental to the individual, this is manipulation that depletes
autonomy. The key is that the conditions are not natural or random, they are
intentional.268
As we come to spend more and more time online, our online behavior not
only influences our off-line behavior, it constitutes all our behavior.269 As more and
more of our commercial and personal relationships are migrating online, our
choices for storing and exchanging information and for entertaining, informing, and
expressing ourselves do so as well.270 We are adopting a “digital form of life” and
becoming “digital human beings.”271 Nicholas Carr has observed that the essence
of computer systems is not emancipation, but control and the acts of control become
harder to detect and those wielding control more difficult to discern.272 More and
more our online experiences are shaped to fit the commercial interests of Google
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and Facebook and we pay for the convenience with an erosion of our autonomy.273
This is what the “autonomy trap” entails.
But as noted above, this manipulation is an affront to a person as a rational
and moral being. It is a failure to respect the person’s rational moral agency that is
critical to personhood. It is to treat the person as something less than a person and
is therefore wrong.274
C.

THE BEHAVIORAL-ADVERTISING BUSINESS MODEL AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS
1.

The Economics of the Behavioral-Advertising Business
Model

The immorality of the behavioral-advertising business model is the result in
large part of its economics.275 Economic incentives define critical aspects of the
model. Surprisingly, online advertisements are not worth very much. One estimate
in 2015 suggested that the average Facebook user spends a total of 20 hours on the
platform per month and Facebook earns in profit only about 20 cents a month per
user. 276 These paltry sums drive the business model and have three consequences:
(1) only a platform with hundreds of millions of users can make substantial profits;
(2) the platform must keep the users engaged so they can be advertised to; and (3)
the platform must gather personal data from the users in order to target the
advertisements and manipulate the users. But this business model conflicts with the
desires of the users. Approximately two thirds of Americans do not want
advertisements that target them based on tracking and analysis of personal data.277
The users simply want to connect with other people, but the platforms must
manipulate them to survive and make a profit. Many people believe that their
Facebook feed shows everything that their friends post, but that is not so. The
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algorithm decides what the user sees and it seeks, above all, to increase engagement
and advertising revenue.278
The economic imperatives of the business model have led to immoral
behavior in various forms as described below. One particularly egregious form is
the exploitation of children—it not only adults who are subject to surveillance, data
collection, and manipulation. U.K. Baroness Kidron, a member of the House of
Lords, visiting Silicon Valley to listen to companies’ objections to proposed rules
to protect children online, said of her discussions: “[t]he main thing they are asking
me is: [a]re you really expecting companies to give up profits by restricting the data
they collect on children?’” she said, referring to various online services she had met
with this year. ‘Of course I am! Of course, everyone should.’”279
2.

The Morality of the Behavioral-Advertising Business
Model

Despite the general reluctance to surface moral issues inside280 and outside
Facebook, several commentators have questioned the morality of Facebook’s
business model. Chris Hughes, a roommate of Zuckerberg and former spokesman
for Facebook, has said, “I hate selling ads. . . . It makes me feel seedy.”281 Professor
Zittrain has suggested that aspects of the behavioral-advertising business model are
incompatible with ethically serving users, as polluted streams are incompatible with
ethically mining coal.282 Reporter Eduardo Porter of the New York Times has noted
that “the raw business models of the colossi of the data economy are creepy in and
of themselves.”283 After disclosures that the company’s priority on growth led to
278
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ignoring signs of disrupting elections, Rishad Tobaccowala, chief growth officer
for the Publicis Groupe, one of the world’s biggest ad companies said, “[n]ow we
know Facebook will do whatever it takes to make money. They have absolutely no
morals.”284 But perhaps most damning were the comments by Tim Cook, CEO of
Apple, in a speech to the Electronic Privacy Information Center in Washington, D.
C., in which he said “I’m speaking to you from Silicon Valley, where some of the
most prominent and successful companies have built their businesses by lulling
customers into complacency about their personal information. They’re gobbling up
everything they can learn about you and trying to monetize it. We think that’s
wrong.”285
In late 2018, editorials in two of the world’s most respected newspapers,
The New York Times and The Financial Times, severely criticized Facebook’s
business model. On November 17, 2018, in an editorial titled “Facebook Cannot
Be Trusted,” The New York Times said, “Facebook’s business model, which . . .
capitalizes on personal information to influence the behavior of its users and then
sells that influence to advertisers for a profit . . . is an ecosystem ripe for
manipulation.” 286 On December 2, in an editorial titled “Facebook must recognize
it is more than a platform,” The Financial Times said, “[a]nother company might at
this point question whether its business model is ethically sound. Facebook instead
remains largely in a state of denial . . . . Broad changes to its business model are
required . . . . It is untenable for the doyen of social media to continue placing profits
above privacy, and above democracy.”287
3.

Disregard for Moral Issues

Addiction, surveillance, and manipulation occur only after a person joins
Facebook. It raises the question of why people ignore the moral issues and join
Facebook in the first place. Perhaps the best explanation, but an abstract one, comes
from the neuroscientist Professor Mathew D. Lieberman who said, “[c]reating ways
to keep us connected is . . . the central problem of mammalian evolution.”288 People
use Facebook because it has found a new way of keeping people connected. More
specifically, three aspects make the service attractive: (1) it is free; (2) “network
effects” (the value of a network grows as more people use it); and (3) “lock-in”
Sapna Maheshwari, ’No Morals’: Advertisers Voice Criticism of Tech Giant, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
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(difficulty of abandoning the network). These three factors seem to be more
important than individual choice. If all your friends are on Facebook, how can you
not join? Perhaps it’s also affected by what Professor Aboujaoude calls “reverse
parenting”—parents emulating their children in the virtual world rather than the
other way around.289 Roger McNamee has suggested a consumer rationale: “[a]s
consumers, we crave convenience. We crave connection. We crave free.”290 But
perhaps the enduring motive is not quite so crass. A study at the University of
Connecticut found that although users generally signed up for Facebook to
communicate with friends and relatives, fairly quickly they use it to fight
boredom.291
The user often doesn’t know the ramifications of using the site and doesn’t
understand the underlying economic goal of social networking—monetizing
personal information.292 The monetization of the user’s information, the key to the
devil’s bargain of Facebook use, is by stealth; it is completely “frictionless”—
immediate, effortless, silent, invisible, unnoticed, and automatic.293 An empirical
explanation comes from the scholar who has done the most relevant research on the
topic, Professor Joseph Turow of the Annenberg School for Communication at the
University of Pennsylvania. He has concluded that those who join Facebook are not
participating in a rational exchange, they are giving up their personal information
out of a lack of legal literacy, out of futility, and out of resignation.294 As Professor
Turkle has observed, “[a]s long as Facebook and Google are seen as necessities, if
they demand information, young people know they will supply it. They don’t know
what else to do.”295
One might ask why is Facebook so popular an employer in the tech industry
if the business model is defective. Glassdoor, a site allowing employees to
anonymously rank their employers, gave Facebook the No. 1 place in 2017. 296
Good salaries (starting at about $140,000 per year), generous benefits (Philz Coffee
289
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on campus), and the allure of a famous company may explain the attraction.297 As
Olivia Brown, head of Stanford’s Computer Science and Social Good Club said,
“everyone cares about ethics in tech before they get a contract.”298 Recently, morale
has suffered as employees have begun to question the company’s business model.
In April 2018, Westin Lohne, a product designer at Facebook who left said,
“[m]orally, it was extremely difficult to continue working there.”299 At a gathering
of young engineers at Berkeley in November 2018, many said they would avoid
taking jobs at Facebook. 300 One engineering student invited to a Facebook
recruiting event said, “I’ve heard a lot of employees there don’t even use it . . . I
just don’t believe in the product because like, Facebook, the baseline of everything
they do is desire to show people more ads.”301 Some students who were taking jobs
there are doing so more quietly and advising friends they have carved out more
ethical work at the company or would work from within to change it. 302 The
Financial Times lauded Facebook’s employees saying, “some tech company
employees have highlighted how these companies’ noble goals can clash with the
daily reality of tricking people into clicking on advertisements . . . Bold tech
employees are speaking out and holding their bosses to account for their fine words.
They should be applauded for doing so.” 303 In 2018, Facebook’s ranking in the
Glassdoor survey noted above declined from No. 1 to No. 7.304
More employees perceiving the moral deficiencies in the business model
presents a threat to the companies. Maciej Ceglowski, the founder of the social
bookmarking service Pinboard, has said that “[t]ech workers are the only point of
leverage on these big companies.”305 Jaron Lanier has noted that “[t]he one thing
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that will kill [the internet giants] totally is if the good engineers start leaving. Then
the companies will die.”306
When people talk about their Facebook use (at least to me), they do not
explicitly talk about ethics or morality, but they express reservations. Respondents
to my questions about Facebook use generally say something like, “[w]e are not on
social media or Facebook,” “I am on Facebook, but I have not posted anything in
months,” “I was on Facebook for a while, but I quit some time ago.” Perhaps the
most revealing statement was “I told my daughter ‘Don’t use it [Facebook]. It is
not kosher.’” In the summer of 2018, a New York Times tech reporter, Daisuke
Wakabayashi, found that “[f]or the first time, I noted people were making excuses
as to why they were even on Facebook anymore as though it was an embarrassing
vice.”307 In 2018, after the Cambridge Analytica revelations, Elon Musk, the CEO
of Tesla, deleted his companies’ Facebook pages,308 and reporter Walt Mossberg
of the Wall Street Journal, one of the most prominent tech columnists, deactivated
his Facebook account saying, “I am doing this—after being on Facebook for nearly
12 years—because my own values and the policies and actions of Facebook have
diverged to the point where I’m no longer comfortable here.” 309 Another
dissatisfied user summed up her experience on Facebook saying “[Facebook] took
me right back to high school.”310
Why don’t more quit?311 Because it keeps you from falling out of touch with
people you don’t see very often. Many do not quit because their friendships, their
jobs, their spare time, their very sense of self is closely associated with Facebook.
If they gave up Facebook, they would be severing part of their life or exiling
themselves from society. 312 For others the reason is probably FOMO—the fear of
missing out. 313 One of the most humiliating questions in the English language is,
306
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“Oh! You mean, you haven’t heard?” Some do not quit because of the group
support they find on the platform.314 One morally conflicted Facebook user, the
mother of a special-needs child, suggested gathering members of a support group
on Facebook and jumping ship together because “not that we need Facebook. We
just need one another.” 315 It appears that few people quit for moral reasons. A
moral philosopher, S. Matthew Liao, Professor at NYU, whose focus was not the
moral nature of the business model, asked “Do You Have a Moral Duty to Leave
Facebook?” He decided that the answer for him was to await new information to
see whether Facebook has crossed a moral red line. 316 Billions will continue to use
Facebook regardless of a study of Facebook usage by researchers at NYU and
Stanford that found that deactivating Facebook had a “positive . . . effect” on mood
and life satisfaction.317
Some have asserted that they are not very concerned about the behavioraladvertising business model because they feel that their privacy and autonomy have
not been affected; they do not feel manipulated.318 There is no perfect answer to
such assertions. But one might ask that individual: (1) “Have you ever looked at
the data that Google and Facebook have collected on you?”319 (2) The manipulation
314
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is inherent in the system, so the burden of proof should reverse.320 “Can you show
that you haven’t been manipulated?” (3) “You think your autonomy hasn’t been
compromised? Just wait...” But by then it will be too late.321
4.

Exploitation of Human Weakness

Some might say that the moral question of this behavioral-advertising
business model is the user’s lack of self-control. Columbia University Sociology
Professor Duncan Watts asserted that Facebook’s popularity was due to voyeurism
and exhibitionism and had nothing to do with networking.322 One could argue that
individuals should exercise self-discipline and exhibit moral courage and resist peer
pressure to join Facebook even when all their friends are on it. But as Professor H.
Lustig of the University of California, San Francisco, has said, “addiction and
depression are not choices that people make willingly. Our environment has been
engineered to make sure our choices are anything but free.”323 More and more, we
don’t simply condemn opioid addiction as a lack of self-control. We should not do
so for addiction caused by behavioral advertising.
But the larger question is whether as a society we want to allow the intrusion
of market values and the profit incentive to allow such manipulation of other human
beings in their personal relationships, their commercial activities, and their civic
duties. MIT Professor, Sherry Turkle, has observed, “technology is seductive when
what is offers meets our human vulnerabilities. And as it turns out, we are very
vulnerable indeed.” 324 Psychologists have described in detail many human
vulnerabilities, such as the availability heuristic, the affect heuristic, WYSIATI,
confirmation bias, the priming effect, the anchoring effect, hindsight bias, loss
aversion, the endowment effect, the planning fallacy,325 inattentional blindness,326
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“ego depletion”327 and many other heuristic biases arising from our proclivity to
“think fast” rather than “think slow.”328 Many of these would apply to users of
Google and Facebook. Privacy is especially sensitive to heuristic biases.329 Tristan
Harris, a former design ethicist at Google and co-director of Time Well Spent, has
noted that the user’s willpower is engaged in an unequal battle; it is competing with
1,000 people on the other side of the screen whose job it is to break down the selfregulation that a user has.330 He describes ways they have devised to keep users on
the site, such as controlling the menu to control the choices; stoking the fear of
missing something important; using social approval and social reciprocity; instant
interruptions; inconvenient choices; and auto play (Facebook deliberately auto
plays the next video after a countdown).331 Professor Turkle sums up the discussion
with the conclusion of a precocious sixteen-year-old girl: “[t]echnology is bad
because people are not as strong as its pull.”332
5.

Users as Lab Animals

The depletion of autonomy through addiction, surveillance, and
manipulation and the perversion of personhood are incompatible with human
dignity. An entity that tracks and collects the private information of its constituents
or users has deprived them of their inherent dignity as autonomous individuals and
treated them as objects to be understood and controlled. 333 Several critics have
analogized Facebook users to lab animals: “[i]nternet designers are not treating us
like humans, they’re treating us like lab rats…”; “[w]e have become data-producing
farm animals . . . We are the cows. Facebook clicks on us . . . ”; “[w]e’re being
hypnotized little by little by technicians we can’t see, for purposes we don’t know.
We are all lab animals now . . . ”; and “[the behavioral-advertising business model]
has turned most of the human race into part-time lab rats.” 334 Specific acts of
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manipulation have been reported in which Facebook without the knowledge or
consent of its users has turned them into psychological study subjects and freely
and secretly experimented on them.335 Roger McNamee, commenting on remarks
by Sheryl Sandberg, has noted that, “[i]f Sheryl’s comments are any indication,
running experiments on users without prior consent is a standard practice at
Facebook.”336
6.

Unhappiness

Facebook also seems to sabotage users’ inalienable right to the pursuit of
happiness—it generates more unhappiness than happiness. Professor Lustig has
asserted that “[w]e are our biochemistry, whether we like it or not. And our
biochemistry can be manipulated.” 337 He has written that “reward is not
contentment, and pleasure is not happiness; reward is dopamine and contentment is
serotonin; chronic excess reward interferes with contentment.” 338 A two-week
time-analysis study suggests that the more people use Facebook, the less subjective
well-being they experience. 339 This can explain why many users initially feel
excited by their Facebook use, but after a while experience unhappiness. In 2013,
psychologists at the University of Michigan and Leuven studied two components
of subjective well-being: how young people feel moment-to-moment and how
satisfied they are with their lives.340 The results showed that Facebook use predicted
negative shifts on both components over time.341 The psychologists concluded that,
“[o]n the surface, Facebook provides an invaluable resource for fulfilling the basic
human need for social connection. Rather than enhancing well-being, however,
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these findings suggest that Facebook may undermine it.”342 Deactivating Facebook
can have a positive effect on a user’s mood and life satisfaction.
7.

Critical Silence

It seems clear that the business model of Facebook is morally flawed. But
the primary guardians of morality in America, the churches, have not condemned
it. Perhaps they were led astray by a service that was free and convenient. Maybe
they see the greater convenience of the Facebook platform over a Church webpage
for connecting with members as sufficient justification for any moral qualms. Or
perhaps it is because the pastors are following, not leading, their flocks. The
churches are faced with a fait accompli—many of their members—particularly
younger members—use Facebook, so in an environment of declining church
membership, 343 they may have adopted a utilitarian stance that does not risk losing
touch with their current and future members. Protestant churches and the Catholic
church have websites and are on Facebook, but the Pope apparently is not, although
he is reportedly on Twitter.344 Granted, the churches have protested some uses of
Facebook,345 but their Facebook pages and their suggestions that parishioners can
contact them through these pages lend the moral support of the churches to the
business model. This absence of criticism and active support of the business model
would seem to diminish the moral authority of the churches.346 Perhaps they do not
recognize the ethical issues in the advertising-based business model. Even if they
decide they must participate, they could at least notify members that the church’s
participation is not an endorsement of the business model. It seems odd that Tim
Cook can criticize the Facebook business model, but church leaders do not.

342

Id.; see also Manjoo, supra note 230; Jean M. Twenge, World Happiness Report 2019:
Chapter 5: The Sad State of Happiness in the United States and the Role of Digital Media, WORLD
HAPPINESS REPORT (March 20, 2019), https://worldhappiness.report/ed/2019/ (relating the use of
digital media, including social media, to a rise in unhappiness among Americans since 2012).
Former Surgeon General Vivek Murthy told CBS News in 2017 that “for too many people
technology has led to substituting online connections for offline in-person connections, and
ultimately I think it has been harmful.” See WADHWA & SALKEVER, supra note 5, at 118.
343
See e.g., Jeffrey M. Jones, U.S. Church Membership Down Sharply in Past Two Decades,
GALLUP (Apr. 18, 2019), https://news.gallup.com/poll/248837/church-membership-down-sharplypast-two-decades.aspx.
344
Lina Sharkey, The reason why the Pope has a Twitter and not a Facebook account,
INDEPENDENT (May 23, 2014), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/the-reason-why-thepope-has-a-twitter-and-not-a-facebook-account-9426746.html.
345
See Chris Gayomali, A Catholic Parish Calls Facebook the ‘Opposite of Christian Culture,’
TIME (Apr. 11, 2011), http://techland.time.com/author/chrisgayomali2/page/3/?order=ASC.
346
The same concerns apply to schools, colleges, and other not-for-profit institutions.

51

Journal of Law, Technology & the Internet — Vol. 12
Schools, universities, and other educational institutions have put links to
Facebook on their webpages and in communications with alumni. This common
practice poses moral questions. First, one would think that as not-for-profit entities
they would not be making recommendations for profit-making enterprises.
Educational institutions are not typically in the business of promoting the goods or
services of third parties. 347 Nor do universities in other contexts provide free
advertising or promote other profit-making enterprises. Universities do not suggest
that students and alumni use an Apple, rather than Dell, computer to contact the
university on the internet. Why should they do so for Facebook? Second, Facebook
is not a public utility.348 It is a private enterprise that makes money by monetizing
the personal information of its users. As a publicly listed company, it has very
strong incentives to exploit this information in the future in any possible way349—
ones that we cannot even imagine today. These incentives are a recipe for an
immoral business model. Third, the free advertising by schools and universities put
the integrity of these institutions at stake. Why is a profit-making company with an
immoral business model given the advantage of free publicity? Of course, the
superficial answer is that Facebook is popular with students. The better answer is
that the institutions have lost their moral compass.
Another reason why there has not been a more forceful reaction against
surveillance capitalism and its behavioral-advertising business model is market
imperialism. Market imperialism discourages attention to morality and for many in
the tech industry moral critiques are uncool.350 But perhaps it is also because we,
like the founders of Google and Facebook, did not understand advertising.351 More
specifically, this business model was unprecedented. It was poorly understood;
people did not grasp how it worked or how the companies made money. 352 The
technology implementing the model was dazzling, intimidating, and complex. In
347

This analysis would likely differ when considering private educational institutions that are forprofit.
348
This is true even though users may treat it that way and Mark Zuckerberg has so declared. But
if it is truly a public utility, then it should be heavily regulated as are other public utilities. For
“utility” comments, see KIRKPATRICK, supra note 144, at 144; see also LANIER, supra note 43, at
250. On a similar note, Nicholas Carr has suggested that, “[t]he PC age is giving way to a new era:
the utility age.” CARR, supra note 270, at 61.
349
A major factor in business decisions for publicly listed companies is based on what
shareholders will want: money.
350
CARR, supra note 15, at 10.
351
Sherry Turkle has warned that, “We’re accustomed to media manipulation—advertising has
always tried to do this. But unprecedented kinds of information about us...allows for
unprecedented interventions and intrusions. What is at stake is a sense of a self in control of itself.
And a citizenry that can think for itself.” SHERRY TURKLE, RECLAIMING CONVERSATION 314
(2015).
352
See id.

52

“Because It Is Wrong”: Immorality and Illegality of Online Service Contracts
comparison with the physical world, the online environment made it harder to
detect the acts of manipulation and control. 353 The legal environment was
unprepared and caught off guard when Google and Facebook arrogated to
themselves the right to “move fast and break things” or charge ahead, pushing
technology into new areas without seeking permission.354 The companies believed
that new technology was both good 355 and inevitable 356 and we consented,
switching off our critical faculties.357 The two companies expended huge resources
to take advantage of basic human desires for information and connection and
exploited human weaknesses, such as heuristic biases and addiction. Perhaps we
have not reacted more forcefully because, as Shoshanna Zuboff suggests,
surveillance capitalism has left us feeling helpless, resigned, and numb.358
Nor should we disregard fear or intimidation. Anyone familiar with social
media understands the power of troll swarms, bot armies, and denial of service
(DoS) attacks. Criticism of Google and Facebook could lead to rapid and vicious
attacks by those who value these services. Wael Ghonim, a former Google
executive who organized the Arab Spring protests against the Egyptian dictator
Hosni Mubarak through social media, remarked that “. . . it is much harder to
actually stand up against the mainstream on Twitter than stand up against a
353

CARR, supra note 270, at 199.
For example, Antonio Garcia Martinez has written, “there were almost no legal precedents
covering any [of] this newfangled data-privacy stuff...Facebook and every major ads player...were
making it up as they went along.” GARCIA MARTINEZ, supra note 2, at 326. Nicholas Carr has
noted that “Technological revolutions tend to race ahead of institutional responses, creating all
sorts of social and legal quandaries.” CARR, supra note 270, at 61.
355
Mary Aiken, Adjunct Associate Professor at the Geary Institute for Public Policy at University
College Dublin, reminds us that “what is new is not always good—and technology does not
always mean progress.” MARY AIKEN, THE CYBER EFFECT 303–04 (2016);
see ZUBOFF, supra note 56, at 225 (asserting the “[i]nevitability rhetoric is a cunning fraud
designed to render us helpless and passive in the face of implacable forces...”).
356
SHERRY TURKLE, THE SECOND SELF: COMPUTERS AND THE HUMAN SPIRIT 4 (2005) (“[I]f we
hope to construct the richest lives possible with this [computer] technology, we must not...see its
current direction as inevitable or determined.”). Daniel Kahneman believes the story of Google
demonstrates the inevitability illusion. See KAHNEMAN, supra note 325, at 200–01; see also
COHEN, supra note 231, at 241 (asserting “the fact that emerging patterns of information flow
serve powerful economic and political interest, and thus might have been predicted by anyone
paying attention to the distribution of incentives, does not make the patterns natural or just”).
357
Nicholas Carr, The Internet as Innocent Fraud, ROUGH TYPE (Sept. 12, 2017),
http://www.roughtype.com/?p=8113.
358
ZUBOFF, supra note 56, at 94–95. But see Shoshanna Zuboff, You Are Now Remotely
Controlled, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24,
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/24/opinion/sunday/surveillancecapitalism.html (“Anything made by humans can be unmade by humans. Surveillance capitalism
is young…democracy is old…”).
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dictator.”359 If Facebook and Google felt threatened and wanted to mobilize, or just
inspire, a crowd to attack their critics, what critic would stand a chance of a fair
hearing? We should also not ignore the possibility of silent intimidation caused by
the fear, or possible fear, of such an attack. What Wael Ghonim tells us is that the
affordances of social media can be exploited for evil that is worse than the evil the
protesters used social media to oppose.360 That the cure of Twitter is worse than the
disease of the oppressive Egyptian government because it is even more difficult to
oppose.361 It seems likely that fear of intimidation by a cyber mob has inhibited
criticism of Google and Facebook.
8.

Frictionless Sharing

For some, Mark Zuckerberg’s lofty goal for Facebook (“to give people the
power to share and make the world more open and connected”) 362 excuses the
immorality of the business model. More commonly, the veneration of technology
assumes that innovation has only positive effects.363 Invention is seen as good in
itself with ethical oversight limited to greed prevention.364 In a similar way, Mark
Zuckerberg has believed from the beginning that connecting people through new
technology and frictionless sharing was naturally good.365 But, this belief has been
called a “thinly veiled cover for the true goal of . . . increasing the amount of data
available for ad targeting.”366 Whether the effects of a new technology connecting
people are good or bad depends on the circumstances. Consider the old technology
of the car horn and then a new technology that would allow people frictionless,
direct connections: a tiny, but very loud, megaphone mounted on top of every car,
359

ZEYNEP TUFEKCI, TWITTER AND TEAR GAS 79 (2017). For intimidation, see also Sarah
Jeong, How an Online Mob Created a Playbook for a Culture War, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15,
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/08/15/opinion/what-is-gamergate.html;
RICHARD SEYMOUR, THE TWITTERING MACHINE 37 (2019) (referencing a trolling slogan “none of
us is as cruel as all of us”); JAMES WILLIAMS, STAND OUT OF OUR LIGHT: FREEDOM AND
RESISTANCE IN THE ATTENTION ECONOMY 76 (2018) (stating “[the] mob rule is hard-coded into
the design of the attention economy”).
360
See TUFEKCI, supra note 359, at 79.
361
Id.
362
MCNAMEE, supra note 58, at 241.
363
MOROZOV , supra note 33, at 167; see also, Janan Ganesh, Against the cult of innovation, FIN.
TIMES (Dec. 27, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/fa1f922e-2631-11ea-9a4f-963f0ec7e134.
364
JASANOFF, supra note 26, at 251.
365
Andrew Bosworth, Facebook Vice President, has said, “[t]he ugly truth is that we believe in
connecting people so deeply that anything that allows us to connect more people more often is ‘de
facto’ good.” Sheera Frenkel & Nellie Bowles, Facebook Employees in Uproar Over Executive’s
Leaked Memo, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/30/technology/facebook-leaked-memo.html.
366
Kevin Roose, Is Tech Too Easy To Use?, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/12/technology/tech-friction-frictionless.html.

54

“Because It Is Wrong”: Immorality and Illegality of Online Service Contracts
allowing the driver to express his or her opinion about the drivers of the surrounding
vehicles. Mark Zuckerberg should consider this megaphone a great improvement
over the old car horn; it would be a wonderful way to have people share and connect
more expressively. But most drivers recognize that it would result in an epidemic
of road rage—drivers cursing at other drivers who were changing lanes without
signaling, driving too slowly, etc. This example teaches us that new technology and
connecting people are not necessarily good; it depends on the architecture or
structure of the technology and the way it facilitates positive or negative human
traits. If a technology brings out the worst in human nature, limits on connection
can, in fact, be good.367
This example seems to illustrate one of the implications of the famous
comment that “the medium is the message” by University of Toronto Professor
Marshall McLuhan:368 the architecture or structure of a technology, by limiting and
focusing our perspectives, largely determines its effects.

MOROZOV, supra note 33, at 346 (“Limits and constraints...can be productive—even if the
entire conceit of the ‘the Internet’ suggests otherwise”); LANIER, supra note 42, at 107
(“[C]onstraints compensate for the flaws of human nature”). Friction may also play a positive role.
The friction of face-to-face meetings is why comments in that context are rarely as rude or
provocative as those issued through frictionless digital media. Further, as more people spend more
time online, darkness, regression and impulsivity, characteristics of the e-personality, would
probably exacerbate the problems with this new frictionless device. See ABOUJAOUDE, supra note
62. Julie Cohen has observed that human flourishing in the networked information society requires
an effort to reverse, or at least cabin, the tendencies toward seamless continuity within
infrastructures for information exchange. See COHEN, supra note 231, at 241; see also
NICHOLAS CARR, THE GLASS CAGE: AUTOMATION AND US 182 (2014) (“Removing the friction
from social attachments doesn’t strengthen them; it weakens them”); ANDERSON, supra note 19, at
164 (“Higher, shared, and personal ways of valuing goods require social constraints on use.”);
Zeynep Tufekci, Engineering the Public, 19 FIRST MONDAY (June 30,
2014), https://firstmonday.org/article/view/4901/4097 (“computational politics removes a
‘beneficial inefficiency’...that aided the public sphere”).
368
MARSHALL MCLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA 7 (1964) (“[T]he medium is the message. This
is merely to say that the personal and social consequences of any medium...result from the new
scale that is introduced into our affairs...by any new technology”). Another example of the
negative effects of a new technology on communication would be the computer programs that
allow robocalls. These programs connect people with others (advertisers) frictionlessly but are
perceived by the receivers of the calls as annoyances rather than positive experiences. Previously,
such calls were not economically viable; it cost too much to have human operators make each
call. But automation lowered the cost and spawned an entire industry. Unfortunately, another
technical innovation, caller ID service, does not resolve the problem because the receiver’s phone
still rings. See Wade Roush, Goodbye Phone Calls, Hello, Loneliness: Can you really “reach out
and touch someone” via text?, SCI. AM. (Nov. 1, 2019),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/goodbye-phone-calls-hello-loneliness/.
367
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Finally, this example also suggests the following question for Facebook and
for Google: does the architecture of a new technology call forth the positive or the
negative in human nature?369 If more negative than positive, what is the moral basis
for using the technology?
For Mark Zuckerberg and Facebook the answer is that the company, despite
its failings, is still overwhelmingly a force for good in the world.370 This belief rests
on the assumptions that connectivity is ipso facto good, that connectivity is the
preeminent good, that Facebook’s mission is to connect people and, therefore,
Facebook plays a positive role regardless of any shortcomings. Others who do not
accept these assumptions differ as to Facebook’s effects. Roger McNamee tells us
that “[t]he time has come to accept that in its current mode of operation, Facebook’s
flaws outweigh its considerable benefits.”371
9.

Data Exhaust

The behavioral-advertising business model requires vast amounts of
personal information. This personal information collected by Google and Facebook
has been described as “data exhaust.” 372 This term suggests analogies. One is
“dumpster diving.” Google’s and Facebook’s collection of data has similarities to
dumpster diving. While dumpster diving is not generally prohibited, there are
municipalities that do prohibit it under a theory of trespass.373 The U. S. Supreme
Court held in California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988), that the Fourth
See TURKLE, supra note 295, at 19 (“So, of every technology we must ask, does it serve our
human purposes?”); MOROZOV, supra note 33, at 124 (“We must not fixate on what this new
arsenal of digital technologies allows us to do without first inquiring what is worth doing”);
RICHARD WATSON, FUTURE MINDS 222 (2013) (“[P]erhaps a question we should be asking
ourselves more frequently in the future is not whether we can invent something but whether we
should”). One suggestion is that we promote technologies that correct the problems created by the
last technologies. See VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 34, at 26.
370
LEVY, supra note 139, at 16.
371
MCNAMEE, supra note 51, at 247.
372
See VIKTOR MAYOR-SCHONBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA 113 (2013); Adam
Baron, Turning Trash into Treasure: Data Exhaust and A New Wave of Quant Data, THOMSON
REUTERS (Aug. 30, 2016), https://blogs.thomsonreuters.com/answerson/five-lessons-learned-dataexhaust/ (“Data exhaust is literally the modern day…equivalent of the old adage “one man’s trash
is another man’s treasure.””); see also NICK COULDRY & ULISES A. MEJIAS, supra note 103, at 9
(stating that if data is seen as the “exhaust” of life processes, then “[d]ata is assumed to just be
there for the taking”).
373
Ashlee Kieler, Dumpster Diving for Beauty Products: Is It Legal and
Safe? CONSUMER REPORTS (May 31, 2017),
https://www.consumerreports.org/consumerist/dumpster-diving-for-beauty-products-is-it-legaland-safe/.
369
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Amendment did not prohibit the warrantless search and seizure by government
authorities of garbage left for collection outside the curtilage of a home because
there was no socially accepted objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the
garbage.374 But Justice Brennan in dissent expressed a commonsense revulsion at
the police’s conduct in that case:
Most of us, I believe, would be incensed to discover
a meddler—whether a neighbor, a reporter, or a
detective—scrutinizing our sealed trash containers to
discover some detail of our personal lives.... When a
tabloid reporter examined then-Secretary of State
Henry Kissinger's trash and published his findings,
Kissinger was ‘really revolted’ by the intrusion and
his wife suffered ‘grave anguish.’375
Should the collection of our digital exhaust generate the same sense of
disdain and repulsion as dumpster diving? One answer is that we are sharing our
digital exhaust, but not abandoning it. Another answer is that the collectors of our
digital exhaust obtain consent and this acquits them. But, as explained below, that
answer is defective. 376 Should our digital exhaust be outside the reach of the
market?
Consider two analogies that take the concept of “exhaust” a step further.
Science has recently made it possible to gather a person’s DNA and personal
microbiome. 377 Assume in the future that these acquire a market value and
companies strive to collect them. The janitors of public and private buildings will
vacuum up the strands of hair containing DNA that people leave in rooms and
corridors. The entrance to the building will predictably have a notice stating that
entrance is free, but anyone entering consents to the collection of his or her DNA.378
In the toilets of these buildings, devices will be put in the drainage pipes to catch
human stool so that personal microbiomes can be collected. Again, on the door of
every bathroom stall a notice will inform the visitor that he or she consents to the
374

California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
Id. at 51-52.
376
See infra at p. 142-43.
377
DNA Fingerprinting, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/science/DNAfingerprinting; Kara Rogers, Human Microbiome, https://www.britannica.com/science/humanmicrobiome.
378
In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Assn, 489 U.S. 602, 642 (1989) (Marshall, J.
dissenting), it was expressed that privacy interest exist in a person’s bodily fluids and excretions.
Whether a notice of consent is sufficient to overcome this privacy interest remains a theoretical
question.
375
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collection of stool and the personal microbiome in exchange for free use of the
facility. Would people find this acceptable? Likely, not. But this is essentially what
Google and Facebook are doing already. If you have already given up your mind,
it seems reasonable to render your body as well. But are these appropriate
applications of market thinking?379
10.

Threat to Democratic Practice

Behavioral advertising, through addiction, surveillance, and manipulation
and the perversion of personhood, threatens democratic practice. It does so in two
ways.
First, the behavioral-advertising business model threatens democratic
elections by its policy of favoring demonstrably false and misleading political
campaign advertisements. In 2019, after the Trump campaign put up on Facebook
a false advertisement about Joe Biden, the Biden campaign demanded that
Facebook take it down and Facebook refused.380 Later, when Elizabeth Warren,
another Democratic candidate, intentionally posted an ad with false information
about Mark Zuckerberg to challenge the company, it refused to take it down.381
Facebook responded that it “believes political speech should be protected.”382 But
it is not that Facebook believes in free speech, it is that Facebook’s algorithms favor
disinformation that is inflammatory and provocative. This is the information that
gets shared most often and most widely and this engagement generates more
advertising revenue for Facebook.383
As in the case of the car megaphone, it is not that the technology is bad in
and of itself, it is that the architecture of the technology and the surrounding
circumstances determine whether the technology has positive or negative results.
In the United States, the virality of misinformation caused by Facebook’s
379

Would we want to see Facebook and Google combine our personal data, DNA, and
microbiome and upload the combination together with our brains to achieve Singularity? Ray
Kurzweil, a Google employee, discusses this situation. See RAY KURZWEIL, THE SINGULARITY IS
NEAR: WHEN HUMANS TRANSCEND BIOLOGY 198-200 (2005).
380
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N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/17/business/zuckerberg-facebookfree-speech.html.
381
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382
Id.
383
See Aja Romano, The Scariest Part of Facebook’s Fake News Problem: Fake News Is More
Viral Than Real News, VOX (Nov. 16, 2016), https://www.vox.com/2016/11/16/13626318/viralfake-news-on-facebook.
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algorithms damages democratic election campaigns. In underdeveloped countries
like Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and India where civil institutions are weak, the virality
of misinformation has led to mass violence and killing as mentioned below.384
Second, the data and algorithms of behavioral advertising have enabled
attacks on American democracy by influencing elections. In the 2010 congressional
elections, Facebook created an “I voted” icon and the bandwagon effect increased
voting turnout by 0.39 %, enough to change the results of a close election.385 In his
discussion of this, Professor Zittrain, a co-founder of the Berkman Klein Center for
Internet & Society at Harvard Law School, speculated at what might happen if
Mark Zuckerberg decided to send a message encouraging voting only to those
voters favoring the candidate he favored, and asked whether we should have a
problem with that.386 More recently, in the 2016 presidential race, just before the
election the Trump campaign paid for a voter-suppression effort on the platform
precisely targeted at potential Democratic voters. 387 Theresa Hong, the Trump
campaign’s digital-content director, said, “[w]ithout Facebook we wouldn’t have
won.”388 As for the 2020 presidential election, Texas Congressional Representative
Lamar Smith has said that, “Google could well elect the next president.”389
The influence is not necessarily by Facebook as an entity; its users can
exercise influence. Data Scientist Cathy O’Neill wrote prophetically before the
2016 election that “Facebook’s algorithms can affect how millions of people feel,
and those people won’t know that it’s happening. What would occur if they played
with people’s emotions on Election Day?”390 It is not clear whether Facebook did
384

See discussion infra on pp. 157-160.
Jonathan Zittrain, Engineering an Election, 127 HARV. L. FORUM 335, 335-36 (2014).
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Id. at 336.
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See Dan Sabbagh, Trump 2016 Campaign Targeted 3.5m Black Americans to Deter Them
From Voting, GUARDIAN (Sep. 28, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2020/sep/28/trump-2016-campaign-targeted-35m-black-americans-to-deter-them-fromvoting.
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April Glaser, The Cambridge-Analytica Scandal Is What Facebook-Powered Election Cheating
Looks Like, SLATE (Mar. 17, 2018), https://slate.com/technology/2018/03/the-cambridgeanalytica-scandal-is-what-facebook-powered-election-cheating-looks-like.html.
389
Daisuke Wakabayashi & Cecilia Kang, Google’s Pichai Faces Privacy and Bias Questions in
Congress, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 11, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/11/technology/googlepichai-house-committee-hearing.html?searchResultPosition=7; see also Kevin Roose, Buckle Up
for Another Facebook Election, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/10/technology/facebook-election.html.
390
O’NEILL, supra note 320, at 184; see Natasha Singer, What You Don’t Know About How
Facebook Uses Your Data, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 11, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/11/technology/facebook-privacy-hearings.html (describing
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so, but it is clear that Russian agents did so through Facebook, engaging with
American voters to affect the results of the 2016 presidential election. 391 The
Mueller Report and a report produced for the Senate Intelligence Committee based
on data from Facebook and other companies disclosed that the Internet Research
Agency, a Russian organization owned by an oligarch close to President Putin, had
used false Facebook accounts to send messages to potential American voters,
particularly African-Americans, to discourage them from voting or to otherwise
influence their voting behavior to the advantage of Donald Trump.392 The White
House has issued an official statement that characterized the foreign interference in
United States elections as “an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national
security...of the United States.”393
Historian Yuval Noah Harari, looking towards the future, offers a warning
that Facebook’s global connectivity may doom democracy. He assumes that
referendums and elections are always about human feelings, not about human
rationality. 394 He then posits that this reliance on them “might prove to be the
Achilles’ heel of liberal democracy. For once somebody (whether in Beijing or San
Francisco) gains the technological ability to hack and manipulate the human heart,
democratic politics will imitate into an emotional puppet show.”395
The behavioral-advertising business model is morally deficient. Its design
preferences inflammatory and provocative expression and promotes virality. It has

how Facebook lets third parties target its users); see also Keith Collins & Larry Buchanan, How
Facebook Lets Brands and Politicians Target You, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 11,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/04/11/technology/facebook-sells-ads-lifedetails.html?mtrref=www.google.com&gwh=F7966F5CD72754FDF4153C54D219BF9E&gwt=p
ay&assetType=REGIWALL.
391
THE WASHINGTON POST, THE MUELLER REPORT 14-32 (2019); Scott Shane
& Sheera Frenkel, Russian 2016 Influence Operation Targeted African-Americans on Social
Media, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/17/us/politics/russia2016-influence-campaign.html. For an example of manipulation by a Google user, see
Patrick Berlinquette, I Used Google Ads for Social Engineering. It Worked., N.Y. TIMES (July 7,
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/07/opinion/google-ads.html.
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THE WASHINGTON POST, THE MUELLER REPORT 14-32 (2019); Scott Shane
& Sheera Frenkel, Russian 2016 Influence Operation Targeted African-Americans on Social
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enabled the undermining of our system of democratic elections and endangered the
national security of our country.
11.

Threat to Rule of Law

The behavioral-advertising business model, through addiction, surveillance,
and manipulation, also threatens our legal system and the rule of law. In 2018, it
was reported that Sheryl Sandberg, in a potential “dirty tricks” attempt, hired a
public relations firm to dig up negative information on George Soros because of his
call for regulation of tech companies.396 It seems unlikely that any user can now
trust that Facebook management would not make use of data from the user, the
user’s spouse, or close relatives to blackmail a legislator about a piece of legislation
of interest to Facebook or blackmail a judge or the close relatives of a judge in an
important legal case. Of course, if this ever did happen, the chances are remote that
we could ever learn of it. Especially if the response from Facebook to any
accusation was that its actions were the result of its algorithm and any analysis of
the algorithm would be a violation of its intellectual property rights. Or even if
access were granted to the algorithm, artificial intelligence may well have rendered
it unintelligible to humans. 397 The parties on the other side of legislation or
litigation have no way to assure that this will not happen. Facebook’s history and
recent revelations show that the company is morally challenged and has subjected
the rule of law to an unacceptable risk. One would think that the American Bar
Association would have raised some concerns. But it has placed a Facebook icon
on its webpage, encouraging lawyers to connect with it through Facebook. 398
Perhaps lawyers representing Facebook are a bit too influential in the relevant ABA
Sections.
Sheryl Sandberg’s potential “dirty trick” brings to mind Fordham Law
School Professor Zephyr Teachout’s comment that those with too much power, like
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Google, cannot help but be evil.399 It is not wrong for a company to aspire to grow
to a large size nor wrong for it to try to protect its interests. Surveillance capitalism
incentivizes companies to seek more raw material data and that requires Facebook
and Google to grow. Size gives power and the temptation to protect a company’s
interests by exercising its power in ways that are morally–and often legally—
improper. Google’s size makes it harder to avoid “being evil.”400
The behavioral-advertising business model is morally repugnant. It has not
only threatened democratic practice, but also our legal system and the rule of law.
It is morally wrong. But is it also legally wrong?

Zephyr Teachout, Google is coming after critics in academia and journalism. It’s time to stop
them, WASH. POST (Aug. 30, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/posteverything/wp/2017/08/30/zephyr-teachout-google-iscoming-after-critics-in-academia-and-journalism-its-time-to-stop-them/ (providing an example of
Google’s role in pressuring the not-for-profit New America to fire its Open Markets team after the
team dared to speak up about Google in the mildest way); see also LEVY, supra note 68, at 6
(stating that Google is evil in another way despite its rhetoric of moral purity and “Don’t Be Evil,”
because it seems to have a blind eye for the consequences of its own technology on privacy and
property rights); Nancy Scola, Why Liberals and Big Tech Companies Broke Up, POLITICO (Mar.
17, 2019), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/03/17/democrats-candidates-2020-tech-siliconvalley-1229345 (stating Elizabeth Warren singled out Facebook for taking down her campaign ads
and calling for its breakup).
400
This is true regardless of whether Mark Zuckerberg and the Google founders are “good” or
“nice” people. See Paul Lewis, Our Minds Can Be Hijacked: The Tech Insiders Who Fear a
Smartphone Dystopia, GUARDIAN (Oct. 6,
2017), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/oct/05/smartphone-addiction-siliconvalley-dystopia (citing Roger McNamee, “The people who run Facebook and Google are good
people…”); see also Chris Hughes, It’s Time to Break Up Facebook, N.Y. TIMES (May 9,
2019) https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/09/opinion/sunday/chris-hughes-facebookzuckerberg.html (“Mark [Zuckerberg] is a good, kind person”); Edward Luce, The Zuckerberg
Delusion, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/580f18d6-c951-11e7-aa33c63fdc9b8c6c (“Mr. Zuckerberg suffers from two delusions common to America’s new economy
elites. They think they are nice people—indeed, most of them are. Mr. Zuckerberg seems to be,
too”); Nellie Bowles, Tech Embraces Its Doomsayer, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/09/business/yuval-noah-harari-silicon-valley.html (quoting
Yuval Noah Harari, “I’ve met a number of these high-tech giants, and generally they’re good
people...They’re not Attila the Hun. In the lottery of human leaders, you could get far worse”);
LEVY, supra note 139, at 51 (stating Mark Zuckerberg’s sister described him as a “very ethical and
fair individual”). But see LEVY, supra note 139, at 11 and 59 (noting a report issued in a
U.K. parliamentary study called Facebook “digital gangsters,” New Zealand’s Privacy
Commissioner John Edwards said that Facebook’s leaders were “morally bankrupt pathological
liars,” and Aaron Greenspan, a Harvard student and builder of small digital products, said of Mark
Zuckerberg, “I didn’t trust him from the moment I met him”).
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PART TWO: LEGALITY
I.

CONTRACT LAW AND THE BEHAVIORAL-ADVERTISING BUSINESS MODEL

The behavioral-advertising business model poses a special problem for the
legal system because it is unprecedented. It is unprecedented in the sense that it
(and the contracts implementing it) depend on a technology (the internet) that is
unique in its combination of characteristics: the technology has been distributed
more widely, more quickly and has had deeper effects than any other technology in
human history. This technology, business model, and the attendant contracts were
never seen before and therefore, unfortunately, not foreseen. The unprecedented
nature of this technology and business model explains why we have so far failed
the challenge set for us more than 40 years ago by Harvard sociologist Daniel Bell,
who wrote that, “[t]he major technological problem ahead will be the test of our
ability to foresee the effects of social and technological change and to construct
alternative courses in accordance with different valuations of ends, at different
costs.”401
In our defense we can say that technological revolutions tend to race ahead
of institutional responses, creating a panoply of social and legal quandaries. 402 We
can understand that a legal system based on precedent finds it difficult to deal with
the unprecedented. But we can also recognize that history repeats itself, although
often in a cunning disguise that prevents us from detecting the resemblance until it
is too late.403 Once we have seen the resemblance, then, as University of Chicago
Law Professors Saul Levmore and Martha Nussbaum have suggested, “[o]ld
solutions are sometimes appropriate for new problems.” 404 Thus, the concept of
inalienable rights that was the philosophical justification for American
independence and an important element of the California Constitution can help us
deal with this unprecedented business model and its contracts.
A.

INALIENABLE RIGHTS

The unprecedented nature of this business model has meant that, for the
most part, the response of the legal system to surveillance capitalism and the
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behavioral-advertising business model has been feeble and misdirected.405 Legal
scholars, government officials, and private practitioners have mostly viewed the
current practices of Google and Facebook through the legal lenses of privacy and
monopoly.406 Efforts at privacy legislation and monopoly regulation have achieved
some modest success, 407 but the advertising-based business model has not been
seriously affected. Even the European Community’s most aggressive effort yet, the
General Data Protection Regulations, is primarily directed at privacy.408 Monopoly
MARK BARTHOLOMEW, ADCREEP (2017) (“At a time when a panoply of new marketing
techniques is changing human behavior and eroding consumer agency, the legal system has stood
still”). Perhaps this feeble response is partly a result of Google’s influence over academia and the
private sector. Shoshanna Zuboff has noted that a list of Google Policy Fellows for 2014 lists
individuals from non-profit organizations that one would assume are leading the fight against
Google: The Center for Democracy and Technology, The Electronic Frontier foundation, the
National Consumers League, The Future of Privacy Forum and others. See ZUBOFF, supra note 56,
at 126. See also CHRIS JAY HOOFNAGLE, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION PRIVACY LAW
AND POLICY 361 (2016) (stating his belief that George Mason University Law School “has been
used as a kind of academic front for Google’s activities”).
406
ZUBOFF, supra note 56, at 193 (“The primary frameworks through which our societies have
sought to assert control over surveillance capitalism’s audacity are those of ‘privacy rights’ and
‘monopoly’”). Id. at 54 (“These developments [of surveillance capitalism] are all the more
dangerous because they cannot be reduced to known harms—monopoly, privacy—and therefore
do not easily yield to known forms of combat. The new harms we face entail challenges to the
sanctity of the individual, and chief among these challenges I count elemental rights that bear on
individual sovereignty...”). For the monopoly perspective, see Tim Wu, What Years of Emails and
Texts Reveal About Your Friendly Tech Companies, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 4, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/04/opinion/amazon-facebook-congressional-hearings.html; see
also Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications of
a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1057-63 (2000)
(suggesting a role for contracts and a concept of legislative rules specifying certain contracts that
would carry implied promises of confidentiality).
407
See generally Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 ILCS 14/ et seq. (2008); see also
Daisuke Wakabayashi, California Passes Sweeping Law to Protect Online Privacy, N.Y. TIMES
(June 28, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/28/technology/california-online-privacylaw.html.
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The General Data Protection Regulation in CHARLENE BROWNLEE & BLAZE D. WALESKI,
PRIVACY LAW (2019) § 5.02[3][d]; see also Art. 4 GDPR Definitions, GENERAL DATA
PROTECTION REGULATION https://gdpr-info.eu/art-4-gdpr/ (last visited Sep. 13, 2020). The
GDPR’s emphasis on privacy means that it emphasizes “consent.” See Art. 4 GDPR Definitions,
GENERAL DATA PROTECTION REGULATION (GDPR), https://gdpr-info.eu/art-4-gdpr/ (last visited
Sep. 13, 2020); see also Art. 6 GDPR Lawfulness of Processing, GENERAL DATA PROTECTION
REGULATION (GDPR), https://gdpr-info.eu/art-6-gdpr/ (last visited Sep. 13, 2020); Art. 7 GDPR
Conditions for Consent, GENERAL DATA PROTECTION REGULATION (GDPR), https://gdprinfo.eu/art-7-gdpr/ (last visited Sep. 13, 2020). Privacy is a cluster of problems, so it can be
waived in part. But autonomy is unitary and cannot be waived; it is inalienable so consent is
irrelevant. Emma Martins, Data Protection Commissioner, Office of the Data Protection
Authority, Guernsey, CI, sees the GDPR as “a good starting point,” but has stated that the way our
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and privacy are not the main problem; the business model is. The new harms that
threaten us are more than issues of privacy and monopoly; they undermine our
autonomy and our democracy. Legal protection of privacy and restrictions on
monopoly alone can never safeguard these existential interests because they do not
address the basic problem of the immoral business model.
Inalienabilty is the legal system’s way of saying that something is beyond
the reach of the market. 409 Legally, it can be established by a Constitution or
legislation, but it is important to recognize that courts have the power to interpret
what is or is not inalienable.410 And inalienable rights have occupied a central role
in American moral and legal culture. 411 Most Americans are familiar with the
stirring words of the Declaration of Independence: “[w]e hold these truths to be
self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator
with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit
of Happiness . . . .” 412 The presence of the words “unalienable rights” in the
Declaration of Independence indicates their fundamental role in justifying the
existence of the United States as a country. These rights were not some anomaly or
minor exception to a world of market thinking, no generous concession granted by
market analysis. Nor do they constitute an instance of market failure. They were
the most basic and most important aspects of the social and political lives of
citizens. These words were not included in the United States Constitution. 413
Therefore, their direct legal effect on surveillance capitalism is questionable as a
matter of federal law. But, the constitutions of a number of states do include similar
language.414
The Constitution of the State of California proclaims in Section 1 that “[a]ll
people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these
personal data are used “goes well beyond notions of data privacy,” and “goes to the heart of what
it is to be an autonomous free citizen.” Emma Martins, Conversation about our data must involve
us all, Letter to the Editor, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2020, at 14. The distinction between privacy and
autonomy holds even though the European conception of privacy differs from the American in its
emphasis on dignity. See James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity
Versus Liberty, 113 YALE L. J. 1151 (2004).
409
Inalienability, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
410
MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 161 (1996).
411
Radin, supra note 21, at 1849.
412
The Declaration of Independence, NAT. ARCHIVES, https://www.archives.gov/foundingdocs/declaration (last reviewed Mar. 16, 2020) (emphasis added); WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2482 (1966) gives “inalienable” as a synonym of “unalienable.”
413
See U.S. CONST.
414
See generally, Steven G. Calabresi & Sarah Agugo, Individual Rights Under State
Constitutions when the Fourteenth Amendment Was Ratified in 1868: What Rights Are Deeply
Rooted in American History and Tradition?, 87 TEX. L. REV. 7 (2008).
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are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting
property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy.” 415
California’s Constitution is relevant because the relationship between Google or
Facebook and its users is governed by California law. 416 The digital Terms of
Service for both companies refer to California law and to California jurisdiction
over all disputes in courts in California.417 That relationship is therefore subject to
the declaration of inalienable rights set forth in the California Constitution.
The invocation of California’s Constitution here is not intended to assert
that suing the companies for violations of Section 1 would be the most appropriate
strategy. 418 Rather, the language of the Constitution is cited here primarily as an
affirmation that, as a matter of public policy, California does not accept the idea of
universal commodification; it recognizes that certain activities are not subject to
market forces. In fact, it asserts that the most important rights that people have are
necessarily not marketable, which are characterized as “inalienable.” “Inalienable,”
of course, has various meanings. It can mean that the right may not be sold; that it
may not be transferred; that it may not be bequeathed; that it may not be lost at
all.419 In the context of contract law it means that a person cannot give up the right
by contract; that consent to do so is void.420
Statements in the political sphere, such as the California Constitution (“[a]ll
people...have inalienable rights”), often express what David Ellerman, Visiting
Cal. Const., § (emphasis added); Staughton Lynd has argued that “inalienable” in the
Declaration of Independence is ambiguous. It could refer either to either rights seen as property, in
which case they could be disposed of with consent, or as rights of conscience that by their nature
could not be transferred. He concluded, however, that, “The statesmanship of the American
Revolution...tended to reserve absolute inalienability for the life of the mind.” STAUGHTON LYND,
INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN RADICALISM 54 (1968).
416
See Google Terms of Service, GOOGLE, https://policies.google.com/terms
[https://perma.cc/F9LT-BF8D];
Terms of Service, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/legal/terms [https://perma.cc/EJN3ATBQ].
417
See Google Terms of Service, GOOGLE, https://policies.google.com/terms
[https://perma.cc/F9LT-BF8D];
Terms of Service, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/legal/terms [https://perma.cc/EJN3ATBQ].
418
A suit alleging that the behavioral-advertising contracts violate the inalienable right of “liberty”
or “privacy” in Article 1 could be attempted, and deserves further study. University of California
Berkeley law Professor Chris Jay Hoofnagle has noted that waivers of the extensive privacy rights
in the Constitution are unenforceable, citing Cal. Civ. Code §1798.84. HOOFNAGLE, supra note
405, at 172.
419
Radin, supra note 21, at 1850.
420
See Randy E. Barnett, Contract Remedies and Inalienable Rights, 4 SOC. PHIL. & POL. 179
(1986).
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Scholar at the University of California, Riverside, calls the “inalienist” tradition. In
this tradition, the question of alienability, not consent or contract, is the heart of the
liberal vision of both government and slavery.421 In liberal thought there are two
traditions. One is an “alienist” tradition, which believes that basic rights can be
alienated.422 This tradition sees basic rights as essentially property rights that can
be alienated with full, free, and informed consent.423 Capitalism is in the alienist
tradition.424 Under this view, a contract of self-enslavement would be permitted.425
Second, the “inalienest” tradition believes that basic rights are personal and
cannot be alienated even with full, free, and informed consent. 426 A contract that
purported to alienate these rights would be null and void.427 Political democracy is
in this inalienist tradition.428 The inalienist tradition is the democratic tradition of
liberal thought.429 It would not permit a contract of self-enslavement.430 Statements
in the political sphere, as noted above, express the inalienist tradition, while those
in the economic sphere follow the alienist tradition. Market thinking leans toward
the alienist tradition.
The modern origins of inalienable rights can be seen in the concept of
freedom of conscience which came from the formal separation of spiritual from
temporal power and liberation of the human mind among fifth-century clergy.431
Martin Luther later developed this idea further and it became a fundamental concept
of the Reformation. He wrote:
How one believes or disbelieves is a matter for
everyone’s own conscience, and since this takes
nothing away from secular government, the latter
should be content to attend to its own affairs and let
everyone believe this or that as they are able and
willing, and constrain no one by force.”432
421
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But it was two Scotsmen, George Wallace, a jurist, and Francis Hutcheson,
a teacher of Adam Smith, who directly influenced the drafters of the Declaration of
Independence. Wallace wrote that:
Men and their liberty are not in commercio; they are
not either saleable or purchaseable . . . For these
reasons, every one of those unfortunate men, who
are pretended to be slaves, has a right to be declared
free, for he never lost his liberty; he could not lose
it; his prince had no power to dispose of him.433
Hutcheson's views were very influential. Thomas Jefferson’s division of rights into
alienable and inalienable came from Hutcheson. 434 Hutcheson first made the
distinction between alienable and inalienable rights in An Inquiry into the Original
of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue (1725), but he developed it more fully in his
influential A System of Moral Philosophy (1755), writing:
Our rights are either alienable, or unalienable. The
former are known by these two characters jointly,
that the translation of them to others can be made
effectually, and that some interest of society, or
individuals consistently with it, may frequently
require such translations. Thus our right to our goods
and labours is naturally alienable. But where either
the translation cannot be made with any effect, or
where no good in human life requires it, the right is
unalienable, and cannot be justly claimed by any
other but the person originally possessing it.435
Hutcheson then continues:
Thus no man can really change his sentiments,
judgments, and inward affections, at the pleasure of
another; nor can it tend to any good to make him
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profess what is contrary to his heart. The right of
private judgment is therefore unalienable.436
The culmination of the concept of inalienability came with John Stuart Mill
in his argument against self-enslavement by contract. In On Liberty, he wrote of
the person who sells himself into slavery:
[H]e abdicates his liberty, he foregoes any future use
of it beyond that single act. He therefore defeats in
his own case, the very purpose which is the
justification of allowing him to dispose of himself . .
. The principle of freedom cannot require that he
should be free not to be free. It is not freedom to be
allowed to alienate his freedom.437
The idea of inalienability went from the understanding that one’s
conscience was free to the principle that freedom itself prevents the alienation of
freedom. Thus, one’s freedom cannot be voluntarily disposed of. No form of
consent, however free, full, and informed, will make such an alienation possible.
This argument provides the basis for the reference to “inalienable rights” in the
Declaration of Independence and in the California Constitution. German
philosopher Ernst Casirer summarized this argument as saying that by selfenslavement, a man “would give up that very character which constitutes his nature
and essence: he would lose his humanity.”438 More concretely, he would lose his
autonomy.
The other tradition, the alienist tradition, has its history and supporters, but
they are decidedly a minority. For example, few philosophers in the United States
have taken the position that self-slavery is permissible; that a contract binding one
to slavery should be enforceable. Harvard Professor Robert Nozick, one of the few,
has asked “whether a free system will allow [an individual] to sell himself into
slavery. I believe it would.” 439 Another philosopher, Donald VanDeVeer, has
suggested that “the wisdom, prudence, or moral acceptability of [self-slavery]
remains an open question,” but he has admitted that “[t]o the extent that a person’s
436
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surrender of autonomy is more thorough and permanent . . . and to the extent that
autonomy is regarded as a good or an ideal to which one should aspire, such acts
will be morally suspect.” 440 Others have suggested that the inalienability rule
against slavery would not be justified if the rule were inefficient.441 As Professor
Radin has remarked, “[a]nyone who has no qualms about this argument bears
witness to a (literally) demoralizing triumph of market methodology.”442
This alienist tradition has not been accepted by the legal system. The
Thirteenth Amendment prohibits both slavery and involuntary servitude, except as
punishment for a crime.443 It also authorizes Congress to enforce this prohibition
by appropriate legislation. One piece of legislation, the Anti-Peonage Act of 1867,
abolished peonage and rendered null and void “all acts, laws, resolutions...of
any...State [establishing, maintaining, or enforcing] voluntary or involuntary
service or labor of any persons as peons, in liquidation of any debt or obligation or
otherwise...”444 The key term here is “voluntary.” This statute clearly repudiates the
idea that prohibited servitude must be involuntary. It accepts the notion that if a
person were to voluntarily contract himself or herself into a type of servitude,
peonage, such an act would be prohibited because it is so evil in its nature that the
legal system will not allow even the victim’s full, free, and informed consent to
permit it.
B.

ILLEGAL CONTRACTS: THE PRECEDENT OF THE PEONAGE
CONTRACT

Peonage is a type of bondage. It was a nineteenth and twentieth century
throwback to the earlier forms of bondage in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries. Bondage was characteristic of America in the seventeenth, eighteenth,
and nineteenth centuries. There were four types of bondage: indentured servitude,

440

DONALD VANDEVEER, PATERNALISTIC INTERVENTION 133 (1986).
Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:
One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1112 (1972). Lawrence Alexander has
suggested that “it is perhaps time to re-examine the regime of legal unenforceability of personal
service contracts and its supporting arguments.” Lawrence Alexander, Voluntary Enslavement in
Coons & Weber supra note 249, at 245-46. Judge Richard Posner suggested that it is “puzzling”
from an economic standpoint that a person cannot sell himself into slavery. R ICHARD POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 187 (2d ed. 1977). Margaret Jane Radin has asserted that “the
cases economists find mysterious are mysterious just because economists generally treat property
as fungible, and those cases treat it as personal.” Margaret Jane Radin, Personhood and Property,
34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 1004, 1015 (1982).
442
RADIN, supra note 410, at 24.
443
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
444
18 U.S.C. § 1581 (2012).
441

70

“Because It Is Wrong”: Immorality and Illegality of Online Service Contracts
redemption, apprenticeship, and slavery.445 Indentured servants were recruited in
England, often through deceit and manipulation, to enter into indenture contracts
for passage to America with an obligation to repay for the voyage by working in
America for a term of years. 446 Indentured servitude was a major institution of
colonial America.447 It is estimated that after 1630, between one half and two thirds
of white immigrants to the American colonies came under indenture,448 and more
than half of those who went to the colonies south of New England were servants in
bondage.449
Redemption was indentured servitude of those who came as partially paidup passengers.450 Upon arrival, they entered into contracts of indenture in order to
pay the remainder of the passage price and did so by working for a term, generally
four years.451
Apprentices were often young boys and girls who were bound to a master
for a period of years.452 The master provided food, clothing, lodging, and training
in the master’s trade in exchange for obedience and work by the apprentice.453
Bonded servants, whether indentured or redemptionist, were their masters’ chattel,
but, unlike slaves, they had the right of franchise. 454
The first African slaves were brought to America in the seventeenth century,
where slavery became widespread in the South, particularly after the demise of
indentured servitude in the eighteenth century. 455 Over time, as free workers
became more plentiful and less expensive, masters began to pay wages to
employees rather than purchasing the time of a servant or slave.456
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Taking into account these four forms of bondage, it seems likely that the
majority of the colonial and early republic population in America was subject to
some form of bondage. With the exception of slavery, the other three forms of
bondage constituted contractual bondage. Economic forces caused the decline of
indentured servitude (including redemption) 457 and apprenticeship, and the
Emancipation Declaration ended slavery. But in the nineteenth century a new form
of contractual bondage arose—peonage.
The peonage system of bondage referred to in the Anti-Peonage Act seems
to have originated in Spain and became widespread in Mexico under Spanish
rule.458 In New Mexico, the peons constituted a large class of persons who had very
little or no property and worked mainly as servants or domestics.459 They were not
born into servitude, but rather signed contracts to become peons because the master
advanced them money.460 They were indebted to their master and labored to pay
off the debt. Until they had paid off the debt, they were not free to leave the service
of their master. If they did leave before the debt was paid off, the master or local
officials could seize the peon and return him or her to service for the master.461 A
new master could pay off a peon’s debt to their original master, and then the peon
would be indebted and bound to the new master.462 If the peon did not pay off the
debt or work, he or she could also be let out to the highest bidder under a new
peonage contract.463
The peon still retained rights. Certain local officials, called alcaldes, had the
duty to authenticate the books of accounts between masters and peons. 464 The
master was prohibited from using the whip against the peon, and a peon could sue
a master for excessive punishment.465 Peons did not lose political and civil rights;
they were allowed to vote.466
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While peonage was native to New Mexico, the term was later used to refer
to similar relationships in other parts of the country. Judicial opinions in courts in
the East and South clarified and expanded this definition of peonage. 467 In the
Peonage Cases, 136 F. 707 (D.C.E.D. Ark. 1905), peonage was defined as “the
holding of any person to service or labor for the purpose of paying or liquidating
an indebtedness due from the laborer or employee to the employer, when such
employee desires to leave or quit the employment before the debt is paid off.”468
This definition seems to limit the condition of peonage to only those cases where
the employee wanted to quit before paying off the debt. But Justice Hughes in
Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911), succinctly described the essence of it as
“compulsory service in payment of a debt.” 469 This definition and the case law
support the notion that peonage can exist even before the employee desires to quit.
Outside New Mexico, peonage came to include fieldwork (picking sweet
potatoes, cucumbers, tobacco, and other crops) on plantations or migrant labor
farms; housekeeping in motels and hotels; serving as barmaids, hostesses, and
prostitutes in a saloon and dancehall; tending to chickens in a chicken farm; and
laboring in the forest as lumberjacks. Often, the original debt was for transportation
of the worker from another place within the state, out of state, or even from abroad
(Mexico or the Philippines). The employer, however, often provided food and
housing on credit to the workers at prices that would never allow them to pay off
the debts.
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A report on peonage in the early twentieth century found that no general
system of peonage existed in the United States, but sporadic cases existed in every
state except Oklahoma and Connecticut.470 The most complete system of peonage
existed in the lumber camps in Maine.471 In Maine, Florida, Georgia, and Alabama,
criminal fraud statutes that criminalized taking money with no intention of
performing the services, were used to enforce contracts of peonage.472 If the laborer
left before the debt was paid off, he or she was deemed prima facie to have intended
to take the initial advance fraudulently without any intention of repaying it. 473
Peonage was authorized and enforced by the state not only in these states by suits
from employers, but also in all states by the self-help of employers who seized
runaway peons and forcibly brought them back.474
Peonage raises a challenging question: what exactly is it that makes it
wrong?475 Is it the loss of freedom? Is it the power imbalance? Is it the physical
mistreatment? Is it the commodification? Undoubtedly, what made it wrong was a
combination of these factors. Without presuming to arrive at a conclusive answer,
we can say that the discussion of peonage in these cases provides us with a general
framework for responding to this question. This general framework divides the evil
of peonage into two general categories: physical abuse and loss of autonomy.
Perhaps our humanitarian instincts lead us first to look at the physical side. When
we think of slavery, we think of arduous field labor under a hot sun. Peonage took
that form in some cases, but it could be domestic work and not extreme physical
labor. In some cases, peons were beaten and brutalized, but, as noted above, in New
Mexico the masters were prohibited from using the whip on them. In some cases,
the peons were even guarded night and day and lacked freedom of movement.476
Peonage deprived the peon of something internal—a sense of autonomy.
The answer to another question confirms this suggestion: assuming that slaves were
treated better than their free counterparts, would slavery be acceptable? None but
the most extreme utilitarian would answer “yes.” The reason we reject a positive
response is that our natural moral instincts tell us that the loss of autonomy is the
key evil of slavery.477 As noted slavery historian Yale Professor David Brion Davis
470
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wrote: “Slavery is the perfect antithesis of individual autonomy or selfsovereignty.”478 But perhaps the most eloquent expressions of this idea were by two
former slaves. Mum Bett, the first slave in Massachusetts to sue in 1781 for her
freedom under the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780,479 said, “[i]f one minute’s
freedom had been offered to me, and I had been told I must die at the end of that
minute, I would have taken it.” Additionally, the Reverend E. P. Holmes, a former
slave, testified before a congressional committee in 1883:
Most anyone ought to know that a man is better off
free than a slave, even if he did not have anything. I
would rather be free and have my liberty. I fared just
as well as any white child could have fared when I
was a slave, and yet I would not give up my
freedom.480
The same logic holds for peonage. This is why the judges in the peonage
cases refer to the concept of voluntariness. The statute, as noted, prohibits both
“voluntary or involuntary servitude,” so logically the voluntary nature of the
peonage contract should not have influenced whether it was prohibited or not. As
stated in the Peonage Cases, 136 F. 707 (1905), “[i]t is wholly immaterial whether
the contract whereby the laborer is to work out an indebtedness due from him to
the employer is entered into voluntarily or not. The laws of the United States declare
all such contracts null and void, and they cannot be enforced.”481
The judges, like John Stuart Mill, were not comfortable with the notion that
one could contract to subject oneself to what could become involuntary service.482
But they grappled with the question of voluntariness.483 The opinion in the similarly
named Peonage Cases, 123 F.671 (M.D. Ala. 1903), analyzed voluntariness from
the perspective of time. “[i]f the [peonage] agreement . . . can ever be said to be
voluntary, it certainly becomes involuntary the moment the person desires to
withdraw, and then is coerced to remain and perform service against his will.”484
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Justice Brewer in Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207 (1905), distinguished
voluntary from involuntary peonage on the basis of origin:
Peonage is sometimes classified as voluntary or
involuntary, but this implies simply a difference in
the mode of origin, but none in the character of the
servitude. The one exists where the debtor
voluntarily contracts to enter the service of his
creditor. The other is forced upon the debtor by some
provision of law [such as, the fraud statutes noted
above]. But peonage, however created, is
compulsory service, involuntary servitude.485
The effort to deal with the issue of voluntariness shows that even though the statute
prohibited a peonage contract and resulted in making one null and void, judges still
justified their decisions to convict for peonage by referring to the involuntary nature
of the ongoing relationship if not the commencement of it.
This is not to say that the judges ignored the arduous physical conditions
peons endured. One judge even went so far as to say that, compared with a life of
peonage, “the slavery of ante bellum days was a paradis [sic].”486 Another judge
referred to “those brutalities and outrages which have so greatly shocked the public
conscience in some of the peonage cases.”487 But these statements are outliers. In
any particular case, the specific physical conditions of either slavery or peonage
could be worse, but generally it seems that peons fared better than slaves. The evil
of peonage was not in the physical treatment, but in the loss of autonomy.
In recent decades, peonage has largely been classified as involuntary
servitude or human trafficking. In 1984, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals in United
States v. Mussry, 726 F. 2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1984), expanded the scope of the AntiPeonage Act. It noted that the most common method of forcing another into
involuntary servitude was the use, or threatened use, of law or physical force, but,
that “[c]onduct other than the use, or threatened use, of law or physical force may .
. . violate the [Thirteenth] amendment and its enforcing statutes.”488 A Supreme
Court decision a few years later, United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931 (1988),
485
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held that a conspiracy to violate rights secured by the 13th Amendment must involve
“the use or threatened use of physical or legal coercion[,]” and therefore these rights
cannot be violated voluntarily.489
Later, the emergence of human trafficking as the predominant form of
involuntary servitude led to legislation, particularly, the Victims of Trafficking and
Violence Protection Act of 2000 (“VTVPA”) which changed the discussion from
“involuntary servitude” to “human trafficking.”490 This Act, in part a reaction to the
Kozminski decision, changed the relevant jurisprudence in order to recognize
nonphysical coercion as an element in human trafficking, and, specifically, that
coercion could be established both indirectly and purely psychologically.491 The
problem of initial consent and later coercion in the relationship, as noted in the
earlier cases, continues. Loyola Marymount University School of Law Professor
Kathleen Kim has suggested that “[i]n actuality, many human trafficking cases
appear to fall somewhere between consent and coercion. Those who are willing are
easier to coerce.” 492 The result is that the laws concerning human trafficking
struggle to delineate the parameters of coercion and legal scholars have not yet
provided guidance on this issue.493
For our purposes, the VTVPA’s significance lies also in its proclamation of
Congressional intent: that “Congress finds that . . . [t]he right to be free from slavery
and involuntary servitude is among those inalienable rights [i.e., those referred to
in the Declaration of Independence].”494 Congress has thus expressed its intent that
market thinking should not be applied to deprive people of these rights and subject
them to peonage or involuntary servitude. That is, these political rights should not
be converted into market commodities.495
489
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We can see that in peonage, as in slavery, the main wrong was in denying
the person’s autonomy. This was reason enough to outlaw peonage and make any
contract of peonage null and void. But there was another aspect of peonage, not
common with slavery, that also made it wrong and justified holding such contracts
null and void—its threat to democratic government. As noted above, and as stated
in the 1903 Peonage Cases opinion, “the peon was not a slave. He was a freeman,
with political as well as civil rights.”496 This led Judge Jacob Trieber to declare that
peonage was a greater threat to democracy than slavery. His opinion in the 1905
Peonage Cases states:
Congress recognized that in a government like
ours—a republic—such a system of peonage was
more dangerous to the safety of our republican
institutions than slavery was, for a slave was
property, and possessed none of the rights of
citizenship, could not vote, and had no voice in the
administration of the affairs of the nation. On the
other hand, the peon, although practically a slave as
long as he was indebted to his master or employer,
without the privilege of changing his vocation or
leaving his master, no matter how small the debt, yet
possessed all the rights of citizenship, including the
right of franchise. To permit such a condition was
deemed dangerous, as in the course of time it might
happen that a very large number of people,
compelled by their necessities, perhaps, or through
ignorance or greed, might thus sell themselves to
masters, and thereby come absolutely under their
control, and yet, by reason of the privilege to vote, in
which they would probably be controlled by their
masters, have a sufficient voice in the selection of the
officials to determine the result of an election.497
It can be concluded that a contract for peonage was declared null and void by
Congress and by the federal courts because the resulting condition of peonage
deprived the peon of autonomy. 498 The contemporary peonage contract, that of
human trafficking, is null and void because Congress has declared that it violates
496
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an inalienable right as expressed in the Declaration of Independence. While the
federal Constitution does not mention inalienable rights, the California Constitution
does, so one could infer that such a contract should violate the California
Constitution as well. Another reason for declaring a peonage contract null and void
was that it posed a threat to our democratic institutions.
The parallel threats to autonomy, inalienable rights, and democracy in the
Google and Facebook contracts are evident. Of course, there are significant
differences between peonage contracts and those of the current internet behemoths.
But couldn’t these current contracts also be considered null and void for the same
reasons—harm to autonomy, violation of an inalienable right, and threat to
democracy? As Judge Harrison Lee Winter in his Booker opinion said, “[i]n short,
the [peonage] statute must be read not only to render criminal the evil congress
sought to eradicate so long ago, but, as well, its twentieth century counterpart.”499
His comments could also apply to peonage’s twenty-first century counterpart—the
online behavioral-advertising internet service contract.
Many commentators have spoken of the user’s relationship with digital
technology or social media in terms that reflect a loss of autonomy similar to that
in slavery or peonage. These statements have no legal effect, but they highlight the
similarities between the relationship of internet service user and peon. Nicholas
Carr has described the advertising-based business model as “a modern kind of
sharecropping system. Like plantation owners in the American South after the Civil
War, a social network gives each member a little plot of virtual land on which to
cultivate an online presence through the posting for instance of words and pictures,
and then the social network collects the economic value of the member’s labor
through advertising . . .” 500 Additionally, Tim Wu has written, “Facebook’s
ultimate success lay in this deeply ingenious scheme of attention arbitrage, by
which it created a virtual attention plantation.”501
Others have compared internet services to feudalism or serfdom. Bruce
Schneier stated, “[t]he relationship is more feudal than commercial. The companies
are analogous to feudal lords, and we are their vassals, peasants, and—on a bad
day—serfs. We are tenant farmers for these companies, working on their land by
producing data that they in turn sell for profit.”502 Frank Pasquale has described the
relationships as “self-incurred tutelage” and “digital feudalism of virtual
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worlds.”503 Jaron Lanier has suggested that “the information economy that we are
currently building doesn’t really embrace capitalism but rather a new form of
feudalism.”504 Jacob Silverman has said that, “we’re not just the product, we’re also
making the product. It’s for this reason that some observers have come to think of
our relationship to social media as something like feudalism. They call it ‘digital
serfdom.’”505
These comparisons raise the question of the correct terminology for the
users of Google and Facebook services. Jaron Lanier has proposed that we should
stop calling ourselves “users” because we are not using but being “used.” 506
Considering the references to sharecroppers and serfs and the similarities of users
to peons, perhaps we should call the users “digital peons.”507
This review of the legal system’s experience with peonage tells us that
certain contracts entered into with full, free, and informed consent have been found
null and void and without legal effect. The consent of the individual was not
sufficient to make the contract effective because society had decided that the
relationship established by the contract was too evil to merit support by the legal
system. Consent could not legitimize an illegal contract. The key characteristic of
these contracts was that they deprived the individual of autonomy. As a matter of
principle, it seems reasonable that other contracts that deprive individuals of
autonomy would also be found to be null and void and without legal effect.
As noted above, the California Constitution lends support to an argument
that such contracts violate that document’s declaration of the inalienable rights to
“enjoying and defending life and liberty[] . . . and pursuing and obtaining safety,
happiness, and privacy.” But the California constitution does not specify what
“liberty,” “happiness,” and “privacy” are in regard to contracts. 508 This general
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provision is helpful, but may not provide enough specificity to decide the issue of
whether these contracts should be considered null and void. We look, therefore, to
contract law.

C.

TYPES OF ILLEGAL509 CONTRACTS

Current contract doctrine restricts the justifications for declaring a contract
null and void. In the eighteenth century, however, contracts were often not
enforced.510 The enforcement of a contract was a matter of discretion by Chancery,
and only in the nineteenth century did lawyers and judges create the “will” theory
of contracts that helped adapt the law of contract to a market economy. 511 The
merger of law and equity further subjected a tradition of substantive justice to
increasingly objective, formal, legal rules “which were stridently justified as having
nothing to do with morality.” 512 But in the nineteenth century, judges still
occasionally used a broad interpretation of the public policy principle as a
“freestanding reason” not to enforce contracts they found corrupt.513 The historical
development of contract law helps explain why market thinking, advances in
technology, and the diminished regard for equitable concerns in the law could result
in the failure to object to moral wrong in the behavioral-advertising business model.
It also helps explain why Google’s and Facebook’s user contracts have not yet been
declared illegal.
While the behavioral-advertising business model may be immoral, that does
not mean that a contract used to implement it is necessarily illegal. Moral and legal
legally protected privacy interest; (2) a reasonable expectation of privacy under the circumstances;
and (3) conduct by the defendant that amounts to a serious, egregious invasion of the protected
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standards differ. In most states, contract law is mainly a product of case law, with
certain exceptions (for example, sales under the Uniform Commercial Code), But
California has a Civil Code that sets forth broad principles of contract law. The
Code itself, however, purports to be simply a codification of common law contract
law. 514 And California also has a rich body of case law regarding contracts. And
rules regarding contracts, and rules regarding contracts that injure the public
welfare are found both in the Code and in the case law. For example, California
contract law has a number of terms that it uses to analyze contracts inimical to the
public welfare. The California Civil Code and case law both refer to contracts that
are “illegal,” “unlawful,” “unconscionable,” “against public policy,” “contrary to
good morals,” and “contrary to the policy of express law.”
We can analyze the services contract of the behavioral-advertising business
model in terms of three categories of contracts that are illegal (including unlawful):
(1) contracts that are unconscionable; (2) contracts against public policy (including
those contrary to the policy of express law); and, (3) contracts contrary to good
morals. The cases, of course, do not all follow this neat categorization; there is
much overlap between these three categories.
1.

Contracts Contrary to Good Morals515

The discussion above would suggest that the behavioral advertising service
contracts of Google and Facebook should satisfy the criterion “contrary to good
morals.” But, such an assumption would ignore California legislation and court
decisions that have established precedents for those specific contracts that satisfy
this criterion. Under California law, the category “contrary to good morals” covers
different types of contracts. Contracts that have been found to fall into this category
include those concerning gambling, marriage, marijuana, prostitution,
pornography, hush money, fiduciary duties, rules of professional conduct, and
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arbitration.516 To understand these restrictions on enforcement of contracts, we can
review the case law on gambling and marriage.
Virtually at the inception of statehood, California adopted a conflicted
policy on gambling. On one hand, it inherited the American common law rule that
gambling was a misdemeanor and it considered gambling contrary to good
morals.517 On the other hand, it issued licenses authorizing gambling houses, but
prohibited the enforcement of contracts involving gambling debts. 518 This
prohibition had deep roots in Anglo–American jurisprudence, originating in 1710
in the English Statute of Anne, which declared gambling debts “utterly void,
frustrate, and of none effect, to all intents and purposes whatsoever. . . .”519 Two
early cases before the enactment of the California Civil Code in 1872 clearly
demonstrate the prohibition on the enforcement of gambling debts.
First, in the California Supreme Court case, Bryant v. Mead, 1 Cal. 441
(1851), the court, noting that Blackstone had said that gaming-houses were public
nuisances, went on to say that “[w]agers, which tend to excite a breach of the peace,
or are contra bonos mores, or which are against the principles of sound policy, are
illegal; and no contract arising out of any such illegal transaction, can be enforced.
These are principles of the common law which has been adopted in this State . . . .”
520
But this case also raised two other questions. First, did a California statute
authorizing the granting of a license to keep a gambling-house, confer a right to sue
for a gaming debt? The answer was in the negative; the license was protection
solely against a criminal prosecution. 521 Second, was all gambling wrong? The
answer was also in the negative; the innocent playing of cards as a recreation was
not illegal, but gaming as a business involving significant stakes was illegal unless
licensed.522
The other California Supreme Court case prior to the enactment of the
California Civil Code, Carrier v. Brannan, 3 Cal. 328 (1853), affirmed the rule
established in Bryant, but emphasized the moral basis for its decision: “It needs no
authority or arguments to satisfy this court that the practice of gaming is vicious
and immoral in its nature, and ruinous to the harmony and well-being of society.”523
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California case law after the enactment of the California Civil Code reflects
the disapproval of gambling enshrined in the Code. Section 1667.3 states that “that
is not lawful which is: . . . 3. otherwise contrary to good morals.” An early case,
Shain v. Goodwin, 46 F. 564 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1891), involved notes on a debt for
gambling with dice. The court cited Civil Code section 1667.3 to the effect that a
contract “contrary to good morals” was not lawful. The decision quoted Irwin v.
Williar, 110 U.S. 499 (1884), in which the U.S. Supreme Court said: “[g]enerally,
in this country all wagering contracts are held to be illegal and void as against public
policy.”524 The California court mentioned the moral basis for the policy, saying,
“[i]n the United States wagering and gaming contracts seem to have met with no
countenance from the courts, and consequently in nearly every state they are held
illegal, as being inconsistent with the interests of the community, and at variance
with the laws of morality.” The court refused to enforce the contract.525 Later cases
concerning gambling debts reached the same conclusion. 526 Some of these
decisions did not specifically mention section 1667.3 or the phrase “good
morals,”527 but referred to public policy specifically or in general. A number did
refer to section 1667.3 and said that contracts for the payment of a gambling debt
were “contra bonos mores” and unenforceable under that section.528
The court decisions noted several points that highlighted the evil nature of
gambling. In Pratt v. Padgett, 191 P. 39 (Cal. Ct. App. 1920), the court stated that
when a contract has for its object the violation of law, a court should sua sponte
deny any relief to either party. In Hamilton v. Abadjian, 179 P.2d 804 (Cal. 1947),
the court remarked that even Nevada courts refuse to lend their process to recover
losses in gambling transactions.529 In Kelly v. First Astri Corp., 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d
810 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999), the court found that in the absence of a statute authorizing
Shain v. Goodwin, 46 F. 564, 565, 567 (Cir. Ct. N.D. Cal. 1891) (quoting Irwin v. Williar, 110
U.S. 499, 510 (1884); Scott v. Courtney, 7 Nev. 419, 421 (Nev. 1872)).
525
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a cheated gambler to sue, the doctrine of in pari delicto barred a tort suit by the
cheated gambler against the casino. In Lavick v. Nitzberg, 188 P.2d 758 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1948), the court found that even though draw poker did not fall within the
scope of California Penal Code, section 330 (which imposed a fine for gambling),
the contract still was illegal under Civil Code section 1667.3. The two judges
strengthened their decisions to deny enforcement by noting the prohibition of
gambling in section 330 of the Penal Code.530
But the most sophisticated analysis of the evil of gambling was in
Metropolitan Creditors Service v. Sadri, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 646 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
This case articulated a distinction that was perhaps implicit in earlier law, but was
never expressed. The court noted that the state’s public policy on gambling had
changed.531 The state had passed the California State Lottery Act of 1984,532 and
pari-mutuel horse racing, draw poker clubs, and charitable bingo clubs had become
common throughout the state.533 Thus, the state’s public policy on gambling itself,
but not on the enforcement of gambling contracts, had changed. As the court said,
“while the public policy against [gambling itself] has been substantially eroded, the
public policy against [gambling on credit] has not.” 534 The court discovered a
significant distinction between different types of gambling debts. 535 The court
perceived that the evil in gambling was in gambling on credit, not merely gambling
itself and it interpreted the applicable precedents as applying to gambling debts that
were incurred on credit.536 The court additionally noted that the Statute of Anne, in
fact, had permitted gambling at certain places under certain conditions, but limited
such gambling to “ready money only.”537
The court found addiction to be the special reason for treating gambling on
credit differently from gambling itself; gambling debts are characteristic of
pathological gambling. 538 The court noted that pathological gambling was
prevalent in 2-3 percent of the population according to the Diagnostic & Statistical
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Manual of Mental Disorders.539 In the court’s view, the pathological gambler is
“out of control” and that is why:
[E]nforcement of gambling debts has always been
against public policy in California and should remain
so, regardless of shifting public attitudes about
gambling itself. If Californians want to play, so be it.
But the law should not invite them to play themselves
into debt. The judiciary cannot protect pathological
gamblers from themselves, but we can refuse to
participate in their financial ruin.540
In another case, In re Sir, in which enforcement of the gambling debt was refused,
the debtor was a self-confessed “gambling addict.”541
California law regarding gambling has deep roots, but is conflicted.
Originally, gambling was considered by nature “vicious and immoral,” “ruinous to
the well-being of society,” and “inconsistent with the interests of the
community.”542 Over time, it lost some of its moral taint, but courts still refuse to
enforce gambling debts. In addition, they will sua sponte find them unenforceable
and refuse to allow a tort suit against a gambling house by a gambler for a gamblingrelated offense.543 Today, a major concern underlying nonenforcement is addiction
in the form of gambling on credit, particularly by a pathological gambler. 544
Addiction of the compulsive gambler contributes to the loss of self-control and
autonomy. Accordingly, enforcing a gambling contract would be contrary to good
morals. The contracts of the behavioral-advertising business model could also be
described as “vicious and immoral,” “inconsistent with the interests of the
community” and “addictive.” In fact, the internet critic Richard Seymour has said
that “[t]he model for research into social media addiction is gambling addiction.”545
A second set of cases citing the good morals provision of California Civil
Code section 1667.3 concerns marriage. In the first case, Heaps v. Toy, 128 P.2d
813 (Cal. Ct. App. 1942), a man entered into an oral agreement with a divorced
woman that if she did not remarry and would serve as his “companion” for the rest
539
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of his life, he would support her and her two children for the rest of her life. When
the man refused to perform the contract, the woman sued.546 The court found two
reasons to deny enforcement of the contract: legislation and morals.547 At the time,
California Civil Code section 1676 provided that, “[e]very contract in restraint of
the marriage of any person, other than a minor, is void.” Since the contract in this
case provided that the woman gave up the chance to marry, it was found in restraint
of marriage. 548 But, the court also determined that the contract violated section
1667.3 because the consideration (giving up the chance to marry) was contrary to
good morals. 549 The assumption behind the decision was that marriage was a
valuable social institution and needed to be encouraged even if that resulted in
hardship for a woman.
Later court decisions evidence a change in views of what is contrary to good
morals. In the well-known case, Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976),
Justice Tobriner established the precedent that courts should generally enforce
contracts between nonmarital partners despite the contention that such contracts
violated public policy. California Penal Code § 269a had previously prohibited
“living in a state of cohabitation and adultery.” The criminalization of this conduct
demonstrated that it was contrary to good morals, but this provision was deleted
from the Code before the Marvins’ relationship ended. 550 In any case, the
enforcement of contracts between nonmarital partners was subject to one condition:
that the contract not be “expressly and inseparably based upon an illicit
consideration of sexual services.” 551 The reason for this exception was that a
contract for the performance of sexual services would be “in essence, an agreement
for prostitution and unlawful for that reason.”552 Justice Tobriner did not refer to
section 1667 in his decision, but his reference to the unlawfulness of an agreement
for prostitution confirms that such an agreement would be contrary to good
morals.553
This decision thus recognized that views of morality had changed from
refusing enforcement of agreements between nonmarital partners to enforcing
them, and made enforcing these agreements the law of California, except where the
relationship was meretricious.554
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In Alderson v. Alderson, 225 Cal. Rptr. 610, 612 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986), the
couple cohabited for 12 years, held themselves out as married, and had three
children together. After they separated, the woman sued that, according to their
implied agreement, she had a right to share equally in the property acquired during
their cohabitation. 555 The man defended himself on the ground that the implied
agreement was unenforceable because the consideration for the implied agreement
rested on meretricious sexual services. 556 The court ruled that the implied
agreement should be enforced and found three reasons that the agreement did not
rest on meretricious services: (1) that the agreement was very general and
nonspecific; (2) the agreement was based on “many things,” none of which alone
was crucial; and (3) it would be illogical to deny the enforceability of contracts
between couples cohabiting when cohabitation was so common. 557 This court
quoted Marvin to the effect that “[t]o equate the nonmarital relationship of today to
[prostitution] is to do violence to an accepted and wholly different practice.”558
In a 2001 case, Della Zoppa v. Della Zoppa, 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 901 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2001), the wife alleged an implied contract to share property acquired during
cohabitation. The court relied on Marvin and Alderson to find that the agreement
was not based on a meretricious relationship even though it provided that the wife
would attempt to bear her husband's children.559 The court cited three factors: (1)
the term “meretricious” referred to prostitution; (2) the agreement contained no
explicit reference to meretricious sexual services; and (3) § 1667.3 did not apply
because mores had changed. 560 The court quoted Alderson to write that, “[i]n
today’s society when so many couples are living together without the benefit of
marriage vows, it would be illogical to deny them the ability to enter into
enforceable agreements in respect to their property rights.”561
A subset of marriage cases denied enforcement and concerned divorce. In
Diosdado v. Diosdado, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 494, 495 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002), the
husband and wife signed a marital settlement agreement during their marriage to
protect and preserve their marriage. The marital settlement agreement contained a
provision for liquidated damages of $50,000 and other consequences if the husband
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was unfaithful.562 After the husband was unfaithful, the wife sought to enforce the
agreement, to which the court refused.563
In 1969, the California legislature enacted Civil Code § 4506 (now Cal.
Fam. Code § 2310) and changed the grounds for termination of marriage from a
fault basis to a marriage breakdown basis. Henceforth, dissolution of marriage was
based on irreconcilable differences which caused the irremediable breakdown of
the marriage. 564 The court decided that under § 1667 the agreement was
unenforceable because it attempted “to impose a penalty on one of the parties as a
result of that party's ‘fault’ during the marriage.”565 This provision was “contrary
to the public policy underlying the no-fault provisions for dissolution of
marriage.”566 The court, quoting In re Marriage of Bonds, 5 P.3d 815 (Cal. 2000),
noted that “. . . freedom of contract with respect to marital arrangements is tempered
with statutory requirements and case law expressing social policy with respect to
marriage.”567
Two later cases involving divorce also denied enforcement, following the
principle set forth in Diosdado. First, in In re Marriage of Barapour, No. H025603,
2004 WL 348969 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 25, 2004), the wife brought a marital
dissolution action, but the husband sought to enforce a contract executed by the
couple in Iran. The contract severely limited the wife’s ground for divorce and
deprived her of any share in the community property if she sought divorce.568 The
court held the contract was unenforceable under § 1667.569 The court said that “the
limitation in the Iranian contract on the wife’s right to seek a divorce directly
contravenes California’s no-fault divorce policy.”570
In re Marriage of Mehren and Dargan, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 522 (Cal. Ct. App.
2004) concerned a post-marital agreement under which the husband promised the
wife all interest in community property if he used illicit drugs. When the husband
used illicit drugs, the wife sued for divorce.571 Once again, the court ruled that the
agreement was unenforceable because it violated public policy favoring no-fault
562
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divorce.572 The court relied on Diosdado to decide that the agreement was illegal
under section 1667, along with pointing out that the provision in § 578 of the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts states, “[a] bargain, the sole consideration of
which is refraining or promising to refrain from committing a crime or tort, or from
deceiving or wrongfully injuring the promisee or a third person, is illegal.”573
A marriage dissolution case that showed the limits on the principle of
Diosdado was Beale v. Beale, No. B177640, 2005 WL 2850976 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov.
1, 2005). In the settlement of marriage dissolution, the wife agreed to withdraw a
police report accusing the husband of domestic violence.574 When the wife failed
to sign a letter withdrawing the request for action, the court ordered her to sign it
over the wife’s First Amendment objection.575 A dissenting judge referred to § 1667
and said that in his opinion the settlement agreement violated that section saying
that, “[t]he strong public policy of encouraging victims of domestic violence to file
police reports is set forth in California’s statutes.”576
As with gambling contracts found unenforceable, California law on the
enforceability of contracts related to cohabitation or marriage changed significantly
over time. While marriage is still revered as a valuable social institution, the
perception of “good morals” has shifted so it does not exclude cohabitation.
Prostitution is still against “good morals,” but a relationship based on a number of
different factors will not be considered meretricious. Further, California’s no-fault
divorce and encouragement of victims of domestic violence to report are considered
public policy and will render unenforceable a contract contrary to them. These cases
show that California’s perception of “good morals” has been transformed to give
women greater rights in contracts concerning cohabitation and marriage. A similar
shift in the understanding of rights in the context of internet contracts could well
have significant effects for the enforceability of contracts under the behavioraladvertising business model.
2.

Unconscionable Contracts

We next ask whether a contract to implement the behavioral-advertising
business model might be found to be unconscionable.The contemporary doctrine
of unconscionability dates from the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code and
specifically § 2-302. The UCC was incorporated in the California Civil Code in
572
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1979 and made unconscionability applicable to all contracts, not just to sales of
goods. 577 The UCC has been accepted as codifying the common law of
unconscionability, 578 but one of its purposes was to replace the common law
practice of courts determining that a particular contract clause was “contrary to
public policy.”579 As noted below, however, the UCC has not served as a complete
substitution for inquiries into a contract’s conformity with public policy. In any
case, the doctrine as applied is inconsistent, not systematic, or even coherent.580
California Civil Code §1670.5 states that:
(a) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract
or any clause of the contract to have been
unconscionable at the time it was made the court may
refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the
remainder of the contract without the unconscionable
clause, or it may so limit the application of any
unconscionable clause as to avoid any
unconscionable result.581
This provision does not explain what is “unconscionable,” but the California
Supreme Court, in Baltazar v. Forever 21, Inc., 367 P.3d 6 (Cal. 2016), said that it
“refers to an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together
with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party.”582 Ever
since Yale Law School Professor Arthur Leff’’s 1967 article “Unconscionability
and the Code—The Emperor’s New Clause,”583 courts have divided the analysis of
unconscionability in a contract into two steps. The first step is to determine whether
there is “procedural” unconscionability.584 The second step is to determine whether
there is “substantive” unconscionability. 585 To find that the contract is
unconscionable, the court should find both procedural and substantive
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unconscionability.586 But, California courts have more recently suggested that all
adhesion contracts are procedurally unconscionable. 587 Thus, for an adhesion
contract to be found unconscionable in California, only substantive
unconscionability needs to be proved.588 California case law has defined “adhesion
contract” to mean “a standardized contract, imposed upon the subscribing party
without an opportunity to negotiate the terms.”589 The service contract between a
user and Google or Facebook would be an “adhesion contract” under this
definition.590
Under California case law, procedural and substantive unconscionability
are still interrelated. Pursuant to the California Supreme Court decision in
Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669 (Cal. 2000), 591 the
degree of procedural unconscionability will affect the degree of substantive
unconscionability required for a determination that the contract is unconscionable.
It seems that the Google and Facebook contracts are procedurally unconscionable
because they are adhesion contracts, but compared with other contracts that are
procedurally unconscionable, are they more or less substantively unconscionable?
It depends on how “oppressive” or “surprising” the terms are. In discussing
procedural unconscionability, California courts determine whether a contract is
procedurally unconscionable according to whether there is oppression or
surprise.592
“Oppression arises from an inequality of bargaining power that results in no
real negotiation and an absence of meaningful choice.” 593 The Google and
Facebook contracts certainly exhibit “oppression” in the sense used in the cases:
there is an enormous inequality of bargaining power between them and their users
and there is no negotiation whatsoever over the terms. The issue of “choice” is not
See Baltazar v. Forever 21, Inc., 367 P.3d 6, 12-13 (Cal. 2016).
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so clear. Some court cases say there is no choice when the weaker party has no
“opportunity to opt out” of the unconscionable terms 594 or had “no meaningful
choice but to accept the contract terms.”595 One case states that “oppression” refers
not only to the lack of power to negotiate the terms of the contract, but also to “the
absence of reasonable market alternatives.”596
It might appear that there is “choice” in the sense that there exist other
search and social media sites and a consumer could choose to use one of these other
services. Other court decisions, however, have said that “a contract can be
procedurally unconscionable when the party with substantially greater bargaining
power presents a take-it-or-leave it contract to a customer—even if the customer
has a meaningful choice as to service providers,”597 and that the terms of an internet
service agreement with no opportunity to opt out constitutes “quintessential”
procedural unconscionability. 598 These decisions suggest that the Google and
Facebook contracts in their terms for the collection, aggregation, and handling of
the users’ data would appear to be quite oppressive.
The other element in procedural unconscionability, surprise, generally
“involves the extent to which the supposedly agreed-upon terms are hidden in a
prolix printed form drafted by the party seeking to enforce them.”599 California
courts have also found the surprise requirement satisfied where the reasonable
expectations of the weaker party were disappointed 600 or where “misleading
bargaining conduct or other circumstances indicat[e] that a party's consent was not
an informed choice.”601 What is a “prolix” document? One court found that a 20page lease was not long enough to allow a judgment of “surprise.” 602 Google’s
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Terms of Service are about ten pages long. 603 The Facebook Terms of Service
together with the Data Policy are over 20 pages long, but they differ from instances
of what the courts have previously considered “surprise” which mainly have
concerned arbitration, limitation of liability, warranty disclaimer, non-compete, and
other related short provisions hidden in a much longer text. The Facebook Data
Policy is substantially longer than the Terms of Service. It could be argued that the
Facebook and Google Terms of Service fail to satisfy the “reasonable expectations”
of the user or that other circumstances deprived the user of “informed consent,” but
it is unclear how successful such arguments would be if made by a litigant
challenging the contract. Case law, however, also supports the argument that failure
to read a detailed description of terms constitutes “surprise.”604 Most Facebook and
Google users do not read the Terms of Service or the Data Policy.605 Thus, there is
an argument backed by case law that could support the belief that their contracts
with the companies still satisfied the “surprise” component of procedural
unconscionability.
But whether the procedural unconscionability is great enough to lessen the
relative burden of substantive unconscionability is still difficult to judge. To err on
the side of caution, we can assume that a claim of substantive unconscionability
would have to meet the same level of substantive unconscionability as the case law
suggests has generally been necessary in the past.
Under California law, substantive unconscionability is present where the
unfairness of the contract or one of its terms is extreme.606 The degree of extremity
has been described in a number of cases as sufficient to “shock the conscience.”607
Other cases have stated that the contract or one of its terms must be “unduly
harsh,” 608 “unduly harsh or oppressive,” 609 or have “overly harsh or one-sided
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See Google Terms of Service, GOOGLE, https://policies.google.com/terms
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2014), review granted and opinion superseded sub nom., Sabia v. Orange Cty. Metro Realty, 334
P.3d 685 (Cal. 2014); Bruni v. Didion, 73 Cal. Rptr. 3d 395, 411, 413 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2008), modified (Mar. 24, 2008).
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See Caroline Cakebread, You’re Not Alone, No One Reads the Terms of Service Agreements,
BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 15, 2017), https://www.businessinsider.com/deloitte-study-91-percent-agreeterms-of-service-without-reading-2017-11.
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See e.g., Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., LLC, 61 Cal. 4th 899, 900 (Cal. 2015).
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Chavarria v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 733 F.3d 916, 923 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Parada v.
Superior Court, 98 Cal. Rptr. 3d 743, 759 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009)).
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Grabowski v. Robinson, 817 F.Supp.2d 1159, 1173 (S.D. Cal. 2011) (quoting Davis v.
O'Melveny & Myers, 485 F.3d 1066, 1075 (9th Cir. 2007)).
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results.”610 An example of contract terms that courts found to shock the conscience
occurred in a telecom services agreement where the arbitration clause would always
produce an arbitrator proposed by the telecom company, would preclude
institutional arbitration rules that would select a neutral arbitrator, and would
require the arbitrator at the outset to apportion the arbitrator’s fees between the
parties.611 The court stated that the agreement lay “far beyond the line required to
render an agreement invalid.”612
Another example of a clause that was “overly harsh” or “one-sided” is from
a telecom service contract. It contained a confidentiality clause that required any
arbitration to remain confidential.613 The court concluded that:
[I]f the company succeeds in imposing a gag order,
plaintiffs are unable to mitigate the advantages
inherent in being a repeat player [in arbitration on the
same clause]. This is particularly harmful here,
because the contract at issue affects seven million
Californians. Thus, AT&T has placed itself in a far
superior legal posture by ensuring that none of its
potential opponents have access to precedent
while, at the same time, AT&T accumulates a wealth
of knowledge on how to negotiate the terms of its
own unilaterally crafted contract. Further, the
unavailability of arbitral decisions may prevent
potential plaintiffs from obtaining the information
needed to build a case of intentional misconduct or
unlawful discrimination against AT&T.614
Neither the Google nor Facebook Terms of Service contain arbitration provisions,
so these precedents are not directly applicable. They do, however, illustrate the
extremity that is required to constitute substantively unconscionable conduct.
In conclusion, the Google and Facebook Terms of Service are procedurally
unconscionable because they are contracts of adhesion and exhibit both oppression
610
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and surprise. Whether they also constitute substantive unconscionability will
depend on whether these contracts or their terms “shock the conscience” or are
“overly harsh” or “one-sided.” In deciding whether these contracts are
substantively unconscionable, one fact that should be considered is the dissimilarity
of these contracts with the contracts in the case law. None of the California cases
concern the nature of the services themselves, rather than merely an arbitration,
limitation of liability, warranty disclaimer, non-compete, or similar clause.
Although the behavioral-advertising internet services contract should by its very
nature “shock the conscience,” it is unclear whether such an unprecedented
argument would fit within the narrow doctrinal confines of “substantive
unconscionability” as created by California courts. A plausible argument could be
made, however, that the California courts could currently find that the Google and
Facebook Terms of Service are substantively unconscionable.
3.

Contracts Against Public Policy

As noted above, there is some overlap among the categories of contracts
against good morals, contracts that are unconscionable, and those against public
policy. The concept of public policy was broadly applied in the 19th century and,
as noted above, the UCC may have decreased the use of the “public policy”
category. But it did not eliminate it. Contracts contrary to good morals, such as
agreements to enforce gambling debts, were not only contrary to Civil Code section
1667.3, but were also against “public policy” as noted in the discussion above of
Williar and Metropolitan Creditors. 615 The courts in Marvin, Diosdado, and
Mehren also referred to the “public policy” of no-fault divorce and the court in
Beale relied on the “public policy” of encouraging victims of domestic violence to
file police reports. 616 While the public policy exception to the enforcement of
contracts is similar to that for refusing to enforce contracts contrary to good morals
and those that are unconscionable, it also differs in important respects. Its scope is
broader and grants considerable discretion to judges.
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 178, has tried to summarize the
reasons for refusing to enforce a contract on grounds of public policy.617 Generally,
courts will enforce contracts without passing on their substance. 618 But, when the
615

See Irwin v. Williar, 110 U.S. 499 (1884); Metropolitan Creditors Service v. Sadri, 19 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 646 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
616
See Beale v. Beale, No. B177640, 2005 WL 2850976 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 1, 2005.
617
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 8, intro. note (AM. LAW. INST. 1981); see
generally Cariveau v. Halferty, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 417, 420 n.7 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (noting the rule
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court decides that the interest in freedom of contract is outweighed by some
overriding interest of society, it may refuse to enforce the contract on grounds of
public policy. 619 “First, a refusal to enforce the promise may be an appropriate
sanction to discourage undesirable conduct, either by the parties themselves or by
others. Second, enforcement of the promise may be an inappropriate use of the
judicial process in carrying out an unsavory transaction.”620 The Restatement sees
the delicate balancing of these two factors with other factors favoring a transaction
freely entered into by the parties as the key to the decision on whether to enforce
the contract or not. This standard is a helpful general statement, but we look at
California law for a better understanding.
California statutes do not contain a general provision covering the “public
policy” exception to contract enforcement. Civil Code § 1667.2 states that “that is
not lawful, which is: . . . (2) [c]ontrary to the policy of express law, though not
expressly prohibited . . . .” This provision does not apply to case law because the
term “express law” refers only to statutory law.621 Therefore, for this provision to
apply there must exist a specific statute that does not expressly prohibit the conduct
that is the basis of the contract, but expresses a “policy” that the contract violates.622
There does not appear to be any specific California statute that prohibits conduct
that is the basis of the Google or Facebook service contracts.
The other relevant California Civil Code provision, § 1668, states that
contracts exempting a party from responsibility for fraud, willful injury, or violation
of law are “against the policy of the law.”623 The phrase “the policy of the law” has
been interpreted to include “public policy.”624 But the scope of this provision is
quite limited and does not appear relevant to the Google or Facebook user contracts.
California case law on “public policy” is not limited to this Code section.
The California Civil Code contains many different policy reasons for not enforcing
contracts. 625 Some of these rely on statutes, such as the California Government
Code, which states in § 12920 that “[i]t is hereby declared as the public policy of
619

Id.
Id.
621
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1667 (West 2020); see Della Zoppa v. Della Zoppa, 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 901,
908 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001)
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624
See Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC, 327 P.3d 129, 148 (Cal.
2014) (quoting Civil Code § 1668 and stating “[a]greements whose object, directly or indirectly, is
to exempt [their] parties from violation of the law are against public policy” [emphasis
added] (quoting In re Marriage of Fell, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 522, 527 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997)).
625
See generally, CAL. CIV. CODE (West 2020).
620
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this state that . . . ,”(emphasis added) and the California Insurance Code, which
states in section 676.1 that “[i]t shall be against public policy for a residential
property insurance policy to provide coverage for liability . . . .”(emphasis added).
Below we do not discuss the policy reasons based on statutes because they do not
seem relevant: no federal or California laws prohibit behavioral-advertising internet
service contracts.
California case law has emphasized the role of the legislature in determining
“public policy.” In a nineteenth century case, Lux v. Haggin, 10 P. 674 (Cal. 1886),
the Supreme Court said,
[T]he policy of the state is not created by the judicial
department, although the
judicial department
may be called upon at times to declare it. It can be
ascertained only by reference to the constitution and
laws passed under it, or (which is the same thing) to
the principles underlying and recognized by the
constitution and laws.626
In the latter half of the twentieth century, California courts have repeated this
deference. In Hentzel v. Singer Co., 188 Cal. Rptr. 159 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982), the
court said, “[w]e are mindful of the restraint which courts must exercise in this
arena, lest they mistake their own predilections for public policy which deserves
recognition at law.”627 In Gantt v. Sentry Insurance, 824 P.2d 680 (1992), the court
said:
[I]t is generally agreed that ‘public policy’ as a
concept is notoriously resistant to precise definition,
and that courts should venture into this area, if at all,
with great care and due deference to the judgment
of the legislative branch[.]628
Deference to the legislature means that a contract that violates a specific statute,
such as the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, is unenforceable because that Act
declares the policy of maintaining an honest and fair national marketplace in
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securities a “national public interest.”629 And the public policy deference to the
legislature also applies to administrative regulations issued by administrative
authorities under authority granted by a statute.630
The marijuana case Bovard v. American Horse Enterprises, Inc., 247 Cal.
Rptr. 340 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) also gave an eloquent description of the process of
determining “public policy” in California. The court made a strong argument for a
narrow interpretation of “public policy:”
The question whether a contract violates public
policy necessarily involves a degree of subjectivity.
Therefore, . . . courts have been cautious in blithely
applying public policy reasons to nullify otherwise
enforceable contracts. This concern has been
graphically articulated by the California Supreme
Court as follows: [i]t has been well said that public
policy is an unruly horse, astride of which you are
carried into unknown and uncertain paths, . . . While
contracts opposed to morality or law should not be
allowed to show themselves in courts of justice, yet
public policy requires and encourages the making of
contracts by competent parties upon all valid and
lawful considerations, and courts so recognizing
have allowed parties the widest latitude in this
regard; and, unless it is entirely plain that a contract
is violative of sound public policy, a court will never
so declare. The power of the courts to declare a
contract void for being in contravention of sound
public policy is a very delicate and undefined power,
and, like the power to declare a statute
unconstitutional, should be exercised only in cases
free from doubt. . . No court ought to refuse its aid to
enforce a contract on doubtful and uncertain grounds.
The burden is on the defendant to show that its
enforcement would be in violation of the settled

629

See Cariveau v. Halferty, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 417, 424 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000); 15 U.S.C.A. § 78b
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public policy of this state, or injurious to the morals
of its people.631
Despite this cautionary admonition, the court ruled that the contract was
unenforceable.632
Two other California Supreme Court cases have taken a broad view of
“public policy.” In the first, the Court adopted a broad interpretation of what
affected the public interest and constituted public policy. In the second, it found
public policy not in a state or federal statute or regulation, but in the common law.
The first case, Tunkle v. Regents of University of California, 383 P.2d 441
(Cal. 1963), is perhaps the most instructive California precedent regarding the
public policy exception. It concerned the public policy exception, but also relied on
§ 1668 of the California Civil Code which states that contracts exempting a party
from liability for future negligence are “against the policy of the law.”633 Mr. Tunkl
was treated by a charitable research hospital of the University of California and
died from the hospital’s negligent treatment.634 Before entering the hospital, Mr.
Tunkl signed a release that covered future negligence by the hospital.635 California
case law was such that an exculpatory clause could not stand if it “affects the public
interest.”636 The question was whether the hospital’s release “affected the public
interest.”637 Justice Tobriner set forth six factors that could indicate that a release
affects the public interest.638 These factors were:
1. Was the hospital a business of the type suitable for public regulation?
2. Was the service of the hospital of great importance to and a matter of
practical necessity for the public?
3. Did the hospital hold itself out as willing to perform services for any
member of the public?
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4. Because of the essential nature of its service, did the hospital have a
decisive advantage in bargaining strength?
5. Did the hospital use a “standardized adhesion contract” that gave no
protection against negligence and did not allow the purchaser to pay an
additional fee to obtain protection against negligence?
6. Was the other party’s “person or property” placed under the hospital’s
control?639
In Tunkl, the hospital satisfied all these factors, but Justice Tobriner made clear that
not all factors needed to be satisfied to qualify an agreement as “affecting the public
interest.”640
Clearly, Google and Facebook are not hospitals and their contracts do not
specifically attempt to relieve them from future negligence.641 But in other respects,
the six factors could be appropriate factors for determining whether their contracts
“affected the public interest” and could be analogized to contracts against the policy
of law under section 1668. Certainly, Google and Facebook are businesses suitable
for public regulation; like utilities, the services they provide are of great importance
and could be seen as a practical necessity for the public; they offer their services to
any member of the public with internet access; because of the nature of their
services, they enjoy a decisive advantage in bargaining strength; they use a
standardized “adhesion contract” that does not allow the user to opt out of
surveillance; and the user places his or her “person” (in the sense of the person’s
extensive personal information) or “property” (the personal data) under the
companies’ control. Further, Justice Tobriner’s opinion also found that it was
irrelevant whether the patient was a paying or non-paying patient,642 so the “free”
service of Google and Facebook should not be a reason to distinguish their cases
from the logic of the Tunkle decision.
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The second case that found “public policy” in the common law is Potvin v.
Metro. Life Ins. Co., 22 Cal. 4th 1060 (2000). After an insurance company deleted
a doctor from its “preferred provider” lists, he sued citing his common law right to
a fair procedure and stating that the company should have given him reasonable
notice and an opportunity to be heard.643 The contract between the two allowed its
termination “without cause.” 644 The doctor argued that the public policy
considerations supporting the common law right to fair procedure rendered the
“without cause” clause in the contract unenforceable.645 Justice Joyce L. Kennard
in her opinion declared that “California courts . . . are loathe to enforce contract
provisions offensive to public policy” and ruled that the termination clause was
unenforceable to the extent it purported to limit an otherwise existing right to fair
procedure under the common law.646 In an extensive dissent, Justice Janice Rogers
Brown stated that, “[w]e continue to believe that, aside from constitutional policy,
the Legislature, not the courts, is vested with the responsibility to describe the
public policy of the state.” 647 Justice Brown quoted from another California
Supreme Court decision, Santisas v. Goodin, 17 Cal. 4th 599, XX (1998), to the
effect that “[h]istorically, this court has been reluctant to declare contractual
provisions void or unenforceable on public policy grounds without firm legislative
guidance.” The 4-3 decision in Potvin would seem to indicate the fragile state of
the expansive interpretation of “public policy” in the California Supreme Court.
California law on “public policy” has evolved over the years. It has
narrowed since the nineteenth century, but still can apply to many different
situations. As one prominent authority on California law has noted, although
anything that has a tendency to injure the public welfare is, in principle, against
public policy, determining which contracts fall into this vague category is very
difficult.648 The very nature of the public policy exception makes relying on case
law doubtful. Public policy is a very expansive term that can apply to a wide variety
of situations and is also variable with time and place. It therefore relies little on
stare decisis and can allow a judge to be creative.649 Given the unpredictability of
determining what constitutes “public policy,” the application of “public policy” to
deny enforceability of the Google and Facebook contracts is certainly plausible.
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D.

ILLEGALITY
1.

Factors Affecting A Decision on Illegality

The discussion above has set forth the California law applicable to the
question of the legality of the behavioral-advertising contracts. There are a number
of other considerations, however, that could influence a court’s balancing of the
various factors for and against the legality of such contracts. These are federal
government inaction, the tradition of judicial activism in California, procedural
issues, changes in mores, changes to the business model, the threat to personhood,
threats to a democratic society and democratic theory, paternalism, uncontrolled
experiment, and bad beliefs and bad behavior.
a.

Federal650 Government Inaction

As noted above, when California courts are asked to make new law, they
often look to the executive and legislative branches for guidance. The absence of
any such guidance can embolden a court to act to rectify a serious problem. This
may be true in the case of the loss of autonomy for users of Google and Facebook.
The executive and legislative branches of the federal government have not
been active in addressing the dangers caused by behavioral advertising. The federal
government651 has not enacted any general privacy legislation and it has not moved
to change the business model of internet service companies like Google and
Facebook. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the main federal agency dealing
with Google and Facebook, has recently fined Facebook, and Google’s subsidiary

650

Google and Facebook are active in all 50 states, but only the federal government has the
authority to institute rules across the whole country and the world. The Attorney Generals of some
states have shown interest in investigating Google and Facebook, but any actions will probably
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Murphy, Big Tech feels heat of five investigations, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2019, at 4.
651
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Congress Really Pass a Privacy Bill? N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2019, at A26 and Editorial, Federal
Privacy Law Can Keep Tech in Check, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2020, at 16. But see the recent Justice
Department suit against Google. United States v. Google, Dist. Ct., D. C., case 1:20-cv-03010,
filed 10/20/20; Luigi Zingales, Trump’s Google Lawsuit Could Prove a Poison Pill for Biden,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 27, 2020, at A15.

103

Journal of Law, Technology & the Internet — Vol. 12
YouTube, but has made no effort to change the business model. 652 Government
inaction stems from many factors, but a few quotations show why effective action
by the federal government is not likely.
The FTC’s Views:653
A. “...the FTC staff [in a 2007 staff report] accepted that tracking
and targeting had become part of the digital landscape, important for present
and future
business opportunities.” 654
B. “In a speech given in Washington DC on September 12, [2017,]
Maureen Ohlhausen, the acting chair of the Federal Trade Commission in
the US, tried to pour cold water on the idea [that politicians and regulators
clamp down on Big Tech]. ‘Given the clear consumer benefits of
technology-driven innovation,’ she said. ‘I am concerned about the push to
adopt an approach that will disregard consumer benefits in the pursuit of
other, perhaps even conflicting goals.’”655
C. “Mr. Kohm, whose division [of the FTC] prosecutes boiler
rooms, advertising scams, and other financial fraud schemes, responded [to
questions from FTC employees] that the tech companies were legitimate

652

The FTC fined Facebook $5 billion, but Representative David Cicilline of Rhode Island
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businesses offering free services, and it was unclear how they had harmed
consumers...”656
D. “The reason the FTC has done little is not because it lacks
authority, but because its officials simply do not believe there is a problem
to be solved.”657
Personal Relations:
A. On September 19, 2019, when Mark Zuckerberg met with
Donald Trump at the White House, “Mr. Zuckerberg quickly noted that the
president had the highest level of engagement of any world leader on the
social network. Mr. Trump—who previously savaged Facebook on a range
of issues—immediately adopted a new tone, describing the conversation in
social media posts as ‘nice.’ . . . Mr. Zuckerberg’s simple flattery seems to
have paid off. Mr. Trump hasn’t publicly castigated the company since,
and months later, he continues to tell audiences that he is ‘No. 1’ on the
world’s largest social network.” 658
B. On October 22, 2019, Mark Zuckerberg had dinner with Donald
Trump, “[b]ut looming over the private dinner [was] a question: Did Mr.
Trump and Mr. Zuckerberg reach some kind of accommodation? Mr.
Zuckerberg needs, and appears to be getting, a pass both on angry tweets
from the president and the serious threats of lawsuits and regulation that
face other big tech companies. Mr. Trump needs access to Facebook’s
advertising platform and its viral power . . . Mr. Trump…has been notably
softer on Facebook than on Amazon, Google, Twitter or Netflix at a
moment when his regulatory apparatus often focuses on the political
enemies he identifies in tweets . . . The Justice Department is currently
conducting antitrust investigations of the tech giants.But while Google and
Amazon face ‘mature investigations,’ the Facebook inquiry is ‘not real at
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all,’ a person who has been briefed on the investigation
said.
And
659
Facebook has acted like a company with no worries in Washington.”
Lobbying:
A. “This year [2017], Google is on track to spend more money than
any company in America on lobbying.”660
B. “The four companies [Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and Google]
spent a combined $55 million on lobbying last year [2018], doubling their
combined spending of $27.4 million in 2016.”661
C. “Ms. Pelosi [House majority leader] received nearly $43,000 in
total donations for her 2018 re-election campaign from employees and
political action committees of Facebook, Amazon and Alphabet, Google’s
corporate parent—each of which ranked among her top half-dozen sources
of campaign cash.”662
D. “Last month, the industry lobbying group, the Internet
Association, which represents Amazon, Facebook and Google, awarded
its Internet Freedom Award to Ivanka Trump, the President’s daughter and
White House senior adviser.”663
E. “During the 2016 election cycle, [Chuck Schumer, Democratic
Senate leader] raised more money from Facebook employees than any other
member of Congress...Mr. Schumer also has a personal connection to
Facebook: His daughter Alison joined the firm out of college and is now a
marketing manager in Facebook’s New York office . . . .”664
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Regulatory Capture:
A. “Google, Amazon, and Facebook are deeply embedded in both
parties, and their interests will be protected no matter who is in the White
House.”665
B. “Big Tech has quietly become the dominant political lobbying
power in Washington, spending huge amounts of cash and exerting
serious soft power in an effort to avoid regulatory disruption of its business
model, which is now the most profitable one in the private sector.”666
C. “On March 24, 2015, the Wall Street Journal revealed the
existence of a leaked report from the competition bureau of the FTC
recommending that Google be prosecuted for abusing its market position by
recommending Google services over those of third parties . . . the full
commission had, in a very unusual manner, overruled the staff
recommendation and decided against prosecuting Google. The Journal
alleged that the 230 meetings that Google had had at the White House in the
run-up to the complaint dismissal had influenced the commission.”667
D. In 2011, at Senate Judiciary Committee hearings “[i]ndustry
lobbyists outnumbered . . . supporters [of a bill to outlaw stalking apps] 54
to 2.”668
National Security:
A. “Why should Google worry about potential antitrust violations if
its monitoring Internet access side by side with the DHS and the NSA? [I]t
may be ‘too important to surveillance’ for the government to alienate the
firm.”669
B. “In June of 2013, Glen Greenwald, writing in The Guardian,
revealed that in 2009, Facebook, along with Google and Apple (and four
665
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other online service providers), had given the National Security Agency
direct access to their worldwide network for the agency’s PRISM spying
program.”670
C. “[L]ots of surveillance data moves back and forth between
government and corporations. One consequence of this is that it’s hard to
get effective laws passed to curb corporate surveillance—governments
don’t really want to limit their own access to data by crippling the corporate
hand that feeds them.”671
Using the Platform to Mobilize:
A. “On January 17, 2012, the film and music industries backed the
Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA): a proposed bill that aimed to crack down
on copyright infringement . . . . The bill specifically targeted search engines
such as Google that link to pirate sites. The day after the bill was introduced,
Google put [an image with the message “[t]ell Congress: please don’t censor
the web!”] on its search page for 24 hours. The image was viewed by 1.8
billion people . . . the email servers of Congress were overwhelmed, and on
January 20, 2012, the chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, Lamar
Smith, withdrew the bill.”672
These examples demonstrate that it is difficult to see how the executive and
legislative branches of government will take the initiative to address the business
model of Google and Facebook. This leaves the judiciary as a possible actor. As a
defense lawyer in a recent prominent case remarked in another context, “[t]he court
has a role to play . . . [i]t is the institution that most people have confidence in in
these very troubled times.”673 It may also be difficult to see how courts could take
the initiative to find this business model illegal, but California has a tradition of
judicial activism.
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b.

Tradition of Judicial Activism

The legal system has been weak in responding to the challenges of the
unprecedented. But judges have a tradition of responding to new contractual abuses
with strong criticism. An example is Justice Frankfurter’s dissent in U.S. v.
Bethlehem Steel, 315 U.S. 289 (1942), in which he criticized the inordinate profits
of Bethlehem Steel on government contracts:
Today it is held that because the circumstances of
this case cannot be fitted into a neatly carved
pigeonhole in the law of contracts, "daylight
robbery," exploitation of the "necessities" of the
country at war, must be consummated by this Court.
It is said that familiar principles would be outraged if
Bethlehem were denied recovery on these contracts.
But is there any principle which is more familiar or
more firmly embedded in the history of AngloAmerican law than the basic doctrine that the courts
will not permit themselves to be used as instruments
of inequity and injustice? Does any principle in our
law have more universal application than the
doctrine that courts will not enforce transactions in
which the relative positions of the parties are such
that one has unconscionably taken advantage of the
necessities of the other?674
The California Supreme Court has a reputation as a pioneer in affirming the
rights of the individual against traditional mores, corporations, and the government.
The recognition that all adhesion contracts are procedurally unconscionable is one
example. A major treatise, Farnsworth on Contracts, describes this as California
having “gone to the extreme.”675 In the Marvin case described above, the California
Supreme Court recognized the change in society towards cohabitation and broke
new ground in enforcing an oral contract.676 In three other cases, the California
Supreme Court took progressive positions to protect the interests of consumers and
gig workers: People v. Krivda, 5 Cal. 3d 357 (Cal. 1971), Discover Bank v. Superior
Court, 36 Cal. 4th 148 ( Cal. 2005), and Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. Superior
Court, 4 Cal. 5th 903 (Cal. 2018).
674
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In People v. Krivda, the question the California Supreme Court addressed
was whether a householder has a reasonable expectation of privacy concerning
items that are thrown away in a garbage can, which is then placed adjacent to the
road to be collected, or in the alternative, if the householder abandoned the trash
when the householder threw it in the garbage can. 677 The Court found that the
placement of one's trash barrels onto the sidewalk for collection was not necessarily
an abandonment of one's trash to the police or general public and the defendants'
reasonable expectation of privacy was violated by unreasonable governmental
intrusion.678 This decision was a step forward for privacy advocates.679
In Discover Bank, the California Supreme Court held that a class action
waiver was unconscionable and unenforceable when it occurred in an arbitration
clause in a consumer contract of adhesion with small amounts of damages and
deliberate cheating by the party with superior bargaining power.680 The clause was
unconscionable because it was, in effect, a violation of California Code § 1668
regarding exclusion of culpability.681 At the time, this decision was a significant
victory for consumers.682
In Dynamex Operations, the California Supreme Court established a clear
standard for distinguishing independent contractors from employees, a contentious
issue that had long plagued labor law. Under the ABC test set by the Court the
hiring entity had to establish three factors to prove that a worker was an independent
contractor.683 A bill that passed the California Senate in September 2019 accepted
the ABC test and showed promise of increasing wages and benefits for hundreds of
thousands of struggling workers, especially those working for the ride sharing
services Uber and Lyft.684
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In 1974, the California Supreme Court did express the need for the law to
reflect changed circumstances. Justice Tobriner’s opinion in Green v. Superior
Court, 517 P. 2d 1168 (1974), stated:
In taking a similar step today [responding to the
changes wrought by modern conditions
by
discarding outworn common law doctrines], we do
not exercise a novel prerogative, but merely follow
the well-established duty of common law courts to
reflect contemporary social values and ethics. As
Justice Cardozo wrote in his celebrated essay ‘The
Growth of the Law’ chapter V, pages 136—137: ‘[a]
rule which in its origin was the creation of the courts
themselves, and was supposed in the making to
express the Mores of the day, may be abrogated by
courts when the Mores have so changed that
perpetration of the rule would do violence to the
social conscience. . . . This is not usurpation. It is not
even innovation. It is the reservation for ourselves of
the same power of creation that built up the common
law through its exercise by the judges of the past.685
California judicial decisions in the future could also reflect changes in social values
and ethics to outlaw the manipulation and loss of autonomy inherent in the
behavioral-advertising business model.
c.

Procedural Issues

A court in California will not have the chance to rule on the illegality of the
Google and Facebook contracts unless someone brings this claim to the court. A
suit brought by a user of Google or Facebook, could make claims based on contract,
statutory violation, or tort, while raising the issue of illegality. According to the
Terms of Service of Google and Facebook, the suit could be brought in either a
federal court in the Northern District of California or in a state court.686 Ordinarily,
the plaintiff would have to raise the question of illegality of the contracts, but courts

685

Green v. Superior Court, 517 P. 2d at 1184.
See GOOGLE PRIVACY & TERMS, https://policies.google.com/terms (last visited Oct. 7, 2020),
and FACEBOOK TERMS OF SERVICE, https://www.facebook.com/legal/terms (last visited Oct. 7,
2020).
686

111

Journal of Law, Technology & the Internet — Vol. 12
do have the authority to raise it sua sponte.687 In a 19th century case, the California
Supreme Court in discussing its reversal of a case on points which one of the parties
did not have the opportunity to discuss, said, “the court is bound to satisfy its own
conscience, and cannot shut its eyes to the fact, although it is not put in issue. A
court of equity will not allow itself to become a handmaiden of iniquity of any kind.
It intervenes, not for the sake of the party who is benefited by the intervention, but
for the sake of the law itself.”688
A suit claiming the illegality of a contract is usually filed with breach of
contract as the main claim. But in this case, a claim of breach of contract would
seem to contradict the claim that the contract was void.689 A claim of illegality
could be added to current or future suits against Google or Facebook alleging other
claims under federal statutes (such as the Wiretap Act, the Stored Communications
Act, and the Electronic Communications Privacy Act); California statutes (such as
the California Computer Crime Law, and the California Invasion of Privacy Act);
the California Constitution; and the common law. One specific claim could be an
allegation of a violation of an “autonomy privacy” right. The California Supreme
Court established a right of “autonomy privacy” in Hill v. National Collegiate
Athletic Assn., 865 P. 2d 633 (1994). This right concerns an interest in making
intimate personal decisions or conducting personal activities without observation,
intrusion, or interference.690 But the protection of this right “is to be determined
from the usual sources of positive law governing the right to privacy—common
law development, constitutional development, statutory enactment, and the ballot
arguments accompanying the Privacy Initiative.”691 This possible claim deserves
further study.
Prior cases against Google and Facebook seem to have been brought in
federal court in California. 692 Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a
687
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plaintiff must show subject-matter jurisdiction (Rule 12(b)(1)) and assert a claim
on which relief can be granted (see Rule 12(b)(6)); otherwise a defendant may ask
the court to dismiss the suit. Suits against Google, Facebook, and others alleging
injury to data privacy interests for disclosures of personal information have had
difficulty in satisfying the requirements for Rule 12 (b) (1) (often called
“standing”). Unless standing is conferred by a statute or the Constitution, the
plaintiff must establish it by showing (1) injury in fact, which is neither conjectural
or hypothetical; (2) causation, such that a causal connection between the alleged
injury and offensive conduct is established; and (3) redressability, or a likelihood
that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.693 In data privacy cases, it
has been difficult for plaintiffs to show injury-in-fact. As Paul S. Grewal, United
States Magistrate Judge of the U.S. District Court in Northern California, wrote in
2013:
[I]n this district’s recent case law on data privacy
claims, injury-in-fact has proven to be a significant
barrier to entry. And so even though injury-in-fact
may not generally be Mount Everest, as then-Judge
Alito observed, 694 in data privacy cases in the
Northern District of California the doctrine might
still reasonably be described as Kilimanjaro.695
But the climb might not be that steep for two reasons. First, California case
law on illegal contracts described above seems to indicate that the specific harm of
the individual contract is not as important as the abstract harm to society as a whole.
This could be true in a case claiming the illegality of the Google and Facebook
contracts as well. Second, in In re Facebook Privacy Litigation, 192 F. Supp. 3d
1053 (N.D. Cal. 2016), Judge Ronald M. Whyte said that “a California breach of
contract claim for nominal damages may support [federal court] standing.”696 In a
pending case against Facebook, Judge Vince Chhabria ruled that the dissemination
Private Ordering, in CONTRACT, STATUS, AND FIDUCIARY LAW 326-27 (Paul B. Miller & Andrew
S. Gold, eds. 2016).
693
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of the plaintiffs’ sensitive information to third parties in violation of their privacy
was sufficient to confer standing.697 Finally, in Patel v. Facebook, Inc. 932 F. 3d
1264 (9th Cir. 2019), a $35 billion class action suit filed in California federal court,
the court ruled that a violation of the Illinois biometric-data-privacy statute injures
an individual’s concrete right of privacy and alleges a concrete injury-in-fact.698
From these cases it appears that standing is not an insuperable barrier to a suit
against Facebook or Google.
Satisfying the requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) 699
to allege sufficient facts to avoid dismissal has also been difficult. The applicable
federal statutes that grant standing, such as the Wiretap Act or the Stored
Communications Act, often are narrowly drafted with a particular purpose that does
not cover privacy abuses. 700 The Wiretap Act’s definition of “contents” of an
electronic communication in a way that excludes information that Facebook
intercepts through the use of cookies has prevented plaintiffs from successfully
alleging sufficient facts. 701 The Stored Communications Act only contemplated
temporary storage of data, but Facebook’s persistent cookies resided permanently
on the user’s browser.702 In a suit against Google under the California Consumers
Legal Remedies Act, the court found that the plaintiffs could present no caselaw to
support their interpretation of the word “sale” in the Act as including the barter of
personal information for free services.703 The court added that, “California federal
courts have expressly rejected defining ‘sale’ as to include ‘transactions’ based on
non-tangible forms of payment, including internet usage information
specifically.”704 A suit against Google or Facebook would probably not be able to
rely on a violation of either the Wiretap Act or the Stored Communications Act.
A suit against Google or Facebook should be a class action since Google
and Facebook have a significant amount of users who have suffered similar harm.
One hurdle these suits would face is comporting to the requirements of Federal Rule
697
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of Civil Procedure 23, which governs class actions. For example, the suit would
have to show that the class is so numerous that joinder of all parties was impractical
and that there were questions of law or fact common to the class.705 In the past,
plaintiffs have been able to overcome objections to class certification in suits
against the companies.706 In Pulaski & Middleman, LLC v. Google, Inc., 802 F. 3d
979 (9th Cir. 2015), the court defeated Google’s challenge to class certification that
asserted the action did not satisfy the requirement of Rule 23 (b) (3) that, “the
questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions
affecting only individual members.” Additionally, in Patel v. Facebook, 932 F. 3d.
1264 (9th Cir. 2019), the court rejected Facebook’s challenge to class certification
that complained that the class action was not “superior to the other available
methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy” as required under
Rule 23(b)(3). Based on the cases out of California, a class certification challenge
should not be an impossible hurdle for a class action suit against Facebook or
Google.
Any individual contemplating such a suit would face a powerful opponent
in Facebook or Google with virtually unlimited resources, but a class-action law
firm, such as Edelson PC,707 with possible assistance from organizations such as
the American Civil Liberties Union, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, the
Electronic Privacy Information Center, and the Center for Democracy and
Technology could mount an impressive challenge.708
d.

Changing Mores

The judicial system has always faced the challenge of its relationship to
society. Should judges try to foresee the direction society is moving and expedite
its movement or should they wait until society has already moved and the judicial
system is already lagging behind? Regardless of a judge’s answer to this question,
the law must change as society changes. The question is only how quickly. As
Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis declared in their seminal article describing
the right of privacy, “[p]olitical, social, and economic changes entail the
recognition of new rights, and the common law in its eternal youth, grows to meet
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the demand of society.”709 Speaking of the creation of new rights, they said “[t]his
development of the law was inevitable.”710
One of the most important truths of the recent past has been that significant
change in morals in liberal democracies (e.g., attitudes toward gambling,
cohabitation, drug use, sexual harassment, and gay marriage) has been possible
when the society was ready for it. Journalist Malcolm Gladwell’s concept of the
“tipping point”711 helps to explain many mysterious changes that mark everyday
life by describing them as epidemics. Three concepts at the heart of this idea are (1)
contagiousness, (2) little causes have big effects, and (3) change happens at one
dramatic moment.712 The tipping point suggests that effecting change relies on a
few dedicated people, the so-called connectors, mavens, and salesmen, and on
factors such as stickiness and context. 713 The tipping point, however, seems to
apply more to marketing behavior than to moral changes. As to social mores, New
Yorker writer Adam Gopnik has remarked that the way that change has happened
is not by hectoring and calling it necessary, but by moving it into the realm of the
plausible: “once something is plausible...it has a natural momentum toward
becoming real.” 714 This “natural momentum” is implemented by norm
entrepreneurs and information cascades as described by Harvard Law Professor
Cass Sunstein.715 Momentum can be generated by awareness that causes a public
outcry. Financial Times columnist Rana Foroohar has opined that consumers are
not troubled by many things, such as algorithmic credit biases, until they are aware
of them:“I suspect that if we all knew how precisely we are being tracked and how
richly we are being monetised by the platform tech companies, there would be more
of a public outcry.” 716 Perhaps Shosanna Zuboff’s book The Age of Surveillance
709
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Capitalism will serve as the information industry’s Silent Spring as suggested by
Chris Jay Hoofnagle.717 Or maybe Professor Liao, mentioned above, will decide
that new information has persuaded him that we have a moral duty to leave
Facebook.718
Seeing the Google and Facebook behavioral-advertising contracts as
immoral, unconscionable, and against public policy would be a moral change that
could occur as the result of a combination of factors. These could include the
constant drip of privacy violations by Google and Facebook, a growing public
understanding of the risks of collection and use of personal data,719 an especially
egregious and personally compelling addiction story, or the results of a study on
the neurological effects of digital addiction.720 One can see the beginnings of such
a change. In 2016, the positive press that the tech giants had enjoyed turned
negative.721 In 2017, Rana Foroohar, speaking of Google, Facebook, and Amazon,
said that they “are increasingly being seen not just as business threats, but moral
hazards as well.” 722 In the past four years the share of Americans who think
technology companies have a negative impact on the U.S. has nearly doubled.723 In
2019, Nir Eyal, wrote a book on how to free oneself from tech addiction and B. J.
Fogg, the creator of “captology,” has said that “[a] movement to be ‘post-digital’
will emerge in 2020 . . . . We will start to realize that being chained to your mobile
phone is a low-status behavior, similar to smoking.”724
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But it seems likely that such a change would come only after current users
and institutions that support Google and Facebook recognize the immorality of the
behavioral-advertising business model. Achieving this recognition would require
an effort by church members to ask whether their church’s use of Facebook was an
endorsement of the ethics of the company’s business model; by school students to
ask their schools why a profit-making company with an immoral business model is
given the advantage of free publicity by the school;725 and for university students
and alumni/ae to question why the university is promoting the use of Facebook, but
not that of Apple versus Dell computers. Students and alumni/ae could also
question their universities as to whether the schools are undermining their mission
and demeaning students and alumni/ae by promoting a service with the values
expressed in Mark Zuckerberg’s messages quoted above (contempt, not respect, for
a user’s dignity, privacy, and autonomy). Efforts such as these by norm
entrepreneurs could change the moral climate and provide an environment in which
the employees of Facebook and Google could find social support for a decision to
leave the companies.726
We may be seeing this change happening now. New Yorker writer Andrew
Marantz has noted that “[w]ithin just a few years, the general public’s attitude
toward social media has swerved from widespread veneration to viral fury.”727 In
May, 2019, noted digital commentator Wade Roush wrote, “[w]ithout revenue from
emotion-pumped advertising, Facebook would wither and there could never be
another social-networking-company that reaches its planetary scale. But I believe
those would be good things.”728 In such an environment, a judge’s decision to find
the contracts illegal could find social acceptance.
Some would find it ironic that the norm entrepreneurs leading this change
might rely on Google and Facebook to destroy their business model; others might
Some promising signs: Mark Zuckerberg’s alma mater, Exeter, has established a course in the
Religion Department “Religion 597: Silicon Valley Ethics: Case Studies in the World of High
Tech” taught by Peter Vorkink, an Episcopal Priest, that poses questions such as “Have we
unwittingly paid for convenience with the erosion of fundamental values?” The course is
reportedly very popular, https://www.exeter.edu/academics/courses. Further, at Harvard
University, where Mark Zuckerberg studied, the course “Tech Ethics” taught by Michael Sandel is
now the most popular undergraduate course. Lawrence Bacow, Allston in focus, HARV. MAG., 3
(Nov.-Dec., 2019). Finally, in 2018, Sergei Brin’s and Larry Page’s alma mater, Stanford, planned
an initiative to focus on “ethics, society and technology.” Andrew Jack & Hannah Kuchler,
Stanford to add ethics to its technology teaching, FIN. TIMES, June 4, 2018, at 4.
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find it unrealistic. The above discussion suggests that these companies might adjust
their algorithms to decrease or eliminate cascades that criticize or threaten their
current business model. 729 Or they might use professional “influencers” to
counteract the efforts of the norm entrepreneurs.730 But we will never know because
either their algorithms are closely guarded business secrets, or because artificial
intelligence has made them unexplainable to humans. 731 The fact that these
companies are able to take these actions strengthens the argument of this essay: that
the behavioral-advertising business model is immoral, and contracts implementing
it are contrary to good morals, unconscionable, and contrary to public policy.
e.

Changes to the Business Model

Changes in the environment could force changes to the business model of
Google and Facebook that would render nugatory any court decision on
illegality. 732 Although Mark Zuckerberg has vowed not to change Facebook’s
business model,733 change could arise from a number of sources.
First, the business model may be inherently defective. Growth has been the
lifeblood of the behavioral-advertising business model. The market-based system
forces the companies to keep growing. But as Brian Wieser, an analyst at Pivotal
Research, has said of Facebook and Twitter, “there are limits to growth; the market
cannot grow forever. The faster they’ve been growing in recent years, the sooner
Siva Vaidhyanathan’s hope that “[w]e could even use Facebook to mount campaigns to rein in
Facebook” seems unrealistic. Siva Vaidhyanathan, Don’t Delete Facebook. Do Something About
It., N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 24, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/24/opinion/sunday/deletefacebook-does-not-fix-problem.html.
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they were getting there.”734 By 2018, Facebook had almost fully saturated its most
important markets in the United States and Europe.735 It may also have "reached
the limit of how much advertising its newsfeed can show.”736 Growth has been
slowing and it has been opined that Facebook, in order to mitigate the possibility
of running out of new users, should mine more data from current users.737 Further,
the numbers of users may be incorrect if one considers the number of fake accounts.
In 2019, it was reported that Facebook deleted 800,000 “false” accounts a quarter,
equivalent to one-third of its monthly active users, and that fake review pages were
rife on Facebook.738 Facebook has tried to lessen the impact of declining growth in
users by trying to engage them more while also gathering more data from them, but
this has been met with resistance from users.739
The current business model is under question. According to Jaron Lanier,
the only hope for social networking sites from the business point of view is for the
appearance of a “magic formula” which provides an acceptable method of violating
privacy and dignity. 740 Otherwise, he believes that Google’s and Facebook’s
business model of free information, surveillance, and manipulation, with
insufficient user rights is not sustainable as technology advances. He asserts that
giant remote companies owning everyone’s digital identities become “too big to
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fail,” and this degrades both markets and governments.741 If it cannot come up with
a broader business model, “[t]he death of Facebook must be an option if it is to be
a company at all.” 742 In a similar vein, writer Annalee Newitz has declared that
“[s]ocial media is broken . . . nothing lasts forever. Facebook and Twitter are slowly
imploding.” 743 After talking with fiction writers and algorithmic experts, she has
written that media companies need to figure out how to make money from helping
consumers protect and curate their personal data.744 “Slow media,” or platforms
limiting how quickly content circulates might be one solution.
Second, society’s views of Google and Facebook could change. Today they
are accepted as independent, private entities even though they possess unparalleled
power and wealth. As noted above, they are used so widely that they can be seen
as utilities. Mark Zuckerberg has called Facebook a utility; Jaron Lanier has
remarked that it is becoming more like an electric utility every day.745 It is a piece
of necessary infrastructure, and government needs to assure the availability of such
a utility for citizens and businesses. Facebook and Google are utilities that citizens
depend on, but which they do not understand and are ripe for manipulation and loss
of autonomy. These companies would seem to be ripe for strict governmental
regulation like other utilities. However, regulation could result in significant
changes to the business model. Or Congress might “get really ambitious” and “fund
a rival to compete with Facebook or Google, the way the Postal Service competes
with FEDEX and U.P.S.”746
Third, ad blocking software could affect the behavioral-advertising business
model. Some suggest this software will doom the model to extinction. 747 One
survey found that 47% of Americans already use ad blocking software. 748 But
websites have taken countermeasures including preventing users with ad-blockers
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from accessing their sites.749 It seems likely that advertising will survive, and some
will try to take advantage of the selection process involved in ad-blocking. For
example, Google introduced ad-blocking software on Chrome, but was hit with
ethical questions—was its ad-blocking unfairly advantaging Google?750 It is not
clear that ad blocking software will doom the behavioral-advertising business
model.
Fourth, Facebook could face a permanent decline in its advertising revenue
if it fails to prevent a boycott by advertisers upset at its failure to tamp down hate
speech on the platform. Advertisers have expressed concern that their
advertisements were appearing on the platform next to hate speech and
misinformation and they have received pressure from politicians, supermodels,
actors and others. 751 In June 2020, more than 300 advertisers agreed to boycott
Facebook and as a result the company lost $75 billion in market value in one
week.752 Facebook has agreed to make certain changes, like adding labels to certain
posts, but this is unlikely to satisfy the advertisers. Any substantive changes would
contradict the business model, which allows hate speech and fake news, because
relatively they generate more engagement, more personal data, and more
advertising revenue.
Initial indications are that the COVID-19 pandemic devasted many
consumer companies but does not seem to have negatively influenced the big tech
firms.753 Consumers isolated at home spend more time on their devices, and Google
benefits from the increased use of mobile phones and growing share of Android
749
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app sales.754 But Facebook is perhaps the greatest beneficiary of the pandemic as
two shifts have boosted it. First, users confined to home have rediscovered
Facebook messaging and video calls, which reached record levels.755 Second, there
was an unprecedented increase in the consumption of news articles on Facebook.756
This is a significant change because sharing of news stories had declined on
Facebook for many years. 757 Further, it seems that users are looking for more
authoritative news sources.758 If this is due to adjustments to Facebook’s algorithms
to promote more high-quality content, then it might affect the company’s business
model.759
f.

Threat to Personhood

The huge troves of data that result from the behavioral-advertising model
raise questions not only of autonomy, but also of personhood. What is a person?
Certainly, the physical body, including the brain, is, and always has been, the
primary focus, but personhood 760 can also include some other things, including
data.
In 1982, Professor Radin was among the first legal scholars to examine the
connection between personhood, property, and the market. She divided property
into two types: fungible and personal.761 She suggested that some property interests
can become personal because they are so closely associated with the individual that
without them the individual would not have the opportunity to become a fully
developed person. 762 These personal property rights should be protected against
invasion by government or by conflicting fungible property claims of other people.
She asserted that for an object close to the personal end of the continuum from
754
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personal to fungible, there could be a prima facie case against taking it. 763 The
premise underlying her personhood perspective is that, to be a person, an individual
needs some control over resources in the external environment and this control can
take the form of property rights. 764 We can assert that this property right is an
inalienable property right. One’s personhood should not be monetizable or
alienable as proposed by universal commodification.765
This conception of personhood as including certain forms of property is
applicable to our current digital environment. In discussing this environment, Colin
Koopman, Philosophy Professor at the University of Oregon, has asserted that our
digital information is active in making us who we are and the formats structuring
data help shape who we are. 766 He concludes that our information composes
significant parts of our very selves and that, “we are cyborgs who extend into our
data.” 767 Professor John Cheney-Lippold of the University of Michigan has
asserted in his book We Are Data, that, “[i]n the present day of ubiquitous
surveillance, who we are is not only what we think we are. Who we are is what our
data is made to say about us.”768 We have algorithmic identities that are statistically
ordained by correlation and nothing else 769 and they constitute part of our
personhood. University of Maryland Law Professor Julie Cohen has said that,
“networked information technologies do not simply empower the networked self;
they configure it.”770 Sherry Turkle has noted that the concept of “second self,”
which was the title of her book, does not go far enough:“[o]ne is tempted, to speak
not merely of second self, but of a new generation of self, itself.”771
Our personhood is changing as we spend more and more time online, and
our personal data that constitutes part of our personhood are considered fungible
property and subject to the market. Digitization seems to make personhood
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alienable. As New Yorker writer Jia Tolentino has written, Mark Zuckerberg
“understood better than anyone that personhood in the twenty-first century would
be a commodity like cotton or gold.”772 But, commodification is the antithesis of
personhood as a supreme value which rules out the possibility of involving persons
in a trade-off, as if their worth were a function of their utility. Making personhood
marketable is a contradiction with personhood as we have known it; personhood,
the supreme value, becomes a mere commodity.
Professor Charles Fried has described well the ultimate value of personhood:
All other moral values gather their moral force as
they determine choice. By contrast, the value of
personhood...far from being chosen, is the
presupposition and substrate of the very concept of
choice. And that is why the norms surrounding
respect for person may not be compromised, why
these norms are absolute in respect to the various
ends we choose to pursue.773
Shoshanna Zuboff has interpreted this threat to personhood as one to our humanity:
“an information civilization shaped by surveillance capitalism will thrive at the
expense of human nature and threatens to cost us our humanity.”774
The changes in personhood can also be seen from the perspective of
neuroscience. Our closest relative in the animal kingdom is the chimpanzee, but the
prefrontal cortex of a chimp occupies only 17% of the adult brain versus 33% in
humans.775 Our prefrontal cortex makes us unique; it makes both the biological
human being and the moral person. 776 And this particular organ exhibits
neuroplasticity.777 Under the influence of more and more screen time, the prefrontal
cortex is changing: Susan Greenfield has called this “mind change” by analogy to
climate change.778 “Mind change” is an umbrella term that describes how modern
technologies are changing the functional state of the human brain. 779 She believes
that these changes in the brain, like climate change, may have serious and pervasive
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consequences. 780 Specifically, dopamine can disable the prefrontal cortex, and the
underactivity of this key area can have a profound effect on holistic brain operations
and contribute to a mindset where sensory trumps cognitive and individual identity
is less emphasized.781 She has noted that our new technologies have opened our
brains to manipulation as never before in human history782 and predicted that, given
the malleability of the human brain and the large number of hours spent in front of
screens, the minds of the future will be very different from any others in human
history.783 If that seems overly dramatic, she warns that we cannot afford to be
complacent and assume that our brains are inviolate—to do so would result in a
world in which our key values would be lost forever.784
Among these key values would be personhood itself. When our computer
tools and our digitized data become so integrated with us that they are part of us,
we become the very tools themselves. In such case, it seems likely that our
personhood would cease to be an end in itself and would become merely a device
to be used, a tool to be exploited. 785 A business model—and a contract that
implements it—that promotes changes in personhood of this type are repulsive. This
may help persuade a judge to seize the opportunity to declare such a contract illegal.
g.

Threats to Democratic Society and Theory

The threat to democracy in the form of election interference was described
above. In addition, there are two additional threats to democracy from the
behavioral-advertising business model. This model and the contracts implementing
it pose threats to a democratic society and also to the philosophical foundations of
democracy.
i.

Democratic Society

A number of scholars have warned about threats to a democratic society.
Debra Satz has commented that “particular markets can . . . even undermine the
conditions for a democratic society.”786 Sherry Turkle posed the question: “[w]hat
is democracy without privacy?”787 Yochai Benkler, Robert Faris, and Hal Roberts
of Harvard’s Berkman Klein Center for the Internet and Society concluded that,
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“the basic business of Facebook, when applied to political communication, presents
a long-term threat to democracy.”788
One of the earliest scholars to pose the issue was Professor Paul M.
Schwartz of Berkeley Law School, who issued a prophetic warning in 1999:
The utilization of information technology in
cyberspace will act as a powerful negative force in
two ways. First, . . . it will discourage unfettered
participation in deliberative democracy in the United
States. Second, the current use of
information
technology on the Internet can harm an individual’s
capacity for self-governance. These two negative
effects are significant because our nation’s political
order is based both on democratic deliberation and
on individuals who are capable of forming and acting
on their notions of the good.789
More recently, Stanford Law Professor Nathaniel Persily has described
some of the threats to a democratic society in his article “Can Democracy Survive
the Internet?”790 He has drawn attention to a number of factors from the 2016
presidential election: virality is now the coin of the campaign realm; the internet
uniquely privileges above all outrageous campaign messages; viewers have
considerable difficulty distinguishing between real and fake news; the prevalence
of false stories online erects barriers to educated political decision making;
democracy depends on both the ability and the will of voters to base their political
judgments on facts; and the politics of never-ending spectacles.791 He specifically
criticizes Google’s search engine.792 The strength of such a search engine comes
from the relevance of its search results, but “one man’s relevant result . . . is
another’s filter bubble”—so the search for campaign information will lead the user
in a direction determined by the user’s prior searches. 793 In a similar fashion,
Facebook does not prioritize the search for the truth, but instead provides the most
engaging and meaningful experience to a user.794 Users often find false, negative,
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or otherwise outrageous speech to be more engaging and meaningful. 795 These
downsides of Google and Facebook are the result of the behavioral-advertising
business model that relies on addictive engagement.
Another internet critic who has described the threats to a democratic society
is Zeynep Tufekci. Her comments concern the consequences and power of big data
analytics made possible by the following conditions of behavioral advertising: (1)
availability of big data; (2) a shift to individual marketing; (3) the potential and
opacity of modeling; (4) the use of behavioral science in the service of persuasion;
(5) dynamic experimentation; and (6) the growth of new power brokers on the
internet who control the data and algorithms (such as Google and Facebook).796
Three consequences of big data analytics are problematic for a democratic society
because they undermine the civic experience.
The first consequence is deep and individualized profiling and targeting
which allows for unprecedented focusing of advertising. Specifically, it allows
candidates for office to focus their attention and resources on “swing” districts at
an individual level and ignore unlikely or unpersuadable voters. 797 Previously
inefficient data practices made such precision difficult and limited it to small local
areas.798
The second consequence is the opacity of surveillance that derives from the
information asymmetry and secrecy that are inherent in big data analytics. This
opacity takes advantage of a heuristic bias in humans.799 People will respond less
positively to a message that they perceive as intentionally tailored to them. A
hidden message that is indirect is more persuasive.
The third consequence is the assault on democratic deliberation, on the
Habermasian public sphere.800 It is the destruction of “status free” deliberation of
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ideas on their own merit regardless of who uttered them.801 We now live in what
she calls an “anti-Habermasian public sphere” in which all interactions are between
individuals who are known quantities—the ideas they express are invariably linked
to their personal backgrounds and reasoned debate and the public interest suffer.802
Of course, the threats posed to democracy do not all come directly from the
behavioral-advertising business model. Think, for example, of the design of online
spaces that favors consumers over citizens and corporate interests over the public
interest; the lack of mutual respect in online discussions; trolling and flaming in
online forums; and the online echo chambers that promote polarization. 803 This
activity is not the direct result of the business model, but the business model
facilitates much of this activity.
Marshall McLuhan suggested what is perhaps the most disheartening
description of the situation for a democratic society: “[o]nce we have surrendered
our senses and nervous systems to the private manipulation of those who would
benefit by taking a lease on our eyes and ears and nerves, we don’t really have any
rights left.”804
ii.

Democratic Theory

The behavioral-advertising business model poses not only the practical
threat to democracy in the election process and to a democratic society as noted
above, but also in the theory of liberal democracy. The formation of liberal
democracy was a complex process, but it can be said that modern liberal democracy
started with the insistence on equality of all persons, asserted certain basic human
rights, and then concluded with the argument for self-government.805 The rhetorical
tool used to explain self-government was the concept of contract. This is tied
closely to the idea of consent. The theorists of government, such as Hobbes and
Locke, assumed that men could take on obligations only if these were freely
assumed.806 Thus, all obligations appear under the name of promises and a man can
be held to what he promised because he himself created the promise.807 The most
common way for a person to consent was through a contract. Thus, they adopted
the concept of contract to their vision of how men transitioned from a state of nature
801
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to a government.808 Locke was particularly insistent on the concept of consent. He
wrote that “[n]o body doubts but an express Consent, of any Man, entering into any
Society, makes him a perfect Member of that Society, a Subject of that
Government” and “[t]he Liberty of Man in Society, is to be under no other
Legislative Power, but that established, by consent, in the Common-wealth.”809
Hobbes wrote that “A Common-wealth is said to be Instituted, when a Multitude
of men do Agree, and Covenant, every one, with every one, ...”[emphasis added].810
Consent confers legitimacy.811
The emphasis on consent and contract presupposed at least one fact about
men in a state of nature: they were free. Their consent had to be the result of their
free choice. Both Locke and Hobbes assumed that at the moment of entering into
the contract for government, men were free. Locke wrote that “[t]he Natural Liberty
of Man is to be free from any superior Power on Earth, and not to be under the Will
or Legislative Authority of Man, but to have only the Law of Nature for his
Rule.”812 Hobbes wrote that “[a] Free-Man, is he, that in those things, which by his
strength and wit he is able to do, is not hindered to doe what he has a will to.”813
In the twentieth century, Harvard Philosophy Professor John Rawls also
adopted the contract concept in conceiving his theory of justice.814 Instead of a state
of nature, he invented an original position of equality, not as a historical condition
of culture but as a hypothetical situation. Like Hobbes and Locke, the obligations
of the members of his society are self-imposed and they are “autonomous” 815
(“autonomy” being the twenty-first century equivalent of the seventeenth century
“freedom” of Hobbes and Locke).816 For Rawls, the relevant agreement or contract
that the members of society make, however, is not to enter a given society or choose
a given form of government, but to adopt certain moral principles.817
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As Professor Rawls makes clear, the concept of contract is hypothetical, not
historical.818 This is also true of the contract theories of Hobbes and Locke.819 But
there is a logical paradox in using a hypothetical contract theory with an assumption
of a state of nature (Hobbes and Locke) or original position (Rawls).820 If citizens
are using the internet more and more (including the services of Google and
Facebook), then it seems likely that they are sacrificing more and more of their
autonomy. Even more so if important functions of their life are conducted online
and involve the use of these services. Given the addiction, surveillance, and
manipulation noted above, are they free or autonomous persons as assumed by
Hobbes, Locke, and Rawls? Do they have the basic prerequisites that philosophers
of liberal democracy have posited as necessary for the establishment of a
representative government or a theory of justice?821 Of course, if the concept of
contract is only an abstraction, there is only a philosophical inconsistency, not an
actual one. But this philosophical contradiction should alert us to a real problem:
the commonsense conclusion that a business model that contradicts the intellectual
foundations and rationale of democracy is unacceptable. This fact could be helpful
to influence a judge trying to determine whether the contracts of Google and
Facebook are illegal.
h.

Paternalism

Another factor that could influence a judge is paternalism. A judge would
not want to be accused of paternalism in ruling that the contracts of Google and
Facebook were illegal. Philosophy Professor Emeritus at the University of
California, Davis, Gerald Dworkin, has defined “paternalism” as “the interference
of a state or an individual with another person, against their will, and defended or
motivated by a claim that the person interfered with will be better off or protected
from harm.”822 This concept seems to date from the nineteenth century. In the 1840s
and 1850s, there was an attempt to prevent the overtly political uses of law and to
818
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create a system of legal thought free from policymaking.823 For the new market
regime, new rules of contract, property, and commercial law devoid of paternalistic
and protective doctrines gained prominence. Deviations from market principles
came to be seen as abnormal and improper. Paternalism acquired a negative
connotation that characterizes it today.824
In light of this negative connotation, contemporary scholars have struggled
to explain and justify paternalism. Harvard Law Professor Duncan Kennedy
proposed that paternalism was necessary when a person underestimated the risks
associated with certain behavior or exhibited recklessness.825 He believed there was
no overarching test that would tell us when paternalism was appropriate, he
advocated an ad hoc approach. 826 Other scholars have expressed similar views.
Yale Law School Professor Anthony Kronman in his discussion of paternalism
tried to “reintroduce” the concept of judgment into thinking about contract law.827
He did not try to justify every paternalistic rule but thought that judgment could
lead us in certain cases to limit by an inalienable entitlement a person’s contractual
powers, as in cases of slavery or peonage.828 Dan W. Brock, Professor Emeritus at
Harvard Medical School, has suggested that paternalism concerns the conflict
between two values, autonomy and well-being.829 Thus, it requires a determination
of which value we take to be more important in a particular situation. Associate
Professor Shmuel I. Becker of Victoria University of Wellington and Professor
Yuval Feldman of Bar-Ilan University School of Law have proposed a democratic
justification of paternalism. They assert that legal rules that express concern for
consumers’ wellbeing can be seen as an exercise in self-government. 830 They
simply replicate rules people would have voluntarily established for their
protection.831
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A group of scholars associated with the University of California, Berkeley,
have tried to turn the table on those accusing others of paternalism. They have
suggested that the term “paternalism” should apply to the activities of tech
companies implementing behavioral advertising. 832 When applied to modern
privacy regulations the label is misplaced because these regulations do not make
choices for consumers, but enable choices. 833 They assert that the term
“paternalism” is more appropriately applied to the tech companies using behavioral
advertising to push personalization even where consumers express preferences
against it.834
But perhaps the most cogent response to an accusation of paternalism in a
judge’s finding that the behavioral-advertising contracts are illegal would be the
self-contradiction stated by John Stuart Mill. 835 If a person cannot voluntarily
abdicate his liberty, as Mill noted, then it should also be true that allowing a person
to alienate her autonomy is to deny her autonomy.836 Thus, it must be allowed to
restrict a person’s autonomy to preserve that very autonomy. Autonomy, like
personhood, is a supreme value. Humans take autonomy as a supreme value
because our culture and history tell us so, although this principle, like all others,
ultimately ends up grounding on something arbitrary, but essential.837
A judge applying good judgment to a decision to declare the behavioraladvertising contracts illegal would find support in the commonsense logic of Mill’s
self-contradiction to reconcile any concern about paternalism.
i.

Uncontrolled Experiment

A number of commentators have stated the obvious fact that our experiences
with Google and Facebook are a novel experiment in human behavior. But they
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have also questioned the nature and consequences of this experiment. For example,
Tufts University Professor Maryanne Wolf put the issue in an academic context:
No self-respecting internal review board at any
university would allow a researcher to do what our
culture has already done with no adjudication or
previous evidence: introduce a complete, quasiaddictive set of attention-compelling devices without
knowing the possible side effects and ramifications
for the subjects . . . .838
New York Times journalist Max Fisher, speaking of the tech giants, has questioned
the experiment’s results: “[w]hether they set out to or not, these companies are
conducting the largest social re-engineering experiment in human history, and no
one has the slightest clue what the consequences are.”839
Roger McNamee has found the consequences so far to be negative: “[w]e
are running an uncontrolled evolutionary experiment, and the results so far are
terrifying.”840
Sean Parker, calling himself a “conscientious objector” to social media, has
expressed concern about the consequences for the next generation: “God only know
what it’s doing to our children’s brains.”841
Shoshanna Zuboff has called Facebook’s operation a “vast experiment in
behavior modification...on the broadest possible social and psychological
canvas.”842
And as Susan Greenfield has mordantly observed:
In any case, we cannot afford to wait for a generation
to come to a dysfunctional maturity, or rather
immaturity, to have unwittingly served as the guinea
pigs in an informal experiment, before we devise
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means enabling us to harness the clear benefits of the
screen but at the same time to minimize the risks.843
Sheila Jasanoff, Professor of Science and Technology Studies at the
Harvard Kennedy School, has asked: “[i]s it fitting that societies of such infinitely
creative capacity as ours should reflect on the ethical implications of such farreaching technological experiments only after a threat to human dignity comes
knocking at the door?”844
Silicon Valley entrepreneur and critic Andrew Keen has claimed that “by
so radically socializing today’s digital revolution, we are, as a species, collectively
jumping off a cliff.”845
Common sense in this situation would suggest the application of the
precautionary principle to this uncontrolled experiment. This principle states that a
lack of decisive evidence of harm should not be a ground for refusing to protect
against risks.846 Cass Sunstein has objected that this principle is useless because it
forbids all course of action.847 But a mild, banal version of it would be appropriate.
The application of the precautionary principle to this uncontrolled experiment
would suggest that in the face of the threats to democracy, the legal system, and
personhood, we should not allow the manipulation and loss of autonomy inherent
in the behavioral advertising business model. One way to prevent these harms
would be for a court to declare the contracts illegal.
Our experiences with Google and Facebook can also be seen as an
experiment in another sense—as an initial trial in the use of artificial intelligence—
perhaps a precedent. Professor Russell proposes a new approach to artificial
intelligence he calls “provably beneficial machines.” 848 He has warned of the
danger of enfeeblement of human capabilities and the loss of autonomy when
artificial intelligence becomes more widespread. 849 He has suggested that the
solution to this problem is cultural, not technical: “[w]e will need a cultural
843
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movement to reshape our ideals and preferences towards autonomy, agency, and
ability and away from self-indulgence and dependency . . . .”850 If we fail to resist
the loss of autonomy from the behavioral-advertising of Google and Facebook in
our initial trial with artificial intelligence, there does not seem to be much hope in
resisting the even greater dangers of the much improved AI that will confront us in
the future. Declaring the contracts illegal would be a precedent-setting move to
reshape our ideals and preferences.
j.

Bad Beliefs and Bad Behavior

A final factor that may influence a judge’s decision on the illegality of
Google’s and Facebook’s user contracts is a combination of bad beliefs and bad
behavior—the ignorant and arrogant attitudes of the founders and the shady
practices and broken promises that have plagued the two companies.
The founders share a set of bad beliefs—market values—that weaken moral
sanctions, sabotage their own legitimacy, and make an argument against their
business model more attractive. These include the following:
1. “Valley denizens . . . tend to believe that their
priorities should override the privacy, civil liberties,
and security of others. They simply can’t imagine
that anyone would question their motives, given that
they know best. Big Tech should be free to disrupt
government, politics, civic society, and law, if those
things should prove to be inconvenient.” 851
2. “Rules are made to be broken” and “It is better to
ask for forgiveness than to beg for permission.”852
3. “‘Who will stop me.’ [sic] This became the central
tenet of Internet disrupters . . . .”853
4. “What I’m struck by is the lack of intellectual
modesty in the computer science community.”854
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5. “We fail to ask, on a more fundamental level, if
there are limits appropriate to the human condition, a
scale conducive to our flourishing as the sorts of
creatures we are. Modern technology tends to
encourage users to assume that such limits do not
exist; indeed, it is often marketed as a means to
transcend such limits.”855
Bad beliefs led to bad behavior. An example is the bait-and-switch strategy
both companies used over many years. 856 Professor Hoofnagle has called both
Facebook and Google “a kind of privacy long con.” 857 Facebook changed its
disclosure settings over time to make user profiles much more public but claimed
that users wanted to be “more open.”858 Google proudly claimed its opposition to
intrusive advertising and its support for objective search results, but over time it
secretly began using behavioral data in search.859 The two companies lured users
into a relationship that they promised would be different from their competitors,
but they later went on to imitate their competitors.
Google’s violations of users’ trust seem to be less egregious, but more
insidious, than those of Facebook. Google’s violations include the episodes
described below:
1. “[C]ustomers were never asked if Google Street
View cameras could take pictures of their front
yards and match them to addresses in order to sell
more ads. [Google] adhered to the maxim that says
it’s better to ask for forgiveness than to get
permission—though in truth they weren’t really
doing either.”860
2. “Google suffered a major blow on Tuesday after
European antitrust officials fined the search giant a
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record $2.7 billion for unfairly favoring some of its
own services over those of rivals.”861
3. “What we are witnessing is the computational
exploitation of a natural human desire: to look
‘behind the curtain,’ to dig deeper into something
that engages us. As we click and click, we are
carried along by the exciting sensation of
uncovering more secrets and deeper truths. Youtube
leads viewers down a rabbit hole of extremism,
while Google racks up the ad sales.”862
4. “The program, known as Duplex, is an automated
voice assistant capable of making hair
appointments, booking restaurant reservations and
conducting other tasks over the phone . . . . At no
point in the demo were the receptionists on the other
end of the calls informed that they were talking to a
computer rather than another human . . . . The
onstage demo of Duplex drew lots of oohs and aahs
. . . . But the demo . . . raised a lot of hackles. Zeynep
Tufekci, a professor and writer, called Duplex
‘horrifying’ and said Google’s willingness to use A.
I. to fool humans—and to brag about its ability to
do so on stage at a public event—showed that
‘Silicon Valley is ethically lost, rudderless and has
not learned a thing.’”863
5. “European authorities fined Google a record $5.1
billion…for abusing its power and ordered the
company to alter its practices . . . . ‘Google has used
Android as a vehicle to cement the dominance of its
search engine,’ said Margrethe Vestager, Europe’s
antitrust chief. ‘These practices have denied rivals
the chance to innovate and compete on the merits.
They have denied European consumers the benefits
861
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of effective competition in the important mobile
sphere.’”864
6. “In the first major example [of how European
regulators would use their newfound authority
against the most powerful technology companies],
the French data protection authority announced
Monday that it had fined Google 50 million euros,
or about ‘$57 million, for not properly disclosing to
users how data is collected across its services . . . to
present personalized advertisements.’”865
7. “A collective lawsuit against Google for allegedly
tracking the personal data of 4m iPhone users can
proceed in the UK courts, three judges have
ruled.”866
8. “Google agreed on Wednesday to pay a record
$170 million fine and make changes to protect
children’s privacy on YouTube, as regulators said
the video site had knowingly and illegally harvested
personal information from children and used it to
profit by targeting them with ads.”867
9. “Australian regulators on Tuesday accused
Google of misleading consumers about its
collection of their personal location information
through
its
Android
mobile
operating
868
system . . . .”
864
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10. “[Google] was a culture in which the metrics
were always right. The company was simply serving
users, even if that meant knowingly monetizing
content that was undermining the fabric of
democracy.”869
A partial listing of Facebook’s prevarications include the
following870:
1. “‘The past decade shows that user concerns over
privacy appear to have little teeth on changing how
[Facebook] behaves, aside from a recycling of
contrite statements and promises to do better from
its C.E.O.’ she [Zeynep Tufekci] said.”871
2.”’For a leader [Sheryl Sandberg] of the most
profitable company of its size in the history of
capitalism, who has herself personally garnered
over $1bn in stock gains based on the company’s
success, to claim that the business side of the
company, which she runs, has never worked to
maximise its profits, seems disingenuous to say the
least,’ Mr. Kirkpatrick [author the The Facebook
Effect] said.”872
3. “’The thing that is concerning here is that
Facebook said it had totally turned
off
the
permission to share data for the friends of people
who had an app but in the case of hardware
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manufacturers they didn’t do that,’ he [Sandy
Parakilas, a former Facebook employee] said.” 873
4. “After stalling for weeks, Facebook eventually
agreed to hand over the Russian posts to Congress.
Twice in October 2017, Facebook was forced to
revise its public statements, finally acknowledging
that close to 126 million people had seen the
Russian posts.”874
5.”’At the same time that Facebook was publicly
professing their desire to work with the committee
to address these issues, they were paying a political
opposition research firm to privately attempt to
undermine that same committee’s credibility,’
Senator Mark Warner of Virginia, the top Democrat
on the panel, said in a statement. ‘It’s very
concerning.’”875
6. “In the [Senate Intelligence Committee] reports,
Google, Twitter and Facebook . . . were described
by researchers as having ‘evaded’ and
‘misrepresented’ themselves and the extent of
Russian activity on their sites. The companies were
also criticized for not turning over complete sets of
data about Russian manipulation to the Senate.”876
7. “For years, Facebook gave some of the world’s
largest technology companies more intrusive access
to users’ personal data than it had disclosed.”877
8. “The agency [FTC] found that Facebook’s
handling of user data violated a 2011 privacy
873
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settlement with the F. T.C. That earlier settlement,
which came after the company was accused of
deceiving people about how it handled their data,
required the company to revamp its privacy
practices.”878
9. “Facebook…agreed to pay $550 million to settle
a class-action lawsuit [Patel v. Facebook, 932 F. 3d.
1264 (9th Cir. 2019)] . . . the suit said the Silicon
Valley company violated an Illinois biometric
privacy law by harvesting facial data from the
photos of millions of users . . . without their
permission . . . Facebook has said the allegations
have no merit.”879
10. “Facebook promised users that it would not
share their personal information with advertisers. It
did.”880
Of the two companies, it appears that Google has not faced severe criticism for its
misconduct. Roger McNamee believes this is because Facebook’s conduct is so
much worse than Google’s.881
2.

Consequences of Illegality
a.

Contract Unenforceable and Void

A court, in weighing the pros and cons of declaring the Google and
Facebook contracts illegal, would not be oblivious to the consequences of a
decision that the contracts were illegal. To analyze the consequences, we can start
with some basic questions. If a contract is “unlawful” is that the same as “illegal”?
If a contract is unlawful or illegal, is it merely “unenforceable” or is it “void”? If
void, is it so from its inception or only at a later time?
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2020, at B1.
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Black’s Law Dictionary882 calls an “illegal contract” one whose formation
or performance is expressly forbidden by statute or where a penalty is imposed for
doing the act agreed upon; “unlawful” would involve acts not positively forbidden
but disapproved by law and not recognized because they are against public policy883
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “unenforceable contract” as meaning that the
contract has no legal effect or force in a court action; a “void contract” as one having
no legal force or binding effect.884 California case law and the Civil Code use both
“void” and “unenforceable.”
The California Civil Code contains provisions concerning both contracts
that are unenforceable and contracts that are void. For example, California Civil
Code § 1670.5, specifies that a court will not “enforce” an unconscionable contract.
California Civil Code § 1598 states that contracts in which the object is unlawful,
impossible, or unascertainable are “void,” and § 1916-2 states that a usury contract
is “void.” The word “void” in the cases and Civil Code refers to “void” in the strict
sense, and does not include the sense of “voidable” (meaning that a defect in the
contract can be cured to make it effective).885 It is not clear whether the term “void”
refers to a time period beginning with the inception of the contract or a later time,
but it seems logical for it to refer to the inception unless the context requires a
different meaning.
As noted above, California Civil Code § 1667 defines “unlawful” contracts
and § 1599 states that “that part of a contract which is unlawful is void.” Although
the cases noted previously often refer to contracts that are contrary to good morals,
unconscionable, or against public policy as being “unenforceable,” the contracts
are also void under § 1599.
The concept of voidness is important for its consequences when dealing
with the Google and Facebook contracts. If the contract were found void, then the
consent found in the Terms of Service of Google and Facebook would also be

882

CAL. CIV. CODE § 1667 forbids contracts that are against good morals, unconscionable, or
contrary to public policy. Such contracts thus qualify as “illegal” under the BLACKS LAW
DICTIONARY definition of “illegal contract.” See Illegal Contract, infra note 883.
883
Illegal Contract, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990); Unlawful, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990).
884
Unenforceable Contract, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990); Void Contract, BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990).
885
Id. at 1573.

143

Journal of Law, Technology & the Internet — Vol. 12
void. 886 The companies would then have no legal basis for gathering and
monetizing personal information.
The California Civil Code has one provision on unjust enrichment that
potentially could apply to the situation with Google and Facebook. CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 1589 (Consent by Acceptance of Benefits) states that: “[a] voluntary acceptance
of the benefit of a transaction is equivalent to a consent to all the obligations arising
from it, so far as the facts are known, or ought to be known, to the person
accepting.”
Clearly, the users of Google and Facebook accept the benefit of the search
or social media services and this acceptance could be interpreted as “consent” to
their obligation to allow their persona data to be collected and monetized by the
companies. A serious question arises however as to the extent the “the facts” are
“known” to the users. Further, the collection and monetization of the personal
information leading to the loss of autonomy could be seen as sufficient justification
for finding the “transaction” immoral and against public policy.887
b.

Statutory Violation or Common Law Tort?

Assuming that the consent in the Terms of Service was void or the
transaction itself was void, the question would be whether the gathering and
monetization of the personal information would constitute a civil or criminal
statutory violation or a tort.
The applicable civil legislation would be privacy legislation. There is no
federal general privacy statute. A number of federal statutes protect privacy in
specific sectors, but they do not cover all commercial entities in their collection and
The current consent in Google’s Terms of Service is the statement, “[t]his license allows
Google to: host, reproduce, distribute, communicate, and use your content.” Google, Google
Terms of Service (August 17, 2020), https://policies.google.com/terms?hl=en
[https://perma.cc/F9LT-BF8D]. The current consent in Facebook’s Terms of Service is the
statement, “[b]y using our Products, you agree that we can show you ads that we think will be
relevant to you and your interests. We use your personal data to help determine which ads to show
you.” Facebook, Facebook Terms of Service (August 17, 2020),
https://www.facebook.com/legal/terms [https://perma.cc/EJN3-ATBQ].
887
The acceptance of benefits can have other consequences. For a short period in 2014, General
Mills provided in its terms of service that anyone who received something of value (including
“liking” General Mills on Facebook) could not sue it. It does not appear that anything similar
appears in the Terms of Service of Google or Facebook. There would seem to be a question of
whether such a term would also be against public policy. See SILVERMAN, supra note 3, at 26.
886
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use of personal information.888 Currently, none of these statutes that protect certain
areas of privacy have been used successfully to attack the business model of Google
or Facebook for their use of personal data. California is reputed to have the
strongest privacy statutes in the country, but these statutes still have limitations.889
California’s Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 that came into effect in January 2020
gives users of Google and Facebook more rights over personal data, but it does not
specifically attack, or cover, their business model.890 These statutes do not purport
to give users a right to sue Google or Facebook for use of personal data collected
from users. These statutes, therefore, would not help determine the possible liability
of Google and Facebook for collection and use of the personal data.
The other statutory basis under which a claim might allege a violation would
be “petty theft” under California’s Penal Code.891 Professor Lori Andrews, Director
of the Institute for Science, Law and Technology at Illinois Institute of Technology,
has described the practice of behavioral advertising as “theft.” She explains that:
If someone broke into my home and copied my
documents, he’d be guilty of trespass and invasion of
privacy. If the cops wanted to wiretap my
conversation, they’d need a warrant. But without our
knowledge or consent, 892 virtually every entry we
make on a social network or other website is
surreptitiously being tracked and assessed. The

888

DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 876 (2018). A survey
of these statutes could reveal whether any one of them conditions legality of the activities they
cover on consent. If so, then a court decision declaring the Google and Facebook internet service
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889
Id. at 789.
890
See Natasha Singer, Advocates Behind California’s Landmark Privacy Law Aim to Toughen It,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2019, at B3; Natasha Singer, Weighing How to Comply ‘With a New
Privacy Law, N.Y. TIMES Dec. 30, 2019, at B1; see also Natasha Singer, Why California Has
Better Data Protections, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2019 (showing efforts to broaden privacy rights by
ballot initiative); Nicholas Confessore, Big Tech’s War on Privacy, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Aug. 19,
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CAL. PENAL CODE § 488 (1927).
892
As explained above, the consent would be void if the contract containing the consent was void.
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information is just as sensitive. The harms are just as
real. But the law is not as protective.893
She then concludes that “[t]he guiding force behind this enormous theft of private
information is behavioral advertising.” 894 Her conclusion of “theft” has been
explained in advance by her comment that “the law is not as protective.”895
Professor Cass Sunstein, commenting on manipulation, has asserted that
where the manipulator is focused on his own interests rather than on those of the
chooser, “a self-interested manipulator can be said to be stealing from people—
both limiting their agency and moving their resources in the preferred direction.”896
Given the manipulative nature of the contracts implementing the behavioraladvertising business model, the internet service contracts of Google and Facebook
should meet this standard.
It does not appear that Facebook or Google has faced serious charges of
theft. Professors Andrews and Sunstein have highlighted the moral deficit in
behavioral advertising that would support an argument that the contracts of Google
and Facebook are contrary to good morals, unconscionable, and against public
policy.
The other possible liability would be under tort law. Current tort law has a
restricted scope. Depriving a person of autonomy through the collection and
aggregation of personal information does not yet qualify as a tort. Common law
courts have, however, created new torts when the need arises.897 The tort that is
analogous is that of privacy and this tort is particularly salient for these purposes.
First, the Restatement of Torts (Second) seems to invite lawyers and judges to find
new torts to fit new circumstances. It lists the four typical privacy torts:
unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another; appropriation of the other’s
name or likeness; unreasonable publicity given to the other’s private life; and
publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false light before the public.898 It
then states:
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ANDREWS, supra note 292, at 18; see also FOROOHAR, supra note 91, at 47 (calling these
situations “lawful theft”).
894
ANDREWS, supra note 292 (emphasis added), at 18.
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Id.
896
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE ETHICS OF INFLUENCE: GOVERNMENT IN THE AGE OF BEHAVIORAL
SCIENCE 99 (2016) (emphasis added).
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RADIN, supra note 329, at 198 (proposing a new tort of “intentional deprivation of basic legal
rights”).
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RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A.
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Other forms may still appear, particularly since some
courts and in particular, the Supreme Court of the
United States, have spoken in very broad general
terms of a somewhat undefined ‘right of privacy’ as
a ground for various constitutional decisions
involving indeterminate civil and personal rights.
These and other references to the right of privacy,
particularly as a protection against various types of
governmental interference and the compilation of
elaborate written or computerized dossiers, may give
rise to the expansion of the four forms of tort liability
for invasion of privacy listed in this Section or the
establishment of new forms. Nothing in this Chapter
is intended to exclude the possibility of future
developments in the tort law of privacy.899
Second, the history of the right of privacy demonstrates how courts can
respond to changing circumstances and social mores. The current privacy law in
the United States originated in a famous law review article written by Samuel D.
Warren and Louis D. Brandeis in 1890. They opined that “[p]olitical, social, and
economic changes entail the recognition of new rights, and the common law, in its
eternal youth, grows to meet the demands of society.”900 They saw the development
of new rights as “inevitable,” the newest being the right to privacy, or the “general
right of the individual to be let alone.”901 Although the New York Court of Appeals
rejected any such right a few years later, this narrow right of protection against the
intrusive interests of both the press and its readers was enacted into law over the
succeeding decades by many state legislatures. 902 Over the years, judicial
interpretation expanded the scope of the right of privacy to include the right of a
woman to make her own decisions about whether or not to terminate a pregnancy.
In Roe v. Wade, Justice Blackmun writing for the United States Supreme Court in
a 7-2 decision, found such a right of privacy in the Constitution, even though no
general right of privacy was explicitly mentioned there. 903 This decision
demonstrates that courts have been willing to accept the challenge posed in the
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Restatement and recognize new forms of the privacy tort when changes in society
make it appropriate.904
To date, the judiciary has not recognized harm to autonomy as a tort.905
Until the recognition of such a tort, the closest analogy is unauthorized disclosure
of personal information. As lawyers Charlene Brownlee and Blaze D. Waleski have
noted, occurrences of unauthorized access to and misuse of personal information
have increased because of the prevalence of data aggregation and advanced
technologies to automate the collection, access to the information, and use of this
information, particularly over the Internet. 906 The growing number of lawsuits
caused by breaches of data security have alleged various offenses: negligence,
intentional or negligent breach of privacy, violation of promises made to customers,
invasion of privacy, possessory rights, breach of contract, violation of unfair trade
practices and violation of a specific legislative act. None of these causes of action
would seem to explicitly fit deprivation of autonomy, but they provide some helpful
lessons for how to frame an autonomy tort suit.
Previously scholars have analyzed the collection and aggregation of
personal information, but they did not agree on the nature of the problem. Professor
Jerry Kang of UCLA Law School saw the issue as one of surveillance in tension
with human dignity and proposed a rule that personal information may be processed
only in functionally necessary ways. 907 Professor Daniel Solove of George
Washington Law School on the other hand believed that the problem was not
surveillance but a problem with the helplessness, frustration, and vulnerability one
experiences when a large bureaucratic organization has vast dossiers on
individuals.908 Fordham Law Professor Joel R. Reindenberg suggested that the lack
of participation by citizens in decisions about the gathering of their information is
inherently manipulating citizens. 909 Berkeley Law Professor Paul M. Schwartz,

However, Paul M. Schwartz had a more pessimistic outlook on this issue in 1999, that “unless
courts expand these [privacy] torts over time, which is unlikely . . . .” Schwartz, supra note 265, at
1634.
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907
Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1263
(1998).
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Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for Information
Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393 (2001).
909
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however, saw the problem as a lack of privacy protection that exposes information
about a person’s communication and consumption of ideas.910
Other scholars have suggested the creation of new specific forms of tort.
Professor Jessica Litman of Wayne State proposed a tort of breach of confidence
or breach of trust.911 Professor Andrew J. McClurg of Florida International College
of Law has suggested a tort of appropriation.912 Sarah Ludington, Senior Lecturing
Fellow at Duke Law School, has promoted the idea of a tort of misuse of Fair
Information Practices (transferring the principles of Fair Information Practices in
the Privacy Act of 1974 from the public sector to the private sector).913
These proposals and suggestions indicate the direction that tort law could
take to adjust, as it has in the past, to changing social mores and circumstances.
Such adjustment is likely to take time. It seems unlikely that currently the Google
and Facebook behavioral-advertising contracts would be found to involve theft or
a tort—but they could still be found void. Is there an alternative business model
that would serve users but not violate California standards of good morals,
unconscionability, and public policy?
c.

Alternative Business Model914

Any court presented with the task of deciding whether the Google and
Facebook contracts were illegal would consider the effect on users. The court would
want to consider whether there was an alternative business model that would not
violate California standards of good morals, unconscionability, and public policy.
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There is an alternative—a subscription model.915 This model was available to the
founders of Google and Facebook, but was ignored in favor of the despised, but
useful, advertising model. In 2015, Mark Zuckerberg justified the rejection of the
subscription model. When a new Facebook employee suggested a subscription
model to him, Mark stopped the employee with the comment, “Facebook’s mission
is to make the world more open and connected. I don’t understand how
subscriptions would make the world either more open or more connected.”916
A subscription model would avoid the moral and legal problems of
behavioral advertising. The user would no longer be a product, but would become
a customer. Google and Facebook would look to the customers, not advertisers, as
the source of their revenue and the focus of their attention. They would use the
personal data of their customers only to improve services for the customer, not
monetize it through behavioral advertising. The companies would no longer have
an incentive to addict the customers to use of their services. They would not collect
and maintain enormous amounts of personal data. They would not addict, surveil,
or manipulate their users. They would not compromise the users’ autonomy. The
contracts would not be found contrary to good morals, unconscionable, or against
public policy. This poses a “wishful and wistful” question: would we prefer a paid
option for social media?917
The major difference in the subscription model is, of course, that the
customer has to pay. That change is likely to be unwelcome to users. Free services
have become a virtual right, although they are an anomaly created by the distinctive
environment of the early internet. The long period of free access to services in the
late 1990s accustomed users to free services.918 As a result, some observers believe
the subscription model is unrealistic. Former Facebook manager Antonio Garcia
Martinez has disdainfully dismissed the idea of a paid option, saying, “[o]h, and
spare me your claims that you’d be willing to pay for Facebook instead of seeing
ads. It’s not even clear what Facebook should charge you.”919
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Additionally, New Yorker reporter Ken Auletta believes that, given
stagnant incomes and already large subscription payments, the economics do not
support this “noble idea.” 920 He cites a Brookings study reporting that, after
adjusting for inflation, American wages have risen only 0.2 percent over the past
forty years, and today the average household already pays monthly subscription
charges of $267 per month not including electricity, gas and other unavoidable
monthly bills.921 But he does not try to estimate what subscriptions to Google and
Facebook would cost. One study found that the average American spends more than
$1,300 on digital media a year.922 Others have made estimates of the value of the
services: $8,500/year for search and $300/year for social media as what users would
accept as payment to quit using them.923 Another calculation in 2017 was for the
average ad revenue per user: for Facebook, the average revenue per U.S. user was
$6/month, but it was suggested that few would agree to pay in exchange for the
protection, rather than the monetization, of their personal information.924 In a 2015
suit, plaintiffs alleged that the monetary value of the information of each user each
year was $59.20.925 Zeynep Tufekci has stated that she would be happy to pay more
than 20 cents per month (estimated to be Facebook’s profit per user per month) for
a Facebook or a Google that did not track her, upgraded its encryption and treated
her as a customer whose preferences and privacy matter.926
But if the subscription model is unrealistic, why is it successful? Consider
the subscription services for internet connectivity, cellphone service, and a number
of internet service providers, such as HBO, Netflix, Spotify, and Patreon, are
currently successfully selling subscriptions for online services. 927 The Financial
Times in discussing ad-driven online businesses said that “[n]ews sites that have
920
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prospered have done so on subscriptions, not ads.”928 In 2018, New York Times
tech columnist Farhad Manjoo discovered the beginning of a remarkable
renaissance in art and culture based on subscription payments929 and observed that
the way to save a local newspaper is to have people pay for it—$5 or $10/month or
more.930 One small example he cites is the news service The Information, which
charges $399/year for a subscription, has a subscriber base of 10,000 and a positive
cash flow.931 Subscriptions are now being considered a status symbol.932 Perhaps
the most promising subscription model would be one that was combined with a
progressive, digital-ad revenue tax, as suggested by Nobel Prize winning economist
Paul Romer. The tax would encourage the breakup of Google and Facebook into
smaller companies and make it easier for new companies to enter the market.933 In
fact, social media platforms such as Vero and Idka already exist 934 and a new
platform, Openbook, was started in 2018.935
The subscription model also has the potential to change the psychology of
the relationship of users to each other and to Google and Facebook. It seems
plausible that a subscription model could discourage some of the negative behavior
that is so common on Facebook. When the user has a commercial relationship rather
than enjoying a “free ride,” it seems likely that the user would be more responsible.
But, further research is needed here. A starting point for such an effort could be to
examine the experience of the existing subscription social media platforms.
In weighing the pros and cons of finding the behavioral-advertising
contracts illegal, a judge would need to understand what the harm to users would
be. The existence of the subscription model would not completely change the
services the companies offered, and customers would still be able to communicate
with friends they currently communicate with. The other services could continue as
928
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well. Further, asking a customer to pay for a service is not something exceptional
or extraordinary; it is the way the market economy works. 936 The subscription
model would eliminate the huge profits that both companies have enjoyed, but
leaders of both companies have been aware of the moral deficiencies of advertising
from the very beginning. The declaration that the contracts are illegal and the need
to change to a subscription model should not come as a big surprise to both
companies.
d.

Ownership of Data937

The subscription model would renew the question of ownership of the
personal data of the customers. Yuval Noah Harari believes this may be the most
important political question of our era. 938 Warren and Brandeis in their seminal
article said that “where the value of production [of a literary or artistic composition]
. . . is found . . . in the peace of mind or the relief afforded by the ability to prevent
any publication at all, it is difficult to regard the right as one of property, in the
common acceptation of that term.”939 But as early as 1971, Harvard Law Professor
Arthur Miller noted that one of the most facile approaches to safeguarding privacy
was the notion that personal information is a type of property.940 Later, in 2011,
Lori Andrews suggested resort to “novel legal theories to give people a property
right over their own data.”941 Currently, the United States, unlike other Western
countries, does not have a basic data protection law.942 There is no legal right to
personal data in the United States. The result is that different laws determine the
privacy of different types of information. In 1998, UCLA Law School Professor
936
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Jerry Kang outlined the basic conflict: users assumed that their data belonged to
them, the collectors of the information asserted equal rights in the data because it
arose from a mutual interaction.943 In practice, who holds the data decides how to
exploit it.
The discussion above on “digital exhaust” and “dumpster diving” would
suggest an analogy to abandoned property. Are the users of Google and Facebook
effectively abandoning their personal information as if they were placing it for
disposal outside the curtilage of their home? If so, it would presumably belong to
the first person who found it—probably Google and Facebook. That result would
be harsh, and to date does not seem to have been suggested seriously.944
Proposals for property legislation have been made for many years. In 1967,
Alan Westin, Professor of Public Law at Columbia, suggested that legislation
should define personal information as a property right. 945 In 2011, Paul M.
Schwartz developed a model of “propertized personal information” that (1) limited
the alienability of personal information; (2) established opt-in default rules; (3)
created a right to rescind data trade agreements; (4) conferred liquidated damages
to successful litigants to effectively deter violations ; and (5) defined institutional
roles in regulating the information market.946 One recent proposal by University of
Chicago Booth School Professors Luigi Zingales and Guy Rolnik is for a Social
Graph Portability Act that would give Facebook users ownership of all the digital
connections that they create (their “social graph”).947
The concept of ownership raises the question of the purpose of granting
ownership rights. Proponents of ownership rights often have seen them as a way to
protect privacy. Both Arthur Miller and Lori Andrews proposals were seeking to
protect people’s privacy. Others have noted that the purpose of creating property
rights in data can be to facilitate alienability. Wayne State Law Professor Jessica
Litman has said, “[w]e deem something property in order to facilitate its
transfer.”948 She believes that “[t]he market in personal data is the problem. Market
solutions based on a property rights model won’t cure it; they’ll only legitimize
943
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it.”949 She has proposed a model under which personal information could not be
property, and it would be illegal to buy it or sell it.950
Jerry Kang also hypothesized that viewing personal data as a civil or human
right would entail a rule of inalienability, though he summarily rejected such a
possibility because it would risk “surrendering control over information privacy to
the state”.951Berkeley Law Professor Pamela Samuelson has written, “the common
justification for granting property rights—to enable market allocations of scarce
resources—does not apply to personal data. What is scarce is information privacy,
not personal data.”952 She notes that it would be unusual for a property rights regime
to establish a rule or strong presumption against alienability and suggests that if we
consider information privacy as a civil liberty, then, just as it does not make sense
to commodify voting rights, it would not make sense to propertize personal data.953
Stanford Law Professor Mark A. Lemley believes that creating an
intellectual property right in individual data is “a very bad idea.”954 To quote Bruce
Schneier’s comments on privacy, “[t]he . . . fundamental problem is the conception
of [autonomy] as something that should be subjected to commerce in this way.
[Autonomy] needs to be a fundamental right, not a property right.”955 To paraphrase
Nicholas Carr, we should not come to see autonomy as something to be traded for
apps and amusements.956
True to Jessica Litman’s concern, recent discussion on ownership has been
conducted in terms of payment. If the users’ data is so valuable, then shouldn’t they
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be paid for it? Jaron Lanier voiced support for this idea, attributing it to Ted Nelson,
a formative figure in the development of online culture.957 Lanier wrote, “[i]n a
world of digital dignity, each individual will be the commercial owner of any data
that can be measured from that person’s state or behavior.”958
The term “commercial owner” seems to emphasize the right to alienate the
data. Lanier was originally concerned with finding ways to compensate artists,
authors, and other creative people.959 The individual would receive nanopayments
proportional both to the degree of contribution and the resultant value.960 It is not
clear whether search history or social media data would warrant nanopayments.
One effort to theorize how such a scheme would work is that of Professor Eric
Posner, and E. Glen Weyl, a principal researcher at Microsoft, who have proposed
the commodification of personal data through online auctions in “radical
markets. 961 But Chris Jay Hoofnagle and Jan Whittington have identified the
problem with Lanier’s proposal to compensate artists, authors and other creatives:
it suggests that “the only way to address the inequities of the information economy
is for the consumer to be fully engaged in the commercialization of identity.962
Lanier’s proposal is misguided because it rationalizes and justifies the
commercialization of a person’s autonomy.
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History tells us that autonomy has for centuries been a fundamental right
that cannot be commercialized. It is something that is beyond the scope of market
thinking. It is a “basic right.”963 It is an inalienable right. It is a human right.
Of course, not every bit of personal information is crucial to a person’s
autonomy—it is a question of aggregation and scale. Standards for data collection
and use have been suggested: those in the 1973 Code of Fair Information Practices,
those in the 2012 Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights, those of Paul Schwartz, Jerry
Kang’s concept of allowing the processing of personal information only in
“functionally necessary ways,”964 and those described by Zeynep Tufekci.965 They
could serve as the start of a discussion—not on Facebook or Google—but rather on
the extent to which collection and aggregation of personal data can be done without
causing the contract with the customer to be judged illegal and void. Together with
a fiduciary duty, such standards could help resolve many of the current privacy
issues.
e.
Bankruptcy
The overwhelming portion of the income of Google and Facebook currently
comes from advertising and it seems unlikely that a subscription model would
generate the same profits as behavioral advertising. Thus, a decision that declared
the contracts of the behavioral advertising model illegal would have catastrophic
consequences for both companies. They could include:
i. The bankruptcy of the two companies.
The loss of the overwhelming portion of their income, their inability to use
the users’ data to sell advertising would in all likelihood quickly lead to the
bankruptcy of the companies. This would be a case of true “disruptive
innovation.”966
ii. The conversion of the companies to a subscription business model.
The conversion of the companies to a subscription model would be a
decision by each company. If they could devise a business model that did
963
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not involve exploiting the users’ personal data, the contracts implementing
that model would presumably not be found illegal. The interest of users in
continuity of service would be preserved, but users would have to pay for
the service.
iii. The creation of a limiting principle on the collection of the users’
personal data.
The illegality of the present contracts would be based on the fact that the
companies developed a business model that collected more data than
necessary for the maintenance and improvement of their services to the user.
A limiting principle for the collection of data, such as that of the suggestion
of Jerry Kang,967 would need to be accepted.
iv. The imposition on the companies of a fiduciary duty in the handling of
the users’ personal data.
In order to protect the interests of the users, the bankruptcy court should
permanently enjoin the companies from using the data or algorithms based
on it for advertising purposes. The court or the legislature should then
establish a fiduciary duty in Google, Facebook, and other collectors of
personal data.968 Courts can establish a fiduciary relationship by applying
the principles of fiduciary relationship or applying similarities to traditional
fiduciary relationships. 969 Fiduciary duties are imposed on many
professions, such as doctors, lawyers, and accountants, and roles, such as
agents, executors, and trustees. Once the sensitivity and power of personal
data are recognized, it is clear that the collector and holder should bear a
fiduciary duty.
f.

International Consequences

A decision declaring the user contracts of Google and Facebook illegal and
the ensuing bankruptcy of both companies would have greater impact abroad than
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in the United States. This is for two reasons. First, the number of users of both
companies’ services are more numerous abroad than in the United States. Google’s
search service has over one billion users worldwide,970 but it has only 246 million
users in the United States.971 Of Facebook’s 2.41 billion users, only 220.5 million
are in the United States. 972 The impact of the companies abroad is far more
extensive than in the United States.
Second, the impact is often more extreme abroad. In the United States,
unrestrained or violent messages that have occurred on Facebook have inspired
some radical rightwing violence, but abroad the reaction has been much worse. In
countries with weak institutions, Facebook’s behavioral-advertising business
model has been much more destructive.973 This business model requires ever more
data gleaned from ever more engagement. Facebook’s algorithm-driven newsfeed
emphasizes whatever content draws the most engagement from users and that
content is often the most negative and provocative, stirring primitive emotions of
anger and fear. Facebook not only amplifies existing prejudices within a filter
bubble and boosts extremists, it also changes the way they see others and incites
them to violence. In countries like Sri Lanka, India, Libya, and Myanmar, Facebook
users have incited massacres of Moslems, the Rohingya, and other minorities.974
Mary Fitzgerald, an independent researcher on Libya, told reporters for The New
York Times in 2018 that, “[s]o many times over the past seven years . . . I heard
people say that if we could just shut down Facebook for a day, half of the country’s
problems would be solved.”975
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But Facebook does not seem willing to change, much less shut down. One
reason is that Mark Zuckerberg strongly believes in free speech even when people
do not tell the truth. Steven Levy writes that “[h]e held a Panglossian view of the
goodness of humanity, and felt that people would sort out for themselves what was
true.”976 Mark Zuckerberg told Steven Levy, “[t]he big lesson from the last few
years is we were too idealistic and optimistic about the ways that people would use
technology for good and didn’t think enough about the ways that people would
abuse it.”977
But as in the case of the micro megaphone, this ignores the architecture of
the technology and the surrounding circumstances. Professor Russell has suggested
that access to true information is a prerequisite for freedom of thought, but observed
that unfortunately democracies “seem to have placed a naïve trust in the idea that
the truth will win out in the end.”978 They—and Mark Zuckerberg—do not seem to
grasp that the “truth value of information is not the same as its economic value.”979
Another reason is the immoral business model. As noted above, Andrew
Marantz has called Facebook’s refusal to censor hate speech immoral. 980 Maria
Ressa, the chief executive of the Philippines-based new website Rappler, gave a
reason why Facebook will not act: “[i]f Facebook wanted to solve this they could,
but doing it would curb growth . . . troll armies have real engagement.”981 Zeynep
Tufekci has asked why Facebook can’t discover problems itself and take action.
Her answer: “follow the money: Silicon Valley is profitable partly because it
employs so few people in comparison to its user base of billions of people. Most of
its employees aren’t busy looking for such problems.” 982 The change to a
subscription model would eliminate the need for more engagement, more
provocative content, and more data collection. It could help mitigate the problem
of hate speech generally and particularly of violence incited on Facebook in
countries with weak institutions.
Facebook’s experience abroad reminds us of the lesson of the car
megaphone: contrary to Mark Zuckerberg’s belief, frictionless connection and
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radical transparency are not always positive. Whether the results are positive or
negative depends on the architecture of the technology and the surrounding
circumstances. In the experience of Facebook’s foreign usage, it is clear that the
lack of social and political institutions that could provide some friction to
communication through Facebook led to vicious attacks on minority groups. This
is simply a more extreme version of the negative consequences of Facebook’s use
in the United States.
PART THREE: CONCLUSION
I.

MORALITY

The behavioral-advertising model now predominates for internet service
contracts. Google and Facebook were the most successful innovators of this model
and have suffered the most criticism of it. But the critics have not analyzed the
business model from the perspective of morality or law. Specifically, there is little
discussion on whether the business model is immoral or illegal and whether the
contract between the user and the company might be defective. The absence of such
a perspective seems to be due to market imperialism (that is, the predominance of
market reasoning), particularly in law schools, during the last fifty years. Market
imperialism has crowded out moral analysis and espoused universal
commodification. The result has been a new business model that violates the user’s
inalienable right to autonomy. It is this violation that makes the contracts
implementing this business model both clearly immoral and plausibly illegal.
The central problem of the behavioral-advertising business model is
advertising. Philosophers in the 1980s believed that persuasive advertising was
immoral because it manipulated people and reduced autonomy. The advertising
they criticized was that on radio and television. These medias had no way of directly
collecting personal information on users, so manipulation was more theoretical than
actual, but the public was left with concerns about the probity of advertising. The
founders of Google (Larry Page and Sergey Brin) and of Facebook (Mark
Zuckerberg) were strongly opposed to advertising because they saw it as sleazy and
distracting. For the Google founders it also posed a moral dilemma—the potential
for advertising to compromise the integrity of the search engine. Mark Zuckerberg
seems to have been concerned about advertising only because it affected user
experience. He expressed contempt for concern about the key moral issue at the
time—users’ privacy.
The founders were able to maintain their disdain for advertising during the
early years. At that time, the ads, similar to those on radio or television, were not
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very effective commercially or bad morally. Ironically, it was only when the ads
became truly abusive in exploiting the users’ personal information to manipulate
and weaken their autonomy that the founders stopped criticizing advertising.
Two things: grandiosity and public listing, changed the founders minds.
First, the founders were exemplars of the “e-personality,” the unwitting creation of
extensive online interaction. A key characteristic of the e-personality is grandiosity,
and the founders had oversized ambitions. The Google founders’ grand scheme was
to “organize the world’s information and make it universally available and useful.”
Mark Zuckerberg’s was “to make the world more open and connected.” Larry
Page, considering the fate of Nicola Tesla, the brilliant inventor who died in
poverty, believed he needed abundant resources to avoid the same destiny. Both he
and Sergey Brin felt they had to build a huge company to realize their dreams. To
make the world more open and connected, Mark Zuckerberg needed a company of
worldwide scope.
Second, the founders realized that they needed substantial funds to expand
and gain the scale they required. They understood that the most practical way to do
this was to take their companies public on Wall Street. Google went public in 2004,
Facebook in 2012. But as public companies, they were subject to the demands of
their investors for a more profitable business model.
The solution was the behavioral-advertising business model that Google
pioneered. Under this new advertising model, advertisers bid in an auction on
search words to win the right to place their ads alongside search results. At the
beginning the ads were not directed to specific individuals, but Google learned that
it could mine the data “surplus” (more data than needed to serve users) to target
individual users. This was the birth of “surveillance capitalism.” When Sheryl
Sandberg moved from Google to Facebook in 2008, she brought the behavioraladvertising business model with her.
This business model is immoral because it uses addiction, surveillance, and
manipulation to deprive the user not only of privacy, but of autonomy. While
addiction is generally associated with substances, “behavioral addiction” has now
achieved recognition and is included in the American Psychiatric Association’s
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. Google and Facebook
website designers include social validation loops and intermittent reinforcement to
“hook” users and cause addiction. This process involves fast-paced screen
interaction that excites and arouses, causing the release of dopamine that underlies
systems for reward and addiction and inhibits the prefrontal cortex. The result is
addiction to short-term, dopamine-driven feedback loops—addiction to Google and
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Facebook. Arguments that users should exercise self-discipline fail when the user’s
environment has been engineered to make sure that choices are not free and when
the latest findings of psychology on human weaknesses are applied in the design of
the platforms of Google and Facebook. Addiction is a paradigm threat to personal
autonomy.
Obtaining the data necessary to the behavioral-advertising business model
requires watching and tracking—surveillance. Facebook has been called the
biggest surveillance-based enterprise in history. 983 It not only collects the
information of its users, it also obtains personal information on people who are not
on Facebook. Information is power and more information is more power. Facebook
and Google, which have unparalleled data bases on individuals, also have power
over these individuals.
Given that the government has access to this information, every Google and
Facebook user is potentially subject to a careful review of their data for potential
evidence of criminal offenses. It also creates an enormous temptation to use the
data for the benefit of the companies, for “dirty tricks,” and for undermining critics,
and influencing—or even blackmailing—legislators, administrators, and judges.
Any accusation of such conduct could be met with a flat refusal to make available
the relevant evidence—an algorithm—because it was a confidential business secret.
Addiction and surveillance allow manipulation. Manipulation is the treating
of another person not as a fellow rational agent, but as a device to be operated.
Manipulation violates another person’s autonomy. It is easier to successfully
manipulate people when using something that is new and poorly understood. The
overwhelming majority of internet users have no formal training in it and lack a
knowledge of how Google and Facebook are manipulating them. Once surveillance
capabilities are in place, the next step is to modify the user’s behavior to benefit
Google and Facebook.
Philosophers have not reached consensus on the precise nature of threats to
autonomy. But it is clear that we take the natural environment as given, and do not
consider it as limiting our autonomy. But, when the environment is intentionally
arranged to influence the individual in a way that is beneficial to the influencer and
detrimental to the individual, the individual is manipulated, and autonomy depleted.
As we adopt a digital form of life, our environment online is intentionally arranged
by Google and Facebook for their benefit. Our online experiences are shaped to fit
983
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the commercial interests of Google and Facebook and we pay with an erosion of
our autonomy.
Autonomy depletion is in large part determined by the economics of the
business model. The amounts Google and Facebook earn from each user is paltry,
so they need to gather as much personal data as possible from hundreds of millions
of users who are continuously engaged on the platform. The economic imperatives
of this business model lead to the exploitation of human weaknesses and immoral
behavior, such as treating users as lab rats, and using surveillance and data
collection to manipulate children. The lack of criticism about the depletion of
autonomy from religious, educational, and civil institutions may be due to the belief
that the new technology was both good and inevitable. This lack of criticism also
suggests that these institutions have so valued the instrumental advantages of the
platforms that they have ignored their moral responsibilities to their members,
students, and citizens. Silence on the moral defects of the platforms may also be
attributed to silent intimidation caused by the fear of a troll swarm, bot armies, or
DoS attacks instigated or encouraged by the platforms.
The grandiose goals of the founders do not excuse the immorality of the
business model. These goals were based on a faulty presumption: that innovation
has only positive effects. This belief shows a dangerous, adolescent understanding
of human nature. The simple example of the car micro megaphone tells us that
connecting people is not necessarily positive; it depends on the architecture of the
technology and whether if facilitates positive or negative traits of human nature.
Facebook and Google are not necessarily good; it depends on how they affect
people, and how people use the platforms. It depends on the conclusion of our
moral intuitions, not the novelty of the technology.
The collection, aggregation, and handling of personal data do not seem, so
far, to have caused high levels of concern among users, perhaps because they do
not sense the addiction, surveillance, and manipulation. Maybe users will awake to
the use of their data exhaust only when they are made aware of the collection of
other more concrete forms of exhaust, such as their DNA in their hair and the
microbiome in their stool. Morally, the collection of their personal data is more
damaging than the collection of their DNA and microbiome, although less noticed,
because it leads to diminished autonomy.
The business model of surveillance capitalism is morally reprehensible in
another respect: it poses a threat to democratic elections. The threat is twofold.
First, behavioral advertising preferences inflammatory and provocative expression
and promotes virality. Political messages that are false and misleading are shared
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most widely and most often. Second, the data and algorithms of behavioral
advertising have enabled attacks on American democracy by influencing elections,
particularly the 2016 presidential election. A 2019 Presidential Notice has stated
that foreign interference in American presidential elections constitutes “an unusual
and extraordinary threat to the national security . . . of the United States.”
Concerns about morality have followed Google and Facebook from their
very beginnings. This should not surprise us if we remember that Mark Zuckerberg
was “just not a fully formed individual, from an ethical standpoint.” Democratic
Congressman Tom Lantos of California told the tech companies during a televised
hearing in 2017, “[w]hile technologically and financially you are giants, morally
you are pygmies.”984 Internet critic Professor Zeynep Tufekci of the University of
North Carolina noted in May, 2018 that “Silicon Valley is ethically lost, rudderless
. . . .”985 It should not surprise us that Google and Facebook’s business model is
immoral. In fact, the essential characteristics of the advertising-based business
model entail moral challenges both in its early stage when privacy is the major
issue, and at a later stage when microtargeting diminishes autonomy through
techniques of behavior modification: addiction, surveillance, and manipulation.
Universal commodification is morally wrong, 986 and this includes the
commodification of our personal data through behavioral advertising. Grave threats
to human dignity, democracy, and the rule of law follow directly from the demands
of this business model for ever more personal data. The business model itself is
wrong and its inevitable effects are antithetical to a free, democratic society of
autonomous individuals.
For Larry Page, Sergey Brin, and Mark Zuckerberg the ends were
grandiose, but naïve; the means expedient, but immoral. In advertising, they first
rebuffed the bad, but then welcomed worse. And grandiosity—together with
misplaced faith in technology—helped them to forget and to ignore the moral
issues. In a moment of reflection last year, Mark Zuckerberg mused that, “[o]ne of
the most painful lessons I’ve learned is that when you connect two billion people,
you will see all the beauty and ugliness of humanity.”987 But he did not mention, as
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he might have fifteen years ago, the inevitable connection between advertising and
the ugliness. Clearly, over the last decade what has become suddenly normal—a
business model that divests users of privacy and autonomy through intentional
addiction, pervasive surveillance, and constant manipulation—is morally wrong.988
What are the implications of this immorality? First, it is clear that the
theoretical judgment that the business model and the contracts are immoral does
not by itself cause any change. For change to occur, several things must happen.
Users must be persuaded of this immorality and choose to act on it as members of
educational, religious, and civic organizations. The legal implications, of course,
will become clear only when and if a court rules that the contracts are illegal under
the contract law of California (where Google and Facebook’s headquarters are
located). But there could be serious business consequences before such a ruling. If
the value of a stock is a reflection of the estimated risk and reward, it seems likely
that the stock price of the two companies does not reflect an unacknowledged threat
to the business model of the companies. The realization that the business model is
potentially subject to a devastating attack on the legality of the contracts that
implement it should affect the price of the stock.
Another implication of this moral judgment should be a restraint on the
companies’ (and Silicon Valley’s) libertarian philosophy of “move fast and break
things,” of “who will stop me?” and of “creative disruption.” The companies may
achieve a new awareness that innovation is not always positive, that the application
of new technology in ways that are detrimental to human flourishing can bring
misfortune to those who do it. Young digital entrepreneurs, if not the founders, may
learn that if they “move fast and break things,” eventually society will “brake”—if
not “break”—them. If hubris was the true sin of the founders, perhaps they could
learn some humility.
The immorality of Google’s and Facebook’s business model, not the
ingenuity or convenience of the technology, should also be the underlying
presumption of every discussion, every examination, every congressional hearing
about the role of these tech behemoths in our society. The unease that citizens and
congressmen feel about the two companies is essentially a moral concern, but
market thinking’s dominance has made people hesitant and inartful in expressing
this concern. Senators and representatives in hearings should seize the initiative to
raise the issue of morality—something the founders are unfamiliar with and
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uncomfortable with—and put them on the defensive, asking them to justify
themselves to society.
Perhaps we can revise the famous quotation about wealth creation attributed
to Honoré de Balzac and say that, “behind every great fortune lies not an equally
great crime, but an equally great moral failure.” 989
II.

LEGALITY

Commentators and academics have raised the issue of the legality of the
activities of both Google and Facebook under privacy and antitrust law, but no one
has analyzed the legality of the business model. This essay has analyzed the
immorality of the behavioral-advertising business model of surveillance capitalism
from another legal perspective—that of contract law. Once we understand that this
business model is immoral, then we must ask what we, as a society, will do about
it. Some may say that the business model is the natural consequence of market
forces, and is therefore efficient and acceptable. But the legal system, specifically
contract law, tells us that certain contracts are so pernicious that society will not
enforce them. Among those contracts are those that deprive people of inalienable
rights.
The inalienable rights stated in the Declaration of Independence, and in
many state Constitutions, were basic to the creation of the United States. These
rights were not some anomaly or minor exception to a world of market thinking, no
generous concession granted by market analysis. Nor do they constitute an instance
of “market failure.” They were the most basic and most important aspects of the
social and political lives of citizens. Citizens could not lose them even through full,
free, and informed consent. These rights were beyond the reach of the market;
society had decided that they should not be commercialized. These inalienable
rights depend on the autonomy of each citizen. The formative philosophers of
liberal democracy, Hobbes, Locke, and Rawls, all posited that autonomous
individuals were necessary for a representative government and a theory of justice.
American history tells us that contractual relationships depriving people of
their autonomy were very common in the seventeenth and eighteen centuries. But
as society progressed, the inherent evil in these contractual relationships led courts
to declare them illegal and null and void. Slavery was the most obvious example,
but several forms of bondage were common in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries. In the nineteenth century another form of contractual bondage became
989
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common in the United States—the contract of peonage, a contract under which
advances of money, often for transportation, were repaid by labor in the home,
farm, or worksite. What made peonage intolerable to the legal system was not the
physical conditions under which the peons worked, but the loss of autonomy. In
this respect, peonage was similar to slavery. But peonage was a greater threat to
democracy than slavery because the peons were citizens who could vote and,
because of their loss of autonomy, their masters could exert undue influence over
their votes. For these reasons, peonage was outlawed by statute and courts found
contracts of peonage null and void in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries.
The internet service contracts of Google and Facebook, through addiction,
surveillance, and manipulation, also deprive the users of their autonomy. From a
historical perspective, the users of these platforms are essentially “digital peons,”
and, like peons, they have voting rights. Clearly, these companies are not leading
society into a bright future of individual choice and freedom. They are taking us
backwards to a society in which large numbers of citizens are subject to contracts
of bondage. In the twenty-first century, we may see a society in which, as in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, a majority of citizens live under contracts of
bondage. The behavioral-advertising business model is not progress, but regress;
not moral advance, but moral retreat. If we define progress as human flourishing,990
then surely surveillance capitalism is a step back. The illusion of progress is a cruel
joke.
Both Google and Facebook are based in California and the standard Terms
of Service in their internet service contracts specify that any suits against them must
be brought in a court in California. The law of California governs the service
contracts. The contract law of California provides three bases for a court to declare
a contract illegal and therefore null and void. These are: (1) violation of good
morals; (2) unconscionability; and (3) conflict with public policy. 991 The legal
meanings of “good morals” and “unconscionability” are different from those of
common usage, but still carry moral opprobrium.
No California cases seem to have addressed the internet service contracts,
but many are helpful in hypothesizing how an internet service contract case could
be resolved. California law on illegal contracts has evolved over the last few
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decades and could evolve further. First, as to good morals, California cases on
gambling and marriage indicate that courts will hold a contract illegal if it involves
addiction (in the case of gambling) or unduly restricts the rights of women (in the
case of marriage). If a California court were to accept addiction as an integral part
of the behavioral-advertising business model and the internet service contract
supporting it, then the court could well find the contract against good morals.
Second, California law holds a contract unconscionable if it is both
procedurally and substantively unconscionable. The Google and Facebook Terms
of Service are procedurally unconscionable because they are contracts of adhesion,
and exhibit both oppression and surprise. Whether they also exhibit substantive
unconscionability depends on whether these contracts or their terms: “shock the
conscience,” are “overly harsh,” or “one-sided.” It seems clear that the behavioraladvertising internet services contract should by its very nature “shock the
conscience,” but it is unclear whether such an unprecedented argument would fit
within the narrow doctrinal confines of “substantive unconscionability” as created
by California courts. A reasonable argument could be made, however, that the
California courts could currently find that the Google and Facebook Terms of
Service are substantively unconscionable.
Third, California courts have recognized that the scope of “public policy”
is very broad and vague. At times, the courts have been reluctant to find that a
particular contract is against public policy, but they have often followed the axiom
that “whatever is injurious to the interests of the public is void, on the grounds of
public policy.” Given the unpredictability of determining what constitutes “public
policy,” it seems that the application of “public policy” to deny enforceability of
the Google and Facebook contracts is plausible.
In addition to the California statutory and case law on contracts, there are a
number of other background factors that would influence a court in deciding
whether to rule that the Google and Facebook contracts are illegal. There is a
growing perception that these companies are violating the public trust, but have
such overwhelming influence in the executive and legislative branches of the
federal government that probably only the judicial branch is able to nullify their
business model. This perception together with the historical judicial activist role of
California courts in the development of the law could persuade a California judge
that it would be appropriate for a court to act in view of the paralysis by the other
branches of government. Changes in mores and business could also influence a
court to take action by ruling the contracts illegal.
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The public perception of the companies has become less favorable in the
last few years, and as users learn more about the use of their personal data, the
chances of a major public relations disaster increase. Once a movement gathers
momentum—becomes plausible and reaches a tipping point—it becomes
inevitable. Judges are sensitive to such changes in public opinion.
Another change that could affect a judge’s decision is a variation in the
business model of the two companies. The current business model, which is
dependent on continuous growth, may not be sustainable; the companies could be
turned into public utilities; or their business model might be destroyed by ad
blocking software. Any one of these changes could render moot a decision on
contract illegality.
Other factors could influence a judge to rule against the companies. These
include the loss of personhood, which would become data and cease to be an end
in itself. Personhood would become merely a device to use used; a tool to be
exploited. Other possibly influential factors are threats to democratic society and
theory. The big data analytics enabled by the huge data troves of the behavioraladvertising business model undermine the civic experience that is essential to a
democratic society. Further, the behavioral-advertising business model, by
depleting autonomy, negates the intellectual foundations and rationale of
democracy. The fact that the companies’ internet business model is essentially an
uncontrolled experiment on human beings suggests an application of the
precautionary principle—limiting the manipulation of people. Finally, the two
companies’ long record of arrogant behavior and unrepentant violations of public
commitments992 would make a decision contrary to their interests seem like cosmic
justice. These factors would not directly cause a judge to issue an otherwise
unsupportable decision, but, they make it more likely that a judge would rule
against the companies where the case against them, although unprecedented, was
reasonable.
What are the implications of contract illegality? Cosmic justice comes with
severe consequences for the companies and challenges for society. First, if the
contracts are illegal, they are null and void and without legal effect. The contracts’
consent provisions granting the companies the right to collect and use the data
would be null and void. The companies would have no legal right to collect and
monetize the users’ personal data.
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Second, the collection and monetization of the persona data could be a
statutory violation or a tort. The legal system would need to clarify the nature of
the statutory violation or tort.
Third, without a legal right to the data and the possibility of statutory
violations or tort prosecutions, the companies would have to change their business
model. The most likely alternative would be a subscription model that would not
involve the exploitation of addiction, surveillance, manipulation, and loss of
autonomy.
Fourth, the illegality of the current contracts would raise the question of the
ownership of the personal data collected by the companies. Scholars have suggested
a number of alternative arrangements for the rights to the data. As society discusses
these alternatives, it will be important to understand that the user’s rights in data
must be seen has a human right that is inalienable. Restrictions on alienation must
be maintained to avoid manipulation and loss of autonomy.
Fifth, the two companies would suffer the loss of their principal sources of
revenue, payment for advertisements, and would probably go bankrupt. Some
would see this as a case of true “disruptive innovation.”
Sixth, a limiting principle on the collection of the users’ personal data would
be necessary. One suggestion is that of the collection of personal data for use only
in “functionally necessary ways.” Society would have to debate and work out this
limiting principle.
Seventh, fiduciary duties similar to those imposed on doctors, lawyers and
accountants in the handling of the users’ personal data would need to be placed on
the companies. Again, this is a challenge that society would have to address.
This essay is not intended to suggest that the two companies’ contracts will
be found illegal tomorrow. Public mores and the law have not developed to that
extent. But, it is the intent of this essay to suggest that in the future such a decision
is plausible and, as time proceeds, perhaps more and more likely.
In addition to these challenges arising from the illegality of the contracts,
this essay on the morality and legality of the behavioral-advertising business model
suggests some other, larger challenges for society:
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1. Can we reap the advantages of the market while
keeping its activities confined to the goods proper to
it?993
2. “Should human beings in the twenty-first century
accept a world in which their lives are unceasingly
appropriated through data for capitalism”?994
3. “When presented with a new technology, can we
ask whether it serves human purposes?”995 Can we
ask whether it brings out the best or the worst in
human beings?
4. “Can we design systems that utilize our data
collectively for the benefit of society as a whole, but
at the same time protect people individually?”996
5. In the future when we will confront the extreme
dangers of much-improved artificial intelligence
combined with other new technology and a deeper
understanding of human weaknesses, does our
experience with the behavioral-advertising business
model suggest that we can sufficiently reshape our
ideals and preferences towards autonomy, agency,
and ability and away from self-indulgence and
dependency so as to maintain our commitment to the
autonomy of the individual human?997
This essay ends not with a question, but a suggestion. Russell Baker, the
straight-talking founder of Baker & McKenzie, the largest and most international
law firm in the world, once visited Harvard Law School to give an informal
luncheon talk to the East Asian Legal Studies program at the invitation of Professor
Jerome Cohen. The topic of his talk was the law firm’s Tokyo office, which
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consisted primarily of Japanese lawyers with one or two Americans. After he had
finished, one student asked him what he thought of those American lawyers who,
because of a special privilege under the American Occupation of Japan, had been
granted the right to practice Japanese law even though they did not read or speak
Japanese. Mr. Baker responded: “[w]ell, I have a suggestion for those lawyers. Take
a pickaxe and shovel and go earn an honest living!” To right another wrong, we can
tell Larry Page, Sergei Brin, and Mark Zuckerberg: “Your aversion to advertising
was right. Your embrace of it was wrong. Take a subscription model and go earn
an honest living!”998
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